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Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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ARMED FORCES

Tsalko on Social Assistance to Servicemen

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in Russian 19 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Tsalko, official secretary of the interdepartmental commission for the social problems of servicemen and members of their families: "Army's Maintenance Is a Serious Burden but It Has Never Weighed on Russia"]

[Text] A little over a year ago Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin signed directive no. 203 RP approving the program of priority state measures to step up social protection for servicemen, people released from military service, and members of their families under the conditions of the economic and military reforms. What has been done in the period since then? What are the prospects for resolving the urgent problems which perturb the people in uniform?

A distinguishing feature of Russian statehood and public morality has always been the special concern for those to whom the people's security has been entrusted, those who have not spared their lives and health in military service. Here the army's maintenance has always been a heavy burden for Russia. Back in the last century the historian V. Klyuchevskiy noted that the "borderline" position of the Slav lands had long compelled our ancestors, to the detriment of their prosperity, to spend a disproportionately large part of their national energy on two public matters: external defense and the development of an intractable nature.

Nonetheless, however hard the life of the Russian peoples, their soldiers have always been cared for and equipped. That is our national tradition. And those who today, under the flag of overcoming the ideological dogmas of recent decades, are calling on society to renounce that tradition are in my view wittingly or not acting to the harm of the Fatherland.

Yet mass troop reductions after the war and in the late fifties and early sixties carried out without elementary social guarantees have already shown society that after 15-20 years of service a military man can be thrown onto the street at any moment without housing, without a profession, and with minimal funds for keeping his family. That should not happen again.

The creation of a new legislative and normative base for legal protection and social backup for servicemen has become the main task in elaborating the program of priority state measures in this sphere, approved by the president's edict. Russia does not now have sufficient economic potential but it is entirely within its strength to ensure the legal and social status of servicemen with regard to the basic constitutional principles and the economic situation predicted for the end of the transitional period through which it is living.

The main content of the program is a list of the president's edicts and directives, government decrees, and other normative documents (over 50 in all) which must be elaborated in 1993-1995 to implement these goals. The main drafters and executors are the relevant administrations of the

Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry, Internal Affairs Ministry, Border Troops High Command, Ministry of the Economy, Ministry of Finances, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Social Protection, and Federal employment service. Coordination has been assigned to the interdepartmental commission for social questions of servicemen and members of their families.

Our Note

The interdepartmental commission for the social questions of servicemen and members of their families was formed in late 1992 in accordance with the Russian president's edict on the reorganization of the organs of federal executive power. The Russian Federation Government defined among the commission's main tasks the coordination of the elaboration of state measures for appropriate social, material, and pension provision for servicemen, privates and leaders of the internal affairs organs, war and armed forces veterans, people released from military service, and members of their families. Subsequently the commission was assigned the coordination of work to perpetuate the memory of those who died defending the Fatherland.

The commission includes the leaders of over 30 ministries and departments and a number of regions of the Russian Federation. The commission is led by Yuriy Fedorovich Yarov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government.

Right now, with the interdepartmental commission's active participation, on 38 of the 55 points of the program particular state measures have been implemented making it possible to promote the solution of existing social problems. Seven laws and three decrees of the former Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, six presidential edicts, and 22 decrees of the Russian Government and a number of documents of Russian Federation ministries and departments have been adopted. They include legislative acts regulating the status of servicemen, their pension provision, social support for the parents of servicemen, additional guarantees and compensations for servicemen serving (performing missions) in trouble spots, and also specific issues of social protection in Internal Affairs Ministry organs, the border troops, and institutions which carry out punishment in criminal cases in the form of imprisonment. State programs have been elaborated and approved for the provision of housing in 1993-1995 for servicemen released from military service, internal affairs organs staffers, and members of their families and for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of other states and their accommodation and provision with amenities. The allocation of funds for the construction of housing for servicemen is under the commission's strict control, and it was to a considerable degree thanks to this that the plan for its commissioning of housing last year was fulfilled 75 percent. Unfortunately, that cannot be said of the provision of housing for officers released from various departments without housing. There are now 190,000 such families.

Edicts of the Russian Federation president have determined the priority tasks for the development of the contract system of enlistment to the armed forces and for the social protection of citizens exposed to radiation as a result of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk range. In the very near future measures will be determined through legislation for the

social protection of all citizens who have suffered from radiation and other harmful effects. Additional pensions have been introduced for the parents of servicemen who have died during military service after being drafted and the question is being worked on of the extension of this benefit to the parents of servicemen who have died while serving under contract. A wide range of benefits has been defined for the veterans of special-risk subunits.

The structure of the defense budget has been changed radically. Not one fifth, as was the case before, but two thirds are now spent on the maintenance of the personnel, that is on what are essentially social issues.

Right now nine draft documents envisaged by the program have been submitted for examination by the Russian Federation president and the government. These are draft laws on military courts, criminal responsibility for military crimes, the civil alternative to service, veterans, a draft statute on the procedure for military service by Russian citizens, and others. A further 17 documents to be prepared and adopted this year are at the stage of coordination with interested ministries and departments.

At the same time the preparation and submission to the government of the drafts of the relevant normative acts is being delayed on a whole series of issues envisaged by the program. That applies primarily to the implementation of benefits envisaged by the law "on the status of servicemen." To implement these benefits it is essential to seek out additional financial assets, which is very complex. Nonetheless the majority of new norms are already being implemented. Recently the government approved a draft law on the introduction of changes to a whole series of legislative acts in connection with the adoption of the law "on the status of servicemen." Now it is up to the State Duma. The difficult coordination of the drafts of the presidential edicts and government decrees on the procedure for implementing benefits for apartment rents, payment for municipal services and apartment telephones, on the insurance of property in trouble spots, the payment of compensations for treatment and organized leisure on vacation, and also for mutual settlements in connection with the rendering of medical aid to servicemen and members of their families in civilian health institutions and the perpetuation of the memory of those who died defending the Fatherland is being completed or has been completed. The situation remains uncertain with regard to the implementation of tax benefits, the provision of grants for soldiers and sergeants who have been released, and the rendering of financial aid in individual and cooperative construction.

Delays are being allowed in the payment of wages to servicemen. That is an utterly intolerable situation, and the interdepartmental commission has taken steps on several occasions to rectify it in particular departments and has tried to achieve the pursuit of a single social policy in these departments. Money compensation for the rental (subleasing) of temporary accommodation is seldom indexed.

The commission recently examined international aspects of the social protection of servicemen serving in countries of the former USSR. After examination the commission began preparation of a government decree on additional measures to ensure conditions for a full general education for the

children of servicemen serving in emergency situation regions, abroad, in remote garrisons, and at border posts. Work is being completed on the preparation of government decisions aimed at enhancing the safety of servicemen in military service.

As a result of the implementation of the above-mentioned measures to carry out the program, a normative base will be basically created ensuring that social problems are made less acute for those categories of servicemen who are in a more or less prosperous position. At the second stage, starting in the second half of 1994, there will be an increase in the promptness of the development and adoption of additional measures to step up targeted social support for servicemen, people released from military service, and members of their families in the worst plight: those serving in trouble spots and in remote garrisons and increased-risk subunits, those stationed in unprepared garrisons, those released without housing or a civilian profession, and others.

In informing readers of the work that has been done we are counting on their understanding of the complex situation in which a new legal norm base is being created for the social protection of servicemen and people released from military service and we are also counting on their participation in overcoming the obstacles which are preventing this work from being done more rapidly. We are helped on this plane by letters from citizens on violations of their rights, appeals to Federal Assembly deputies and legal organs, and most importantly their businesslike activity in resolving practical questions of social importance.

POLICY

Concept of Military-Legal Reform in RF Armed Forces

94UM0548A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Aug 94 pp 4-5

[Russian Federation Ministry of Defense draft under rubric "Documents"]

[Text] In accordance with requirements specified in the "Military Security" section of the Russian Federation President's Message to the Federal Assembly, a Russian Federation Ministry of Defense working group drew up the draft Concept of Military-Legal Reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, published here, with the participation of the Russian Federation Supreme Court Military Cases Collegium, Russian Federation General Procuracy Main Administration for Oversight Over Execution of Laws in the Armed Forces, and Russian Federation Ministry of Justice Military Courts Administration.

The draft contains a general description of basic problems of legal work in the Armed Forces, formulates goals, principles and basic directions of military-legal reform in the Armed Forces, specifies measures for improving support to legal work, provides proposals for improving the system of military courts and military procuracy bodies, and proposes a procedure for conducting military-legal reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

The draft Concept has been sent for an opinion to State Duma committees and to Federation Councils of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly handling questions of defense,

security, legislation and legal reform, to the Russian Federation Security Council, to the State-Legal Administration of the Russian Federation President, to the Human Rights Commission under the Russian Federation President, and to scientific and legal institutions of Russia.

We invite KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers and all interested citizens to take part in an active discussion of the draft Concept of Military-Legal Reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

We ask that comments and suggestions on the draft be sent within a month after publication to the following address: 103160, Moscow, K-160, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Military Organizational Development and Reforms Directorate, with the notation "Military-legal reform."

Introduction

It is necessary to carry out military-legal reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces in order to organize Armed Forces organizational development and activity in accordance with the principles of a democratic, rule-of-law state incorporated in the Russian Federation Constitution and to realize the Basic Provisions of Military Doctrine and basic directions of Russian Federation domestic and foreign policy set forth in the Russian Federation President's Message to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly "On Strengthening Russian Statehood."

The basic content of military-legal reform must be a set of measures for completing the establishment of legal foundations of Armed Forces organizational development and activity, achieving a qualitatively new level of law-execution [pravospolnitelnyy] activity of military command and control entities and military officials, ensuring protection of rights and freedoms of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel and rights and interests of military command and control bodies, military units and military officials, and strengthening legality and law and order in the Armed Forces.

This draft Concept of Military-Legal Reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces contains a set of views on goals, principles, basic directions and stages of military-legal reform.

The draft Concept of Military-Legal Reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces was drawn up by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense together with the Russian Federation Supreme Court Military Cases Collegium, [Russian Federation General Procuracy Main Administration] for Oversight Over Execution of Laws in the Armed Forces, and by the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice Military Courts Administration.

It is proposed to examine the draft Concept of Military-Legal Reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Collegium, in the Russian Federation Government, and in Russian Federation Federal Assembly committees handling questions of defense, security, legislation and legal reform, and to submit it to the Russian Federation President for approval.

1. Basic Problems of Legal Work, and Goals and Principles of Military-Legal Reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces

1.1. Basic directions of legal work in the Armed Forces

For purposes of legal regulation of Armed Forces organizational development and activity, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense shall organize **legal work** in the Armed Forces, which includes the activity of military command and control bodies and military officials aimed at preparing, adopting and executing federal laws and other normative-legal acts in the military sphere, ensuring legality and law and order in the Armed Forces, making effective use of legal means and legal procedures for these purposes, and organizing interworking with military courts, military procuracy bodies and other law-preservation [pravookhranitelnyy] bodies.

Basic directions of legal work in the Armed Forces include lawmaking [pravotvorcheskiy], law-execution, law-protection [pravozashchitnyy] as well as law-preservation activity.

Lawmaking activity envisages participation in preparation of draft laws, edicts and directives of the Russian Federation President and of decrees and directives of the Russian Federation Government, and also in preparation and adoption of legal acts of officials of military command and control bodies.

Law-execution and law-protection activity is aimed at ensuring precise, steadfast execution of prescriptions of law and use of legal means and legal procedures in the activity of military command and control bodies and military officials, assurance of representation and legal protection of interests of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel, military command and control bodies, military units and military officials.

Law-preservation activity envisages the exercise of military-administrative and criminal jurisdiction by military officials, military command and control bodies and military units, including maintaining military discipline, conducting a preliminary investigation [doznaniye], and applying disciplinary measures for servicemen's infractions.

In addition, measures are carried out for **support to legal work** in the Armed Forces (cadre, military-scientific, information, humanitarian, criminologic, statistical, logistic and financial, normative-legal and organizational support).

Experience shows that the present status of legal work and of its support in the Armed Forces does not conform to requirements of the Russian Federation Constitution and Basic Provisions of Military Doctrine and legislation in the defense area and demands resolution of a number of problems.

1.2. Basic problems of legal work and of its support in the Armed Forces

1.2.1. Lawmaking activity

The following are basic problems in the area of **lawmaking activity** at the present time:

- insufficient centralization, coordination and control of participation in law-drafting and other standard-making work which impede development of a unified Ministry of Defense position on resolving fundamental legal questions;

- insufficient number and low level of legal training of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel who participate in drawing up draft legal acts;
- the sharp increase in volume of lawmaking tasks in connection with adoption of the Russian Federation Constitution and with the requirement to revise the majority of legislative and other normative acts in the defense area;
- need for strengthening interworking of military command and control bodies with other state authorities in drawing up draft normative acts.

1.2.2. Law-execution and law-protection activity

The basic problems in the area of **law-execution and law-protection activity** at the present time are the following:

- insufficient level of legal support to day-to-day activity of commanders (officers in charge) and other military officials in the principal military units (brigade, regiment) and also in certain military command and control bodies and in military institutions, which is because legal subunits in those military units are understrength in specialists with a higher military-legal education, and in a number of cases because of the absence of such subunits or specialists;
- low level of legal information of military command and control bodies and of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel;
- insufficient legal protection of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel, and also insufficient protection of rights and lawful interests of military command and control bodies, military units and Armed Forces enterprises, institutions and organizations;
- insufficiently qualified representation of interests of military command and control bodies, military units, Armed Forces enterprises, institutions and organizations, and military officials in military courts, courts of general jurisdiction, and in other law-preservation bodies.

1.2.3. Law-preservation activity

The basic problems in the area of **law-preservation activity** presently are the following:

- low effectiveness of the non T/O&E institution of preliminary investigation in the Armed Forces;
- absence of a legal mechanism for realization of requirements of Part 2, Article 22 of the Russian Federation Constitution in Armed Forces disciplinary practice;
- insufficient depth of research into causes and conditions of criminogenic phenomena in the Armed Forces;
- imperfection of structure and functions of law-preservation bodies operating in the Armed Forces;
- imperfection of organization of the activity of disciplinary battalions.

1.2.4. Support to legal work

Basic problems in the area of **support to legal work** in the Armed Forces at the present time are caused by the following:

In the sphere of cadre support:

- a significant shortage of officers and Armed Forces civilian personnel in military-legal positions;
- insufficient level of legal training of military educational institution graduates.

In the sphere of military-scientific support:

- absence of military-legal subject matter in scientific research subject plans of academic and sectoral legal scientific institutions of the Russian Federation;
- absence of Ministry of Defense scientific research organizations engaged in studying problems of military law and criminogenic processes;
- shortcomings in the existing system of financing military-scientific research which do not permit ordering scientific research work in military-legal questions with the involvement of academic or sectoral scientific organizations;
- insufficient depth of development of the law of war as the sum total of norms of employment of Armed Forces and of the activity of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel in wartime and under conditions of combat operations.

In the sphere of information support:

- insufficient promptness and completeness of information support to legal work;
- low level of automation;
- absence of scientifically substantiated approaches to establishing a system for providing legal information support [informatizatsiya] to the Armed Forces and military justice bodies that stem from the Concept of Legal Information Support of Russia;
- limited number of legislative acts communicated in a centralized manner to military command and control bodies and military units;
- absence of a periodical publication (specialized information bulletin or journal) on questions of legal work in the Armed Forces.

In the sphere of humanitarian support:

- low level of legal culture of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel;
- lack of development of the system for preventing infractions;
- absence of stable legal traditions in Armed Forces activity.

In the sphere of criminologic support:

- absence of purposeful scientific-criminologic expert examination of draft normative-legal acts;
- the preserved practice of evaluating the activity of military officials according to the number of infractions committed by subordinates without analyzing their causes;
- absence of a legal base for protecting victims and witnesses among servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel in criminal cases;
- imperfection of legal training curricula in higher

military educational institutions with respect to criminology.

In the sphere of statistical support:

- absence of a state system of accounting of statistical data in the Armed Forces and military justice bodies that is unified with military justice bodies, and of a system of automated accounting and processing of statistical information.

In the sphere of financial and logistic support:

- absence of purpose-oriented financing and logistic support to scientific research in the military-legal sphere;
- financing and logistic support to military courts and military procuracy bodies at the expense of funds allocated for upkeep of the Armed Forces, which contradicts Russian Federation Constitution requirements on independence of bodies of judicial authority and bodies of the procuracy.

In the sphere of organizational support:

- lack of conformity of the makeup, structure and functions of the existing Ministry of Defense legal service to its assigned missions.

The above problems of legal work and its support determine the content of goals and principles of military-legal reform in the Armed Forces.

1.3. Goals and principles of military-legal reform in the Armed Forces

The following are basic goals of military-legal reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces:

- establishment of legal foundations of Armed Forces organizational development and activity and attainment of a qualitatively new level of lawmaking activity in the Armed Forces;
- attainment of a qualitatively new level of law-execution activity of military command and control bodies and military officials, legal protection of servicemen, persons discharged from military service, their families, Armed Forces civilian personnel, and also military command and control bodies, military units and Armed Forces enterprises, institutions and organizations;
- strengthening of law-preservation activity and the system of support to legality and law and order in the Armed Forces;
- creation of an integrated system of support to legal work in the Armed Forces and formation of foundations of legal culture and legal traditions in Armed Forces activity.

The following principles must be made the basis of military-legal reform:

- assurance of conformity of the organization of legal work in the Armed Forces to basic directions for strengthening Russian statehood and doctrinal principles of Russian Federation Armed Forces organizational development;
- centralization of leadership of legal work in the Armed Forces and its conformity to the principle of

one-man command on a legal basis;

- conformity of structures of military justice bodies in the Armed Forces to the Armed Forces organizational structure and assigned missions, to legislation and to economic capabilities;
- assurance of the necessary level of legal training of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel;
- guaranteed observance of constitutional rights and freedoms of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel with consideration of features of military service;
- observance of generally recognized principles and rules of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation;
- coordination of the procedure for conduct of military-legal reform with conduct of legal reform in the Russian Federation and conduct of military reform, and with stages of Armed Forces organizational development;
- consideration of domestic and world experience of legal support to military organizational development and Armed Forces organizational development and activity.

Basic directions of military-legal reform have been determined based on the goals and principles indicated.

2. Basic Directions of Military-Legal Reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces

2.1. Improvement of legal work in the Armed Forces

2.1.1. Improvement of lawmaking activity

Development of a legal base of Armed Forces organizational development and activity

The main purpose for developing and completing the establishment of a legal base of Armed Forces organizational development and activity in the course of military-legal reform is to bring it into line with the Russian Federation Constitution and with basic provisions of Russian Federation military doctrine, with federal constitutional laws and federal laws in the area of defense, and with principles and rules of international law, and to create a complete, noncontradictory system of military legislation.

The following principles must be made the basis for developing a system of military legislation:

- a systems nature (adoption of packages of legislative acts, exclusion of duplication of legal rules and exclusion of legal gaps);
- legal economy (reduction in the number of normative-legal acts, their codification);
- simultaneous creation of mechanisms for realization of federal laws and other normative-legal acts in the defense area;
- stronger detailing of prescriptions of military legislation.

Development of normative-legal acts and of international treaties and agreements on the following questions should be regarded as immediate tasks in improving the system of military legislation and international-legal acts:

- using the Armed Forces to protect Russian Federation sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- involvement of the Armed Forces for stopping armed conflicts on the state border of the Russian Federation, on the border of another state in accordance with treaty obligations, or within limits of Russian Federation territory that threaten its vital interests;
- participation of military contingents and of servicemen in peacekeeping operations;
- excluding the possibility of using the Armed Forces in the interests of individual groups of people, parties and public associations and not permitting political activity in the Armed Forces;
- maintaining the qualitative status and combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces at a level guaranteeing reliable defense of Russia's vital interests;
- organizing military organizational development and Russian Federation Armed Forces organizational development;
- developing a system of mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements in the military area;
- determining the status of Russian troops, servicemen and their families and of military bases and facilities on the territory of other states;
- ensuring the requisite strength level of the Armed Forces;
- ensuring legal and social protection of servicemen, persons discharged from military service, their families, and Armed Forces civilian personnel;
- carrying out measures for increasing the prestige of military service and for upgrading systems of military-patriotic education and of preparation for military service;
- upgrading the system for training and educating Armed Forces servicemen and for shaping citizens' moral and mental readiness to defend the Homeland.

As a result of military-legal reform, military law must be established as an independent branch of Russian law which includes a system of military legislation and other normative-legal acts in questions of Armed Forces organizational development and activity and which ensures realization in the Armed Forces of the principle of one-man command on a legal basis and of servicemen's constitutional rights with consideration of the specific nature of military service.

Improving the organization of Ministry of Defense participation in law-drafting work and in preparing drafts of international treaties and agreements in the military sphere

To strengthen centralization, coordination and control of the participation of Ministry of Defense directorates and services in law-drafting and other standard-making activity, assign comprehensive accomplishment of the following tasks to the Ministry of Defense Military-Legal Directorate:

- generalization of the practice of realization of legislation on defense questions and also of proposals of Ministry of Defense directorates and services to improve existing legislation, and preparation of proposals for updating the list and content of normative acts;

- organization of participation of Ministry of Defense directorates and services in drawing up drafts of legislative and other normative acts on defense matters and in preparing opinions on them;
- coordination of the participation of Ministry of Defense directorates and services in preparing drafts of international treaties and agreements on military matters and also treaties on questions of delineating subjects of competence and powers among state authorities of the Russian Federation and state authorities of components of the Russian Federation, generalization of the practice of their execution, and preparation of Ministry of Defense proposals for their improvement;
- participation in fulfilling the Program for Interworking of Federal State Authorities of the Russian Federation in the Area of Legal-Information Cooperation With State Authorities of CIS Members.

Improving the organization of preparation of normative-legal acts of military command and control bodies

To bring the organization of preparation of normative-legal acts of military command and control bodies into line with the Constitution and legislation of the Russian Federation it is necessary to ensure the following:

- timely state registration in the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice of normative-legal acts of the Ministry of Defense affecting rights, freedoms and lawful interests of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel, and also of acts of an interdepartmental nature;
- official publication for general information of normative-legal acts of military command and control bodies affecting constitutional rights, freedoms and duties of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel;
- mandatory check of draft normative-legal acts of military command and control bodies for conformity with acts of Russian Federation legislation and with normative acts of higher military command and control bodies;
- functions of organizing and implementing legal expert examination of draft normative-legal acts of the Ministry of Defense and the methods direction of this work in lower military command and control bodies are to be assigned to the Ministry of Defense Military-Legal Directorate.

In accordance with Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 1798 of 1 November 1993, considering that the Human Rights Commission under the Russian Federation President has the right to demand from state bodies official explanations of the normative acts they have published, preparation of explanations of this kind is to be assigned to that Directorate.

2.1.2. Improvement of law-execution and law-protection activity in the Armed Forces

Improvement of law-execution activity

To achieve a qualitatively new level of law-execution activity of military command and control bodies and military officials, the following is necessary:

- fully staff legal subunits of military command and control bodies and of military institutions with specialists with a higher legal education;
- establish legal subunits in all military command and control bodies, military units (from regiment and equivalent on up) and military institutions;
- obligate military officials to coordinate legal acts they draw up with the military legal service;
- ensure qualified representation of interests of military command and control bodies, military units and military officials in military courts, courts of general jurisdiction and arbitration courts, and in other law-preservation bodies by specialists of military legal and other services.

Strengthening of legal protection of servicemen, persons discharged from military service, their families, and Armed Forces civilian personnel

To realize the constitutional right to receive qualified legal assistance with respect to servicemen, persons discharged from military service, their families, and Armed Forces civilian personnel, establish military legal consultations as part of the military legal service.

Assign military legal consultations the tasks of giving these categories of citizens qualified, free legal assistance.

Preserve for servicemen the right to turn for legal assistance to subunits of the military legal service of military command and control bodies, military units, enterprises, institutions and organizations of the Armed Forces in matters relating to their competence, and also the right to make use of services of general boards of lawyers and other legal organizations.

Define the legal status of military legal consultations in the Statute on Military Legal Consultations in the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

2.1.3. Improving law-preservation activity in the Armed Forces

Establishment of military police in the Armed Forces

To strengthen the fight against crime and strengthen law and order in the Armed Forces, establish military police.

Extend the authority of military police to Armed Forces servicemen, citizens called up for military training courses, and also Armed Forces civilian personnel in connection with their performance of official duties or who are on the grounds of military command and control bodies, military units, enterprises, institutions or organizations of the Armed Forces.

The military police must perform the following basic missions:

- prevent, stop and solve crimes and other infractions;
- ensure personal safety of servicemen, citizens called up for military training courses, and Armed Forces civilian personnel;
- conduct a preliminary investigation under the procedure envisaged by procedural criminal legislation;
- accomplish the search for and detention of servicemen who have gone AWOL, who are hiding from bodies of preliminary investigation [doznaniye], of

investigation [sledstviye] and of the court, and who are evading criminal punishment;

- perform a search for stolen (lost) weapons, ammunition and property of the Armed Forces;
- ensure law and order among servicemen on posts;
- escort servicemen kept under guard in the guardhouse to military procuracies and to court sessions of military courts and escort them back to the disciplinary unit or the isolation section;
- perform functions of a military motor vehicle inspectorate.

Legal bases of military police activity and its missions must be defined by a federal law on military police.

Military police are to be subordinate to the Russian Federation minister of defense, who must exercise overall leadership over military police units through the appropriate General Staff command and control body. Leadership of military police units in military districts and fleets is to be assigned to commanders of military districts and fleets and exercised through corresponding staffs. Exclude the possibility of subordination of military police units to commanders of military units and formations.

Establishment of disciplinary courts in the Armed Forces

To establish a legal mechanism for realization of Part 2, Article 22 of the Russian Federation Constitution and strengthen legality and law and order, establish a system of non-T/O&E disciplinary courts in the Armed Forces as part of the administrative justice system being created in place of existing comrades' courts of honor.

Include in the competence of disciplinary courts examination of the following materials:

- on gross disciplinary offenses;
- on certain administrative infractions;
- on acts containing elements of crime, and also on dismissed criminal cases which competent bodies have decided to transfer to a disciplinary court for consideration;
- on servicemen's partial or total deprivation of monetary remuneration;
- on servicemen's material liability for damage caused to the state;
- on protection of honor and dignity;
- on disputes between servicemen of a civil law nature (with their consent).

Preserve for servicemen the right of direct recourse to a military court or court of general jurisdiction.

Legal foundations of the activity of disciplinary courts must be defined by a federal law on disciplinary courts in the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Each Armed Forces serviceman must have the right to recourse to a disciplinary court in cases specified by federal law.

Assign subunits of the military legal service to provide legal assistance in the activity of disciplinary courts.

Higher commanders (officers in charge) are to exercise control over the activity of disciplinary courts, and military procuracy bodies are to exercise oversight.

Improving the system of disciplinary units in the Armed Forces

Preserve and improve the system of disciplinary units as an effective means of correcting and reeducating servicemen.

Punishment in the form of confinement in a disciplinary unit must be applied to conscripted servicemen for commission of military crimes and also for commission of general crimes. When, in considering the circumstances of the case and personality of the defendant, a military court finds it advisable, instead of imprisonment for a period of not over two years, to apply confinement in the disciplinary unit for the very same period.

In connection with the reduction in periods of conscripted military service, establish a duration of punishment of from three months to two years in the form of confinement in a disciplinary unit.

Exclude sending servicemen to a disciplinary unit who have committed a premeditated crime a second time.

Provide for servicemen who have committed crimes not categorized as grave to be confined in post and unit guard-houses in the preliminary investigation period.

Legal foundations of the organization and activity of disciplinary units must be specified by a federal law on disciplinary units in the Armed Forces.

2.2. Improving support to legal work in the Armed Forces

Improving cadre support

In connection with the need to increase the number of military lawyers:

- increase the number of cadets and students at military law faculties of the Military Academy of Economics, Finance and Law;
- expand the training of officials of military command and control bodies in the network of legal training courses without separation from duty;
- expand the network of legal training courses under military educational institutions;
- ensure manning of military law positions in the Armed Forces with reserve officers and civilian specialists having a legal education;
- reprofile military training of citizens under reserve officer training programs at law faculties of Russian Federation state universities to military occupational specialties of a military law profile;
- organize the training of cadres for military police units at facilities of Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs educational institutions.

Improving military-scientific support

To improve the effectiveness of military-scientific support, carry out the following organizational measures:

- establish a Center for Military-Legal Studies;
- expand the training of scientific cadres in the area of military law and refine the network of specialized

- councils and the classification of scientific specialties;
- establish a system of financial and logistic support to scientific research in the area of military law.

Improving information support

To improve efficiency and completeness of information support, establish an automated system of information support to legal work in the Armed Forces, encompassing military command and control bodies, military courts and military procuracy bodies, taking it in the future to the regiment, military court, military procuracy and military police units of the post.

Establish such a system in accordance with the Concept of Legal Information Support of Russia and the Program for Interworking of Federal State Authorities of the Russian Federation in the Area of Legal-Information Cooperation With State Authorities of CIS Members.

Assign to the Ministry of Defense Military-Legal Directorate in this sphere:

- developing the concept and programs for information support to legal work in the Armed Forces;
- forming and keeping a reference bank of legal acts (including of international treaties and agreements) of the Ministry of Defense, and also a bank of legal acts coming from other state bodies;
- reproducing electronic copies of legal acts and providing them to military command and control bodies;
- keeping master copies of normative legal acts and of international treaties and agreements;
- organizing the preparation of digests of normative-legal acts and reference works on military legislation;
- preparing proposals for improving the general legal classifier of branches of legislation with respect to military legislation;
- keeping a bank of military legislation terms with interpretations and explanations;
- interworking with federal state bodies whose sphere of competence includes questions of providing legal information support.

Arrange for a specialized periodical publication (a journal or information bulletin) in the Armed Forces to raise the level of providing legal information support to servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel, to increase openness and accessibility of materials on military-legal subjects, to develop legal culture and legal traditions in the Armed Forces and the theory and history of legal work, and to strengthen legality and law and order in the Armed Forces.

Arrange for publication of a reference on military legislation for servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel.

Expand publication of materials on military-legal questions and provide for appropriate topical sections and rubrics in central and local military publications.

Improving humanitarian support

To improve the level of legal knowledge and develop legal awareness, legal culture and legal traditions in Armed Forces activity, it is necessary:

- to strengthen servicemen's legal training in military educational institutions
- to strengthen legal training of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel in command and public-state training systems
- to provide for independent mastery of normative-legal acts by servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel in the system of professional training
- to carry out measures to increase the level of legal awareness and legal culture of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel in educational work with them

Improving criminologic support

To improve criminologic support to legal work in the Armed Forces

- prepare proposals on improving state criminal policy with respect to fighting infractions in the Armed Forces
- in normative acts of military command and control bodies, provide for realization in the Armed Forces of measures provided by law for protecting victims and witnesses in criminal cases with respect to servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel, and for giving them assistance and compensating for damage
- prepare proposals for introducing amendments and additions to legislation envisaging the introduction of criminal liability for an attempt on the life and health of a serviceman, and also for insulting a serviceman in connection with his execution of military service obligations
- introduce to the practice of Ministry of Defense lawmaking activity the conduct of criminological expert examination of draft normative-legal acts, including criminological forecasting of consequences of their realization, and development of recommendations on improving special preventive legal activity in order to reduce the level of infractions in the Armed Forces
- conduct scientific research to substantiate the set of measures for reducing the level of infractions in the Armed Forces and to realize the federal program for strengthening the fight against crime for 1994-1995
- introduce the study of a course in criminology to curricula of military educational institutions
- exclude an evaluation of command element activity to maintain military discipline and law and order only on the basis of statistical data on the number of infractions recorded

Apply the following criteria in the practical activity of military command and control bodies for evaluating the activity of commanders (officers in charge) in the fight against infractions:

- presence of facts of concealment of crimes and infractions
- presence of facts of a violation of the law by the commander (officer in charge)

Improving statistical support

To create a reliable information base for developing draft normative-legal acts and for carrying out measures for improving legislation, law protection and law preservation activity

- accomplish a transition in the Armed Forces to a state system of accounting for crimes, persons who commit them, and statistical reporting that is unified with military courts and military procuracy bodies
- establish an automated accounting and data processing system and a combined data bank in military command and control bodies, military courts and military procuracy bodies
- determine the procedure for accomplishing control over objects of accounting for crimes and incidents

Improving financial and logistic support

To improve financial and logistic support to legal work in the Armed Forces it is necessary:

- to ensure financial and logistic support to military police units being established within limits of appropriations allocated for upkeep of the Armed Forces
- to ensure an analysis of the dynamics of expenditures of financial and logistic resources for conducting and supporting legal work in the Armed Forces
- to ensure effective financing of scientific research in the military-legal sphere
- that financial and logistic support to military courts and military procuracy bodies be accomplished by the Ministry of Defense only from funds allocated by a purpose-oriented grant from the federal budget for maintaining military courts and military procuracy bodies
- to ensure financing of military-legal publications from funds allocated for upkeep of the Armed Forces, military courts and military procuracy bodies

Improving normative-legal support to legal work

To improve normative-legal support to legal work, develop and implement the Manual on Legal Work in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Statutes on the Military Legal Service and on Military Legal Consultations, Guides on Performing Information Reference Work in the Armed Forces on Normative-Legal Acts, on Legal Training, on Criminological Support, on Legal Accounting and Statistics, and for Preliminary Investigation Bodies; and the Manual on Service of Disciplinary Units of the Armed Forces

Improving organizational support

To improve organizational support to legal work it is necessary to reorganize the Ministry of Defense legal service as the Armed Forces military legal service, to which the following functions are to be assigned

organizational

- methods direction of legal work in the Armed Forces
- specialized direction of lower subunits of the military legal service
- conducting inspections of the status of legal work, analyzing it, taking steps to eliminate violations of

legality within limits of their powers, introducing proposals to officials of military command and control bodies for ensuring legality and law and order;

- organizing the work of military legal consultations;

in lawmaking activity

- generalizing and analyzing the practice of realizing legislation, organizing and participating in development of proposals to improve it;
- organizing and participating in preparation of legislation and other normative acts on military matters;
- conducting legal expert examination (legal control) of draft legal acts being drawn up that are coming for coordination, and also of adopted legal acts;

in law-execution and law-protection activity

- assisting officials of military command and control bodies in realizing normative-legal acts, in applying legal means and legal procedures, and in fulfilling international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation in military matters;
- performance of duties as legal advisers to commanders (officers in charge) by officials of the military legal service for applying rules of international humanitarian law;
- representing interests of military organizations on behalf of commanders (officers in charge) in state authorities, in local government bodies, in courts and in other law-preservation bodies, and in relations with public organizations, legal persons and citizens;
- ensuring protection of rights, freedoms and lawful interests of servicemen, persons discharged from military service, their families and Armed Forces civilian personnel, and execution of legislation on the status of servicemen and other normative acts on questions of legal and social protection of these categories of citizens;
- together with finance agencies, conducting an economic-legal analysis of the financial-economic activity of military organizations and of legality of use and disposition of personal and real property and funds of the Armed Forces;
- consulting on legal matters and giving information, explanations, opinions and proposals on the lawful procedure for resolving legal questions which arise;
- participating in the examination and resolution of petitions, suggestions and complaints, and also in reception of visitors by commanders (officers in charge);

in law-preservation activity

- giving legal assistance to military officials in ensuring legality of disciplinary practice and in performing notarial actions, and to members of disciplinary courts, preliminary investigation bodies and preliminary investigators;

in supporting legal work

- organization and conduct of work to systematize legislation and normative acts of military command and control bodies, and information reference work on normative legal acts;

- methods support to legal training, and conduct of training and methods classes on legal subjects;
- organization and conduct of accounting and statistics.

Based on functions being accomplished by the military legal service, provide for the following organizational structure of the Armed Forces military legal service

Establish a Military-Legal Directorate in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense for direction of the Armed Forces military legal service

Subordinate in a special sense the Armed Forces military legal service to the chief of the Military-Legal Directorate.

For purposes of expert-analytical support to the activity of the military legal service, establish a non-T/O&E consultative body and an expert-legal council under the Military-Legal Directorate with experienced military lawyers—scientists and practitioners—included in its makeup

Organize lower subunits of the military legal service in military command and control bodies, in the troops (forces) to regiment and the equivalent, in military educational institutions, and in Armed Forces enterprises, institutions and organizations

Grant chiefs of military legal service subunits the right to introduce submissions that are mandatory for examination and decisionmaking to commanders (officers in charge) of lower military command and control bodies, military units, enterprises, institutions and organizations on violations of laws in force

Include duties of the assistant regimental commander for legal work in the Russian Federation Armed Forces Interior Service Regulations

Establish military legal consultations of posts in the military legal service structure and subordinate them to chiefs of military legal service of posts.

2.3. Proposals on improving the system of military courts and military procuracy bodies

Proposals on improving the system of military courts

Based on provisions of the Russian Federation Constitution, the Russian Federation laws "On Defense" and "On the Status of Courts in the Russian Federation," and the Concept of Legal Reform in the Russian Federation, it is necessary to reorganize the system of military courts; define more accurately their competence, organization and work procedure; and introduce appropriate amendments to legislation by adopting a federal law on military courts and other legislative acts.

Military courts must become bodies of independent judicial authority ensuring:

- protection of rights, freedoms and lawful interests of servicemen;
- protection of rights and lawful interests of military command and control bodies, military units, and Armed Forces enterprises, institutions and organizations;
- maintenance of legality and law and order in the Armed Forces.

To achieve these goals it is necessary:

- to simplify the system of military courts and go over to its three-component structure—military courts of posts (first instance), military courts of districts and fleets (second instance), and the Military Cases Collegium of the Russian Federation Supreme Court;
- to provide for maintaining military courts outside the strength level of the Armed Forces;
- to determine features of establishment and activity of military courts under conditions of martial law;
- to provide that judges of military courts conclude a contract for performance of military service with the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice Military Courts Administration;
- to determine features of performance of military service by military judges with consideration of constitutional requirements placed on them, of principles of independence, irremovability from office and inviolability of military judges, and of their appointment to military positions by the Russian Federation President;
- to determine guarantees of legal and social protection of military judges and preclude conflicts of laws in force on these matters.

Proposals on improving the system of military procuracy bodies

Based on provisions of the Russian Federation Constitution and the Russian Federation Law "On Defense," to define more accurately the competence of military procuracy bodies and the organization and procedure of activity of the military procuracy and to make appropriate amendments to legislation on the Russian Federation procuracy.

Military procuracy bodies must become a component part of a unified federal centralized system of military procuracy bodies of the Russian Federation and must ensure maintenance of Armed Forces combat readiness and combat effectiveness.

To achieve these goals it is necessary:

- to ensure conformity of the structure of military procuracy bodies to the Armed Forces organizational structure;
- to determine features of the establishment and activity of military procuracy bodies under conditions of martial law;
- to provide for maintaining military procuracy bodies outside the strength level of the Armed Forces;
- to ensure comprehensive legal and military training of procuracy cadres;
- to define more accurately features of performance of military service by servicemen of bodies of the military procuracy with consideration of its belonging to an independent system of procuracy bodies of the Russian Federation.

3. Procedure for Conducting Military-Legal Reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Assessment of Its Effectiveness

3.1. Stages of military-legal reform

Military-legal reform must be conducted in three stages:

First stage—1994-1996. In this stage carry out immediate military-legal reform measures not requiring additional financial and material expenditures through a redistribution of funds allocated to the Ministry of Defense.

Second stage—1997-2000. In this stage realize basic military-legal reform measures, including those requiring additional financial and material expenditures within limits of established budgetary appropriations, and make a transition to a new organization and support of legal work in the Armed Forces for basic indicators.

Third stage—2001-2003. In this stage complete the remaining military-legal reform measures and the transition to organization and support of legal work in the Armed Forces in accordance with this Concept.

3.2. Sequence of conducting basic military-legal reform measures

In the first stage it is necessary:

- to develop and adopt fundamental normative-legal acts on questions of Armed Forces organizational development and activity;
- to improve the organization of Ministry of Defense participation in law-drafting work and in preparing drafts of international treaties and agreements in the military sphere and organization of preparation of normative-legal acts of military command and control bodies;
- to begin creating an Armed Forces military legal service;
- to create a Ministry of Defense Military-Legal Directorate within limits of established strength of the central apparatus;
- to create military legal consultations of military districts (fleets);
- after adoption of the Russian Federation law on military police, to organize training of cadres for manning military police units and to form their experimental structures in two military districts; to generalize and take into account accumulated experience;
- to work out the procedure for interworking of military police units with military command and control bodies, commanders of formations and military units, military courts, military procuracy bodies, military commandants' offices, federal counterintelligence agencies, internal affairs agencies, Internal Security Forces, Border Guard Troops and other troops and military units, state authorities and local government bodies;
- after adoption of a federal law on disciplinary courts, to organize them in two military districts and one fleet; to generalize and take into account accumulated experience;
- after adoption of necessary normative acts, to upgrade the system of disciplinary units in the Armed Forces;
- to begin accomplishing measures for improving all kinds of support to legal work in the Armed Forces.

In the second stage:

- to complete establishment of the Armed Forces military legal service;
- to create military legal consultations on major posts;
- to begin establishing military police in the Armed Forces to the full extent after generalizing the experience of activity of experimental military police structures and making necessary amendments to legislation;
- to establish disciplinary courts in the Armed Forces to the full extent after generalizing experimental activity of disciplinary courts and making necessary amendments to legislation;
- to complete realization of basic measures for improving support to legal work in the Armed Forces.

In the third stage to complete the longest-term measures of military-legal reform requiring substantial material and financial resources (in particular, formation of a system of military police bodies and units, and creation of an automated system of information support to legal work), with consideration of accumulated experience of realizing these measures in the first and second stages of military-legal reform.

3.3. Evaluation of expected effectiveness

Realization of the measures indicated above will permit:

- increasing Armed Forces combat readiness through realization of the principle of one-man command on a legal basis, and strengthening legality and law and order in the Armed Forces;
- increasing the coordination, efficiency and rates of accomplishing tasks of Armed Forces organizational development and activity and of their support by military command and control bodies and by state bodies based on the establishment of a complete, noncontradictory system of legislative and other normative acts in the military sphere in accordance with the Constitution and Basic Provisions of Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation;
- increasing the level of legal and social protection of servicemen, persons discharged from military service, their families, and Armed Forces civilian personnel as a result of formation of a system of military legislation and the sum total of administrative ordinances realizing constitutional rights and freedoms, established benefits, guarantees and compensations of these categories of citizens, and also as a result of an improvement in the system of corresponding bodies in the Armed Forces;
- reducing the overall number of infractions by servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel by improving the system of law-preservation bodies in the Armed Forces and strengthening the legal training of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel;
- reducing the volume of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense expenditures in accordance with court decisions through a reduction in expenditures for reimbursement for court costs and harm caused in

connection with illegal actions and decisions by officials of military command and control bodies, and for payment of penalties, fines, forfeits and other property sanctions, and through fuller reimbursement for property damage caused to the Armed Forces;

- decreasing the number of legal acts of officials of military command and control bodies set aside in accordance with judicial decisions and with submissions and protests of military procuracy bodies by strengthening legal assistance to these officials and the protection of rights and lawful interests of military command and control bodies and military officials.

Conclusion

This draft Concept sets forth basic directions for improving and supporting legal work in the Armed Forces, which are the substance of military-legal reform in the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Comprehensive, coordinated realization of these directions under a unified concept and plan and under unified leadership will permit transferring the organization and support of legal work in the Armed Forces in limited time periods to a qualitatively new level corresponding to the principles of a democratic, rule-of-law state incorporated in the Russian Federation Constitution, to Basic Provisions of Military Doctrine, and to directions for strengthening Russian statehood set forth in the Russian Federation President's Message to the Federal Assembly.

Military-legal reform will permit increasing Armed Forces combat readiness, the coordination, efficiency and rates of accomplishing tasks of their organizational development and activity, and the level of legal and social protection of servicemen and Armed Forces civilian personnel, and will permit strengthening legality and law and order in the Armed Forces.

After approval by the Russian Federation President, approaches to determining the goals, principles, basic directions and stages of conducting military-legal reform in the Armed Forces set forth in the draft Concept are subject to realization in normative-legal acts of state authorities and military command and control bodies.

They also will have to be taken into account by other state agencies of the Russian Federation in drawing up acts similar in purpose and organizing interworking with military command and control bodies in matters of normative-legal support in the defense area.

New Approach to Army Reform Urged

MM2308091794 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Aug 94 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major-General Vladimir Dudnik: "Law on Military Reform Needed"]

[Text] The need to reform the Armed Forces was actively discussed for the first time somewhere around the third year of perestroika. Unfortunately, things never got past the talking stage. Even after the August 1991 putsch was put down. Under pressure from rapidly changing external circumstances the Army as an integrated systemic organism is

crumbling and being reduced, but it is not being reorganized, reaching, in the opinion of many specialists—specifically, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov—"crisis point in its existence."

Five years ago, in November 1988, the press (not the military press, unfortunately) carried the first article on military reform (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, No. 46, 6 November 1988).

The need for military reform was by then recognized by most officers. But the subject was not only prohibited but dangerous for your career.

The current defense minister has not written any brochures or spoken out against reform. On the contrary, he has claimed that "only an ill-wisher could say that nothing is changing in the Army."

Yet a conceptual state document defining the goals, content, components, and phases of the reform of the military sphere has still not appeared.

In its stead, the Russian Federation military doctrine was adopted by Presidential Edict No. 1883 of 2 November 1993.

Conceptually the military doctrine can be seen as a fundamental component of military reform. Organizationally it can be seen as its launch mechanism.

How far has this document gone toward meeting these expectations? What fundamentally new points has it introduced into military organizational development?

First and foremost, a recognition of the Army's domestic function.

Its first section states that armed forces and other troops can henceforth be used "with a view to curtailing any illegal armed violence...within the territory of the Russian Federation."

Needless to say, there is nothing more unnatural than a national army that takes a complacent view of acts of military-political banditry and watches as its state slides into civil war. This would no longer be an army outside of politics. It would be a case of aiding and abetting an antipeople policy. And, thank God, the Russian Army did not permit this to happen in October 1993. Let us hope that it will not do so in the future either.

The military doctrine, focused inwardly for the first time and in such an unbalanced way, was hastily examined by the Security Council 6 October—that is, the day after the Moscow putsch was put down. Is not this the source of the main shortcomings in the document—shortcomings which are hampering the process of Army reform?

As for the domestic function of the Armed Forces which was revealed so publicly for the first time, we have to bear in mind the following.

One of the Army's tasks as the guarantor of state stability is to prevent civil war. And, in the event of a civil conflict, to minimize casualties.

World practice has a well-oiled technological arsenal for force escalation in civil conflicts. We as yet have no such

mechanism. But the forces themselves are in place. At any rate, the defense minister recently stated that the formation of so-called rapid-response forces had been completed.

Last fall the military minister stated for the first time that in order to localize civil conflicts we will use not the national guard, as in the United States, or the gendarmerie, as in France, but airborne troops. Their grouping around Moscow started being built up some time ago to this end. And their general deployment far from likely military theaters and nearer to capitals in conjunction with the "potato maneuvers" of 1989-1990, their mission in August 1991, and their role in October 1993 makes it possible to say that they are acquiring gendarme functions.

To my mind, this discredits these elite troops, which are intended to resolve operational and strategic missions in thwarting and repulsing outside aggression. Their role is to launch an unexpected and irresistible strike against military-political centers, command posts, and weapons-control posts, and to put the strategic—and primarily nuclear—components of the aggressor's military might out of action.

Needless to say, this does not rule out their participation in eradicating factors that threaten national and regional stability. But this can be seen more as a military and professional rehearsal for these troops and a demonstration of the force capability of the country and its Army in maintaining peace.

The famous 82d Airborne Division copes well with that mission in the United States. It is the only one there. And there are no plans to have another as yet. But we have more than three such divisions. Rumor has it that we want to have five.

The burden of the new military doctrine may be too heavy for the federal budget, and, if the military leadership still strives to get it implemented, it will destroy either the country's economy or the Army.

Today's Russian Army is the only army in the world that is cutting back on all the parameters of its field army designed for a large-scale war. And, simultaneously shouldering the immeasurable burden of maintaining order on the borders of the former USSR, it maintains more troops abroad than any other country. Russia will not be able to shoulder this burden and this doctrine for long.

But, judging by the text of the doctrine, this approach of the Defense Ministry's should have been mothballed long ago. At any rate, the "gaining and retention of supremacy in various spheres" is made a strategic task. But, in order to make the gaining of supremacy a reality, we need a credit and financial policy that underpins defense orders.

A few years ago in the sphere of the correlation of forces and assets this was termed "defense sufficiency" and "parity," while the military-industrial complex had an even simpler term for it—the priority development of the defense sectors of production. Back then they developed on the basis of special CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers decrees. We know the result—the complete militarization of the economy.

The arguments of the minister and the military-industrial complex lobbyists are simple—this kind of army requires

this kind of expenditure. And nothing less. Thus, the archaic nature and structure of the Army maintain unchanged outlines for the military-industrial complex and, consequently, for the budget as well. This is a mechanistic, military-professional mentality that predetermines a "balanced approach" to the size of our military might and the financial expenditure required.

As has already been said, this approach is based on a certain principle of "sufficiency." But "sufficiency" to do what? To destroy a possible enemy or to reliably defend your country? We have already tried the "destroy" option. We destroyed only our economy and people's hopes of a bearable existence.

For a reliable defense of our country it is quite sufficient to thwart and repulse aggression. This can be achieved by inflicting "unacceptable damage" on an aggressor. Its dimensions can have a technical and economic validation and (in the United States, for instance) have long been calculated in quantitative terms. It is this that allows our former enemies to consistently reduce their armament levels in a planned fashion.

A justification for just such a "strategy of thwarting and repulsing" was put forward by the late Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov back in April 1987. Unfortunately, his views met with no support at the time. Judging by the text of the doctrine, they still meet with no support. Why is that?

This strategy requires a qualitatively different army. A different army would also destroy our image of our old, so-called defense, but actually militarized industry. This is today an unacceptable option for the current Army generals and the military-industrial complex. As was once the case in the United States, they will have to give way to new-thinking generals. That is the key to reform. Or, rather, to the lack of it.

The doctrine does not contain very much of anything else. But the saddest point is that it contains no concept of "military reform." No, just as it does not contain the aforesaid key formulas of "professional army" and "army democratization." And declarations such as "one-man command on a rule-of-law basis, openness in relations with the public and the mass media" sound simply hypocritical in the context of today's military practice.

It remains to be hoped that the military doctrine is too serious a national document. We must believe that the Federal Assembly will view it as part of a national security concept—something which is also lacking at the moment—and make the necessary additions and amendments to it. Particularly as regards military reform. A better solution—given all our preceding unsuccessful experience—would be to place reform on a firm legislative basis. This would require not a report from the military minister on the military doctrine, but a law on military reform.

Detractors of Military Reform Rebutted

MM2308111994 Moscow KRASNAJA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Aug 94 p 2

[Commentary by Gennadiy Miranovich: "Who Needs Military Reform in Russia?"]

[Text] Many will find this question strange: After all, military reform was first talked about in our country at the start of perestroika, when the USSR adopted a "defensive" doctrine and began making the first major cuts in the Army and the Navy and withdrawing its troops from foreign territories. It was then that the essence of military reform was defined: "The main aims of military reform are to ensure effective defense building with minimum expenditure of assets and resources, optimize the composition and structure of the Armed Forces, and give priority to quality of arms." However we may now regard that definition and those initiatives, which, by today's standards, are clearly limited in nature, the concept of "military reform" has hardly ever left the pages of the most diverse publications ever since.

One would have thought that the question of who needs military reform would have been exhausted long ago. Who indeed, if not all of us—to say the least, the whole world, electrified by the "Soviet military threat"?

The question will not seem so strange, however, if we look, for example, at the latest focus in our press for the bubbling "antimilitary feelings" which had apparently died down. It seems "we are all hostages of the military-industrial complex" and the more than modest budgetary allocations requested for defense are nothing other than the latest whim of greedy "men in boots and uniforms." It seems everything being done in the course of military reform is being done "at prompting from Grachev" and the Russian Federation Law "On Military Duty and Military Service" is "only necessary to the military elite and big shots in the military-industrial complex".... All this and much more that we have been through—for example, the "sensation" in the Vladimir city newspaper MOLVA about more than 500,000 Russian Army soldiers and officers dying in the last two years—was written in black and white in various newspapers only in the brief period of time when parliament was debating the military budget.

Of course, the timing of the attack was no accident, but calculated to produce a quite definite result. The possible effect of such populist exercises is well known. Suffice it to recall the result of the decisions to reduce the length of military service, extend the list of deferments of service, "demilitarize" general education schools, and so forth—decisions largely "prompted" by the mass media. Now everyone is having to rack their brains to decide what is to be done with the Army, which is suffering from a chronic shortage of personnel and from the haste with which it is having to "fashion" specialists for itself.

I personally—a "man in boots and uniform," to use ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's definition, with a fairly long service record (for your information, like many other "men in boots and uniforms," still forced to serve in the remnants of the Soviet Army)—am also troubled by something else: Why in the majority of cases when military reform is discussed do we confine ourselves to criticism of the Army? It is as it is, we say, and reforms itself badly. After all, if we are to believe the dictionaries, military reform is the "fundamental transformation of a state's military system." Clearly, one department alone, even if it is a "power" department, is no match for such a task.

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What can we learn from the history of military reforms carried out in the Russian empire and then in the USSR? According to researchers, they were all undertaken in order to bring the country's military organization into line with the requirements of a specific point in history and resolve contradictions caused by changes in the socioeconomic, foreign policy, and other conditions. Precisely for this reason, for example, a permanent military corps was established in Rus as a result of Ivan the Terrible's reforms (in the middle of the sixteenth century). Peter I (in the first quarter of the eighteenth century) introduced a system of recruitment for the Army and the Navy.... However, do we really have to delve deep into the past in order to see the obvious: Namely, that military reform is a means of extricating the state from contradictions which arise, whether they are military, economic, or ideological in nature?

Is the current military reform an exception in this respect? I think not. With the one proviso, perhaps, that the current reform is not confined to local tasks, unlike many reforms in the past. Its result must be the creation of qualitatively new Armed Forces which in every parameter answer the interests of Russia's military security both in today's military-political, strategic, and other conditions and in the future. Incidentally, anyone who read our report from the military science conference in the Defense Ministry (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 13 July this year) will feel sure that the shape of the Armed Forces is quite clearly defined right up to the year 2000. There are also quite a few projects of a local nature, so to speak, connected with resolving specific tasks directly within the framework of reforming the Army and the Navy.

And not only projects. I stress this not in order to please the military department, but for the sake of justice. Fine-tuning the mechanism to organize the contract service which must cover more than 300,000 people by the end of this year. Forming new groups of troops and forces. Transferring combat formations to a new organizational staff structure. Drawing up general service and combat regulations and other documents regulating the vital activity of the Army and the Navy in various conditions.... This is just a very small part of what is now being done on a practical level to implement the concept of military building. A concept which, I should remind you, has been approved by the country's president. And it is being done, allow me to point out, by those "men in boots and uniforms" whom one writer would so dearly love to get his hands on. The same cannot be said, alas, of other departments involved in state affairs.

Perhaps, under different circumstances, I would have respected military people's modesty and not emphasized all this. Especially as we feel our newspaper informs its readers in sufficient detail about what is happening in the Army and the Navy. But when you see yet another revelation by some Komsomol-youth newspaper or publication, aspiring to popularity in certain party circles, that, say, the military department "is in fact trying to carry out modernization instead of reform," then, forgive me, but there is no room for modesty. The truth is more precious, as they say.

I do not think the authors of these revelations have muddled their terminology and do not understand that reform in fact presupposes modernization. And not only of the Army. In our case, the state's entire military system is due to be modernized. Beginning with regulating (or, to be more

precise, creating) the system of military directorates, the military infrastructure, mechanisms for setting the country's mobilization potential in motion, and so forth, and ending with reequipping the Army and the Navy and making all kinds of changes and cuts in organizational staff. So why this confusion of terminology, whereby it is gradually instilled in the reader that military reform is not reform at all, but simply modernization of the Army? Perhaps it is just that someone would dearly like the Army to be totally preoccupied with reforming and modernizing itself?

Whatever, behind all this terminological bedlam there clearly lies a stereotypical, couldn't-care-less attitude to the Army. The image of a malicious, gluttonous monster in the shape of the Soviet Army, created in the past virtually with the support of the authorities, has somehow automatically switched to the pages of the post-Soviet press. As if no one has even noticed that we now have a quite different Army, purely Russian, that it is still taking shape, and that, however difficult it may be, we must all pull together to provide it with every necessary facility and nurture and cherish it.

It would be naive to assume that this highly complex process, affecting virtually every Russian family, can proceed painlessly. It cannot be painless, if only because it is extremely difficult to calculate and foresee everything involved. And in our Russian version it is virtually impossible.

Let us return to the end of the eighties and recall how reformers at the time envisaged military reform:

Making the leadership of the country's entire defense sphere more efficient;

Bringing the structure of the Armed Forces, the directions of developing arms and combat equipment, and the financing of military building into line with the real military danger;

Focusing military building on the qualitative aspects of defense;

Gradually making the Army professional;

Democratizing the entire military organization of society in line with the principles of a rule-of-law state and the norms of international law;

Taking account of national and historical traditions and progressive experience of military building.

As if that covers everything. But even then they only had to start implementing just some of these plans (cutting 500,000 Armed Forces personnel, dramatically reducing the number of tanks in the Ground Forces, beginning to withdraw troops from abroad, and so forth) for it to become clear that new, unforeseen tasks could not be avoided. Since August 1991, when, with disintegration processes growing in the defense sphere, the previous notion of the Armed Forces structure—initially a unified structure, then a joint structure—collapsed, reform has taken on a national aspect and these tasks have become immeasurably greater.

First, realities emerging in the security sphere have demanded a dramatic acceleration of efforts to solve a whole series of reform-related tasks, primarily to do with creating a legislative base for organizing national defense.

As we know, the Law "On Defense" and the Law "On Security," adopted on 5 March and 24 September 1992 respectively, are the main components of this base. Second, with Russia becoming an independent entity in international relations, tasks connected with implementing its security strategy—totally unforeseen by any previous versions of reform—have now arisen.

Who would have thought, for example, that we would have to newly equip 60,932 kilometers of our borders, hastily deploy military bases outside the country, and set up the Kaliningrad Defense Center? Add to this the need to be constantly on the alert, because apparently there are practically no borders with international legal status in "CISovia," as our post-Soviet commonwealth has been christened. If we are to believe Western experts, some 85 armed conflicts could arise on the territory of the former USSR solely because of border and interethnic disputes. But why bother guessing? Surely we have seen with our own eyes that any attempt to review borders (even if it seems just) leads to bloodshed? Show me a reformer who knows how many more "rapid deployment forces" Russia will need to prevent even today's "hot spots" from being reduced to ashes.

There is no such reformer! Moreover, a defense budget that is not even capable of keeping the Army and the military-industrial complex from collapse has been adopted in our country because, as Duma Defense Committee Chairman Sergey Yushenkov honestly admitted recently, "neither society nor the State Duma can give a clear answer to the question of what kind of army our state needs and what kind of army will guarantee its defense capability."

A bitter admission, but one with which it is hard to disagree. After all, the very concept of "national security" has now taken on new meaning. Naturally, this also complicates all attendant calculations. If some people still beat their chest with their fist, claiming that scaling down the Army and the Navy or introducing alternative service is enough to guarantee Russia's security, it does not necessarily mean they are right. Would it not be better to take a close look at practice? It shows that the success of military reform depends on a great many factors. On the kind of relations we develop with the near and far abroad. On the response in the CIS to Russia's initiatives regarding peacekeeping and military integration. And on the people's standard of living and social protection....

Naturally, we could take a different course of action. We could set up a picket outside the parliament building or Defense Ministry and demand the immediate introduction of alternative service, as favored by the "Soldiers' Mothers of Russia" Movement. But then we would have to turn a blind eye to the real situation. To the fact, for example, that some of our units are so undermanned, they can no longer function properly. To the fact that no military district in the USSR—and now in Russia—has met its draft quota since 1990. And, finally, to the fact that we still do not have the mechanism to determine those liable for alternative service, or the mechanism for its implementation, or specially trained cadres—in economics, law, pedagogy, psychology, sociology, and religion—who could train, educate, and organize the labor activity of "conscientious objectors."

No one would argue that the state would benefit from a mobile, organized contingent of manpower. It would also be

a dream come true for our "professionals": There would be someone responsible for the procurement of vegetables, supply work, construction, and other duties inappropriate for military subunits, which they nearly always have to do now. But can we take this step today, with the scandalous personnel shortages in the Armed Forces and draftees refusing to be drafted? Moreover, given our legal and other chaos, will citizens undergoing alternative service not become rather like prisoners released from convoy, as some sensible people warn?

Alternative service is far from the only aspect of defense building—and certainly not the main aspect—where simple solutions have yet to be found. But surely this does not mean that military reform in Russia, as one "chronicler" claims, has reached deadlock? And surely the Army is not to blame for the fact that the country's defense readiness from the point of view of mobile resources, say, strictly speaking even depends on the representative of the State Motor Vehicle Inspection Administration carrying out a routine technical check of motor transport? The Army can neither increase allocations to meet the needs of military security, nor amend a law that is disastrous from its point of view, nor regulate the conversion of defense production to ensure that it has as many howitzers as it needs, nor reform the education system to increase the patriotic education of the up and coming generation.... All this and much more that constitutes military reform is the prerogative of the state. So, gentlemen, perhaps you should made this your starting point when judging reform and reformers.

Lt-Gen Manilov Assesses Trend to 'Partnership' Ideology

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[Text]

From the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Files

Valeriy Leonidovich Manilov. Born 10 January 1939 in the city of Tulchin in Vinnitsa Oblast (Ukraine) into a military man's family. Graduated from the Odessa Infantry School in 1962 and served in various posts in the troops and in the central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Starting in 1989 was chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Information Directorate. In 1992 came to head the Information Service of the CIS OVS [Joint Armed Forces].

Since 1993 has been deputy secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council.

Lieutenant General. Participant in the combat operations in Afghanistan. Graduated from two military academies: the Military-Political Academy in 1976 and the General Staff Academy in 1985.

Candidate of philosophical sciences. Has more than 100 publications and works on military-political problems, defense questions, and national and collective security.

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Partnership is the main distinguishing feature of world development after the end of almost half a century of the "cold war" and a unique kind of key to establishing interstate relations of a new, nonconfrontational, democratic type. This formative process is complex, varied, and contradictory. It has its own internal logic, its own dialectics, and its own strategy and tactics of formation and development. Attitudes toward the idea of partnership are varied: from assessment of it as a panacea for all troubles to complete rejection of it. But its main thrust is interpreted positively by all responsible political forces of contemporary times. And the vitality of the idea of partnership is reinforced by the fact that its realization coincides with the main direction of progress toward interaction, coordination, and unification of efforts and toward cooperation and integration.

A Command of the Times

Affirmation of partner relations, that is to say, relations based on equality, mutual understanding, trust, respect, and consideration of one another's interests, characterizes the processes occurring in all spheres of life of the world community: political, economic, and spiritual. This is fully applicable to such a sensitive sphere as security too.

There is a deep-seated connection among national, regional, and global security. It is not always visible and not immediately revealed, but its impact on the situation is unquestionable. The character of this impact becomes increasingly rigid as the level of interdependence and interrelatedness of the contemporary world increases and integrational trade-economic and military-political processes grow. And today's political realities confirm this. The threat of a global nuclear war has fundamentally declined, thanks to the efforts of many states, above all the former USSR and then Russia and the United States. The world has undoubtedly gained from that, but unfortunately it has not rid itself of the danger of war. Multidimensional, regional confrontation has come to replace global, for the most part unidimensional, confrontation. The number of crises, local wars, and armed conflicts has risen sharply. Today there are more than 60 of them. Europe, which even a few years ago did not have a single armed conflict within its borders, takes precedence in these statistics.

That is one of the indirect results of the destruction of the foundations of the bipolar structure of the world, which opened the way to interregional centrifugal processes. The European community, like the world community incidentally, finds itself facing a real danger of slipping toward a disaster whose prerequisites are formed by the new sources of tension.

Those sources include the war in Yugoslavia. More and more states are being drawn into it one way or another.

They include the enormous arsenals of weapons, including nuclear weapons. Their nonproliferation is becoming more and more alarmingly open to question.

They include the instability in the new independent states of Eastern and Central Europe. These states are infected with a socioeconomic crisis that is systemic and chronic in nature.

They include the hotbeds of conflict in various regions of the former USSR—both in the CIS states and close to their borders. The trend toward escalation continues.

They include certain states' attempts to satisfy political ambitions by filling the vacuum of force formed as a result of the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization.

They include the territorial claims of some states against others and attempts to revise borders that were formed after World War II. These claims and these attempts are being vigorously revived.

They include international terrorism and the illegal distribution of narcotics and many other things.

We face a situation that contains a real or potential threat to the national interests of states. There are a considerable number of ways to resolve this situation, and they encompass the entire spectrum: from civilized, political-diplomatic, humane ways to the path of military force. The choice of the optimal path that satisfies both the national interests of the state and the global interests of humankind to the greatest possible degree is an extremely difficult one because of a multitude of related problems—both those inherited from the past and those that have just arisen. And only combined efforts and the consolidation of the political will of peoples and states can make that choice easier. This means the will of all peoples and states that exist in the world community today, without any deletions or exceptions. Following the models and stereotypes of the "cold war" here is dangerously nearsighted. Just as an exclusive orientation only to the "force structures" of NATO or the Western European Union and other similar organizations is. Of course, on the tactical level, this may yield certain positive results, but, from the standpoint of the strategy of forming a new model of a secure and stable world, such an approach is unsound. Moreover, excluding the new independent states from the integration process, selecting them on the basis of political sympathies or antipathies or market considerations, isolating certain states or groups of states, or arbitrarily narrowing the military-strategic "security space" all may lead to a temporary shutdown of potential sources of tension and instability and then their later reappearance under particular conditions.

It follows from this that collective security is an objective necessity. That is in fact why the idea of the program "Partnership for Peace" has received such vigorous support from most states. Ultimately, cooperating in the name of peace means attending to one's interests. It applies to the NATO states and the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole. It applies to the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics. It also applies to Russia and other CIS members.

It is precisely an effective European-wide regional system of collective security, organically linked to both the Eurasian and other regional systems, and to the worldwide system, that is the main guarantee of the national security of each of the states separately and all of them together. Moreover, if NATO is in reality the European center of power whose

entry onto the global level is ensured by the participation of the United States of America in the bloc, the collective security system of the Commonwealth of Independent States should be the Eurasian center of power, which, thanks to Russia's participation in this system, is also linked to the global level of ensuring security.

In this way, through the partnership of Russia and the United States of America, two great powers that objectively play a determining role in the present system of international relations, the linkage of regional systems of collective security among themselves and with the global system of security is achieved; and that in turn is a very important guarantor of the balance and stability of the common space of the world community's vital activities. One may acknowledge this fact or not, agree with it or not, but it will not cease to be a fact because of that.

Of course, today the geopolitical picture of the world, delivered from a kind of universal Sword of Damocles, which was the constant presence of the threat of a global nuclear disaster, has undergone fundamental changes. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the USSR and the dismantling of the ideological watershed between the East and the West had a fundamental effect on the distribution of forces that took shape during the "cold war" and spurred development of qualitatively new processes, which in a historically short period of time relegated the global confrontation of the polarized systems concentrated around the two superpowers, the USSR and the United States, socialist and capitalist, to the past.

For decades the interrelations of these systems defined the appearance of the world. Its recognizable and unattractive features are well known.

1. The predominance of confrontation in interrelations and the reliance above all on military force in policy toward one another. Here four groups of countries stood out from the standpoint of the aggregate potential force for achieving their goals: the superpowers that headed the opposing blocs; the great powers, permanent members of the UN Security Council, which influenced the world community; average states able to influence the development of the situation in certain regions; and small countries that had a negligible influence on international relations.
2. The ideological struggle of the two systems was considered a fight to the death, until the opposing side was completely annihilated.
3. The United States and the USSR as countries heading the opposing systems recognized that their territories were vulnerable to nuclear strikes, which could be prevented only by following a policy of deterrence.
4. Ensuring the vitality of their allies and friendly regimes in different regions of the world was considered a most important aspect of the policies of the United States and the USSR.
5. Both sides considered armed conflict in Europe the main military danger.

Today the world is in the stage of changing from the opposition of the bipolar structure of "East-West" to new

international relations, which open up great possibilities for constructive cooperation and settlement of disputed issues and conflicts through political means and by dialogue, mutually acceptable compromises, and binding treaties and agreements.

The process related to the rejection of total structures and establishment of normal market relations has encompassed virtually the entire former system of socialism, although it is moving at different speeds and with many unique features in each country. This process provoked profound changes in a number of established international structures that were born from the standoff between the East and the West and served that confrontation. The withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the former USSR from the territory of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Germany was carried out, and radical transformations in the national armies of most of these and other Warsaw Pact countries occurred. Changes are occurring in the functions and structure of NATO and the Unified Armed Forces and national armies of the states participating in this organization. Their numbers are being reduced, the structure is being changed, and the American military presence in Europe and in other regions of the world is decreasing.

The essence and political substance of the concept of "superpower" is changing. Historically it was associated with having nuclear weapons, unlimited economic potential, and claims to represent the model of the future of humankind. Today, 15 independent states function in the place of one of the superpowers, the USSR. Of course, Russia, as the successor of the USSR's nuclear status and as a state that possesses all the other necessary parameters—geostrategic, demographic, resource, scientific-technical, defense, and others—could lay claim to the role of superpower. But, having made its difficult democratic choice after suffering for more than 70 years, Russia deliberately and voluntarily abandoned claims to the role of a model social structure for all humankind. The words from the message of the president of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly are significant in this sense: "Our strategic goal is to make Russia a prosperous country where free people proud of their ancient history and boldly looking to the future live, a country where power is based on law and does not oppress the citizen, a country with an efficient economy that combines national traits with world achievements. The creation of favorable external conditions for the country's development is in Russia's interests. This must be achieved with a proper and friendly but at the same time firm and consistent foreign policy in which the desire for cooperation does not come into conflict with the country's national interests and Russians' sense of national pride."

The new is never easily born. That is obviously an objective law of history, this midwife of sociopolitical and economic systems that replace one another. Russia with tribulations and through upheavals, trials, and mistakes is creating a socioeconomic system based on market relations, democratic federalism, and generally accepted principles of equality and self-determination of peoples and respect for human rights and liberties. Russia's potential is sufficient to overcome all difficulties, to firmly take a place in the world community in keeping with its true role in the history of humankind, its contribution to the development of social progress, and its responsibility for ensuring peace.

The reality is such that even the United States is gradually moving toward a situation where its identification with superpower is becoming an atavism and where many countries are more and more boldly moving out from under American control, insist on equal partnership, and in their affairs are guided by their own national interests. And, even the United States itself, still the undisputed world leader in a number of spheres, above all the economic sphere, frequently is simply unable to behave as a superpower in view of certain other countries of the world acquiring capabilities comparable to America's.

Nature cannot endure a vacuum, as they say, nor can politics, incidentally. So the narrowing of the functions of superpowers in ensuring a balanced worldwide situation is linked to an expansion of the list of great powers and an activation of their role. And their ability to influence the global situation is growing, above all through economic capabilities. Japan, whose economy is characterized by a high rate of development and a substantially lower level of inflation as compared with the United States and the main Western European countries, is taking leading roles as one of the centers of economic might. Germany's influence is growing. Its gross national product is about three-quarters of the combined GNP of France and Great Britain. When the 1991 Maastricht Accords take effect, this will allow Germany to substantially strengthen its positions not only in Western but even in Eastern Europe, as well as in the world as a whole.

The economic balance among the most influential countries in the world in the future will change against a background of greater "economic weight" in the middle-level countries, for the most part from among the developing countries. They include such countries as India, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Argentina, and a number of others. Overall the absence of the opposition of the two world systems not only allows but even requires that the developing countries be viewed in a different way. They are no longer the "third world," which in the recent past was forced to lay its path between Scylla and Charybdis, the two global geopolitical blocs. Now they are subjects of the world community ready and able to build relations with other states on principles of equality, mutual advantage, and equal security. In other words, they want to and can be partners in joint construction of a new, civilized world order and of the regional and global systems of security that guarantee stability and prosperity.

Thus, if we are speaking of the strategy of partnership from the standpoint of the conditions of its formation and the driving forces that ensure its realization, I think we have solid grounds to assert that partnership is a command of the times. It is an objective necessity of social progress. Taking it into account in practical policy, confirming the strategy of partnership as a dominant factor of contemporary world development and one of the basic, main directions of the daily activity of states meets both their fundamental national interests and the interests of universal security.

Arguments of Force or the Force of Arguments

The abandonment of global political opposition and military confrontation has not resulted, it turns out, in the automatic establishment of mutual trust and cooperation as accepted principles of relations among states on the regional

and local levels. On the contrary, practice confirms the sharp increase in conflicts in relations among certain countries in some regions. Along with this, the potential for small and medium-size states to influence both the policies of the great powers and the world situation is expanding. This means that the probability increases of the emergence of unpleasant combinations of destructive actions and destructive will, which are capable of causing complications in the situation with far-reaching circumstances.

The dialectics of change in the contemporary world are characterized by an exacerbated struggle of positive and negative phenomena and trends. And, while positive trends are realized above all along the lines of consolidation, the negative ones are realized above all in phenomena and processes of a nationalist, disintegrational character. The threat to security and peace today is for the most part associated with them.

Therefore, the joint search for optimal ways to harmonize the process of change, above all by forming regional security systems and a global system as interlinked subsystems capable of integration in the new system of international relations based on partnership, has become one of the pressing tasks of the present stage of world development. Such a system could offer much more potential for socio-economic and spiritual progress and guarantees of security to all its participants as compared to a situation in which each country acts on an individual basis.

The establishment of the new system of international relations is progressing under the aegis of asserting the priority of political, diplomatic, and other nonmilitary means of resolving contradictions and conflicts. Strictly speaking, above all that is what defines its new quality, the quality of partnership. However, it is hardly right in this connection to believe that military might has already lost its importance in maintaining stability and peace. It remains an important instrument for satisfying and protecting the national interests of states and regulating and maintaining the stability of international relations. That is to say, **humankind today lives in conditions of a relatively stable balance of the force of arguments (political-diplomatic, international law, economic, and other arguments) and the arguments of force (above all military force).** It seems that realization of the strategy of partnership, a unique kind of core of the present and future system of universal security, can and should strengthen this balance against a background of a steady increase in the importance and effectiveness of the first component and the higher threshold for use of the second.

The evolution of views on military force is based on real political processes. After World War II, the ideas of military force as the main component of state might and of war as the normal form of achieving political objectives were preserved because of the general "confrontational" atmosphere in which reliance on military force was the natural expression of militarized thinking, the so-called "total" approach to wars. Destruction of the enemy's armed forces, disabling of its military-economic potential, and ultimately its unconditional capitulation were considered the basic military objectives. And there was a clear line between a state of war and a state of peace.

The experience of the war in Korea (1951-1953), and then the recognition of the fact that in conditions where the

opposing sides have nuclear weapons war between the two blocs threatens mutual destruction, led to expanded indirect use of military force in forms of deterrence, pressure, and coercion and to assertion of the idea of its measured direct use. Although military force continued to be accepted as one of the important components of a country's might, wars were divided into nuclear and conventional ones. And the former ceased to be treated, at least officially, as the "normal" form of achieving political objectives. At the same time, conventional wars were considered a natural component of the political process. In accordance with the concept of "general and limited warfare," which predominated in that period, general warfare no longer presupposed the unconditional surrender of the enemy, but doing such damage to the enemy that its political system would be deprived of the ability to survive began to be considered the criterion for victory. Limited warfare presupposed a strict framework from the standpoint of political objectives, means used, and spatial scope. Measured use of force originated from the idea that the transitional stages between war and the state of peace were nullified, and there was no clear line.

The circumstance that realization of the idea of "measured" use of military force, above all during the war in Southeast Asia (1964-1973), yielded negligible results marked the beginning of the formation of a new approach to wars and armed conflicts. It served as the basis for the appearance and consolidation of the thesis of the reduced role of military force in contemporary international relations. This thesis was confirmed during the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989); participation in it—by another superpower this time—brought just as insignificant results from the standpoint of affirming this model of the social order and the standpoint of restoring peace and stability.

Research on the problems related to the collision surrounding the correlation of arguments of force with the force of arguments, including the climatic and biological consequences of nuclear war and analysis of the phenomenon of a "nuclear winter" and the catastrophe in Chernobyl, showed that using nuclear weapons as a means to achieve political objectives was unacceptable. Understanding of the irrationality of this argument of force gradually took hold of the people who shape the policies of states and formulate and approve doctrines and strategies and thereby determine the actual rather than declared character of international relations.

Nuclear weapons began to be considered, in any case in the official precepts of the participant states in the "nuclear club," above all as battlefield weapons rather than as political means or as a factor to deter possible aggression.

However, given the limited membership of the "nuclear club," this role of nuclear weapons proved to be quite relative too: unconditional deterrence of one another by the great powers and very hypothetically, of other countries, including the so-called "threshold" and "near-threshold" countries, that is to say, those capable of becoming possessors of nuclear weapons relatively quickly.

Recently, this group has substantially expanded. It includes Argentina, Brazil, Israel, India, Iraq, Iran, the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea], Pakistan, Taiwan, the

RSA [Republic of South Africa], and South Korea. Here is quite an important detail: Greater nuclear potential is accompanied by the production and import of missiles and materials suitable to use as radiological weapons.

Presence of Nuclear Weapons and Means of Delivering Them in "Threshold" and "Near-Threshold" Countries

Country	Nuclear Weapons	Means of Delivering Them
Argentina	No	Being Developed
Brazil	No	Being Developed
Israel	Yes	Yes
India	Yes	Yes
Iraq**	No	Yes
Iran***	No	Yes
DPRK***	No	Yes
Pakistan	Yes	Being Developed
Taiwan	No	Being Developed
RSA	No	Being Developed
South Korea	No	Yes

Most likely this list will be revised and added to—according to data from various sources, today around 20 states are ready to acquire modern nuclear weapons. Needless to say, the point is not only and most likely not so much this list, but that the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons through the planet is a reality that is becoming increasingly ominous. Given intensified nationalism and fundamentalism, and frequently in the most extreme manifestations, and the presence of regimes in certain states that are extremist in terms of their mentality, the probability of attempts to resort to the argument of force in the nuclear version is sharply increasing. The reported statement of a so-called member of the "international Serbian death squad" is very symptomatic in this regard. The essence of this statement is that in the event targets in the former Yugoslavia are bombed by NATO planes, nuclear charges on the territory of certain European states and the United States will be exploded. You may question whether the extremists have such charges and the very possibility of realizing such a threat as much as you want, but the fact remains: This is nuclear blackmail. The suggestion dropped in May 1994 by one of the representatives of the present Ukrainian leadership in connection with the aggravated situation concerning Crimea that, in the event of a development of events that are unfavorable to Kiev, it may revise its attitude toward the nuclear weapons deployed on Ukraine's territory, and at the same time the SALT-I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol was a variation of this political phenomenon.

In short, the monstrous "argument" has been put into political circulation. This confirms more and more the urgent need to take the most vigorous practical steps to make the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons regime universal and to provide a system of guarantees to exclude the possibility of nonsanctioned access to nuclear means.

It is notable that the multipolar structure of the world as compared to the bipolar structure creates many fewer

restraints, counterweights, and effective obstacles on the path of extremism and adventurism in politics, above all on the regional level. In a bipolar system, attempts to achieve political objectives by military means were mutually restrained. Wars and armed conflicts occurred as a rule in those regions of the world where the influence of the superpowers was the least. Overall stability not only in interrelations among states but even within the states was maintained. Frequently this was an illusion of stability, and moreover accompanied by the freezing of the power of dictators or totalitarian regimes, but even so armed clashes were blocked.

In the multipolar world that is taking shape, making a decision to seize part of the territory of another state has proved to be much easier for the aggressor (as in the event of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait) than even a few years ago. Incidentally, it was precisely after the war in the Persian Gulf that regional wars and low-intensity conflicts finally became a focus of attention in analyzing and evaluating threats to stability and peace.

By late 1991, the foundations of the present approach to using military force and the new substance of military strategy applicable to the international situation until the end of the 20th century had been defined in the United States. Their substance, as everyone knows, includes four basic provisions:

1. Strategic deterrence and strategic defense, an element of it, remain an important principle of the new military strategy.
2. The ability to respond to crisis situations.
3. Presence on the forward lines: deployment on a permanent or rotating basis of groupings of armed forces provided with appropriate forward bases; agreements with allies and friendly countries on access to bases (storage facilities); joint planning and conduct of exercises and other measures.
4. Restoration of military potential, regardless of forthcoming troop and arms reductions, preserve the capability to build up armed forces in the event a regional war escalates into a global one and the United States participates in it.

Such an approach means that the United States has changed the "bipolar" view of the world and acts from the idea that Russia and the CIS and other new independent states should not be considered potential enemies. This circumstance could not fail to have an effect on NATO military doctrine and the development of the armed forces of the main European countries. The essence of the strategic concept adopted at the session of the NATO Council in November 1991 amounts to changing the center of gravity of the bloc's efforts from preparations for a world war or a war on the entire European continent to preparations for limited or local wars. Instead of that, the concept affirms a broader view of security and fixes the necessity of stepping up the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of the activity of the North Atlantic Alliance. The military component is considered a guarantee against a return to confrontation as well as a factor that reduces the possibility of conflicts arising. In accordance with this, the European

NATO countries as well as the United States intend to reduce the number of people in their armed forces. For example, by the mid-1990s, the FRG plans to reduce this indicator by 24 percent, Great Britain—by 17 percent, and Italy—by 3 percent.

Military development in other states of the West is also oriented in this same direction.

Radical changes have occurred and continue to occur in the military doctrines and development of the Armed Forces of Russia and other new independent states that formed on the territory of the former USSR. Generally speaking, a historically unique situation has taken shape from the standpoint of the quantitative and qualitative changes in military force remaining after the collapse of the superpower. More than 10 national armies are being built on the basis of the mighty Armed Forces of the USSR, which possessed a wealth of military experience and traditions, a developed infrastructure, and powerful support systems. This process, which already is very painful, is even more complicated because of the mass withdrawal of troop groupings (from 1989 to August 1994 roughly 630,000 men) from the territories of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. And it is a great blessing for the new independent states, and indeed for all humankind, that the disintegration of such a threatening and complicated military organism did not lead to military cataclysms.

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[Text] The Armed Forces of Russia, which on 7 May 1994 marked its second anniversary, inherited from the former Armed Forces of the USSR organs of military administration, strategic and tactical formations, military units, establishments, organizations, and military educational institutions located on Russia's territory, as well as troop groupings and naval forces outside its borders but under Russian jurisdiction. On 2 November 1993, an edict of the Russian Federation president affirmed Russian military doctrine—a qualitatively new military-political document in comparison with the Soviet past and world experience.

Russia's military doctrine begins from a realistic evaluation of the military-political situation that took shape as a result of overcoming the confrontation created by the ideological standoff. It affirms the prevention of wars and military conflicts and preservation of peace as the basic priority tasks of the strategy for ensuring Russia's security. The absolute priority of political means for preventing, limiting, and resolving conflicts both in the international arena and within a country has also been established. The objective of Russia's policy in the area of nuclear weapons has also been presented—eliminating the danger of nuclear war by preventing aggression against Russia and its allies from escalating; clear and precise guarantees that these weapons will not be used have been given; and the desire to ban testing of these weapons and reduce them to a minimum level to ensure that strategic stability is maintained and eventually to eliminate them completely has been confirmed.

Russia does not treat even one state as its enemy. This doctrinal precept is supplemented by the provision that Russia considers all states whose politics do not damage its interests and are not in conflict with the UN Charter to be its partners in the cause of maintaining international peace

and security and preventing wars and armed conflicts. Russia will cooperate within the Commonwealth of Independent States—with its participants when resolving problems of collective defense and security and coordinating military policy and defense development. For the Russian Federation, this direction of cooperation is a priority one; on the regional level—with countries that participate in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as with other states and military-political structures in neighboring regions with existing or forming systems of collective security; on the global scale—with all states that are members of the United Nations Organization, above all within the framework of the UN Security Council, on the basis of the principles and norms of international law.

Consequently, the idea of the Partnership for Peace program was officially recorded in Russia's military doctrine long before it was advanced by the United States of America and reviewed and approved in NATO. This statement in no way represents a claim to supremacy; rather it indicates that the partnership strategy is an organic part of Russia's general security strategy and, on an even broader plane, of its political course on the international arena.

In strict accordance with this course, Russia is building and developing its relations with the United States of America on the basis of equal partnership using the experience of cooperation in the years of World War II. The historical memory of the peoples of Russia and the United States is not burdened with grave recollections and serious mutual insults, and consolidating Russia's security will help reinforce the security of the United States; while by contrast, with the other states that are members of NATO and the states of Eastern Europe, Russia intends to build relations on the basis of trust, cooperation, and good will and will strive to create a system of Eurasian security. With the states of the Far East, the Asian-Pacific Ocean Region, Southeast Asia, the Near and Middle East, Africa, and other countries, Russia is building relations based on good will and respect of mutual interests. Russia considers the Commonwealth states its friends and allies and relations with them priority relations.

Russia rejects the use or threat of the use of military force as a means to achieve political, economic, and other objectives. It consistently takes every possible step to use political means to resolve even the toughest international problems. Russia's policy on a settlement in Bosnia clearly confirms this. The rejection of reliance on military force is also manifested by the idea that Russia does not intend either now or in the foreseeable future to build up its military potential.

Russia's military-political leadership, in determining defense aspects of security, proceeds from the idea that, in contemporary conditions, political efforts to prevent war and to maintain, reestablish, and affirm peace may be effective only if they rely on sufficient military might. Taking into account the fairly high probability that military conflicts with limited political and strategic objectives will arise in regions adjacent to Russia and other CIS states and on the territory of the former USSR, above all on the southwestern and southern borders, as well as other factors of military danger caused, among other things, by certain states building up their military potential and by their desire

to dominate certain regions using military force in resolving disputes, the development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces is under way. The number of personnel is being constantly reduced; in 1994 alone more than 300,000 people cut by plan. Starting in early 1995, a provision of the law should go into effect that says that the number of personnel in Russia's armed forces should not exceed 1 percent of the country's population. By that time, the planned reduction of troops should be complete. A strictly defense grouping is being created within the borders of Russia's territory, and the obligations under international treaties and agreements in the area of the elimination and reduction of arms and military technology and restriction of military activity are being realized consistently and punctually.

The organizational, military-technical, and legal structuring and successful reformation and establishment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as an important feature of the new Russian state is one of the important factors of society's stability and effective resolution of the problems of national and collective security and regional and universal peace.

There are obviously sufficient grounds to extrapolate this conclusion to most participant states in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Signed in Bishkek on 9 December 1992, the Agreement on the Concept of Military Security of the Participant States in the Commonwealth provides general reference points and general guidelines for national military doctrines, plans and programs of military development, and approaches to preventing and settling armed conflicts, maintaining stability, and ensuring security and peace.

In accordance with this, the basic parameters of national armies are being defined. Thus, Ukraine plans to have an army with no more than 400,000–420,000 men by the year 1995, and with no more than 200,000–230,000 by the year 2000, given favorable development of the situation. Belarus expects to have armed forces with roughly 40 percent fewer personnel by the year 1994 than the grouping on Belorussian territory at the start of 1992. Eventually further reduction in the size of the army to 60,000–70,000 personnel is possible. The other CIS states are handling military development in the same key.

All the coordinated doctrinal provisions of the CIS states essentially became the military-political basis for the Treaty on Collective Security, an important instrument of protection of their national interests, united efforts, and optimization of expenditures to maintain individual and common security. Despite the obvious discrepancies in the processes occurring in the Commonwealth of Independent States, in particular in the area of defense development, it is precisely in this area that a very important, promising trend has been observed. I would call it an integrational trend, since it marked the change from division to unification, consolidation, and joint work to ensure national and collective security. And favorable prerequisites are being created to provide a civilized solution to problems related to the sphere of the interrelations of the Commonwealth states in the area of defense development, especially in everything that concerns the quantitative parameters, deployment, and makeup of troop groupings. As is well known, they must be

combined with a system of international treaties and agreements signed by the USSR and obligations of the successor states stemming from those treaties and agreements.

With the creation of the CIS, a qualitatively new situation emerged in connection with the levels of conventional arms as defined by the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe for the whole of the former Union, differentiated by regions. While the general ceiling of armaments had to be unconditionally observed in any case, regional levels needed to be redistributed among the Commonwealth states taking into account the formation of national armed forces and in strict compliance with the interests of both individual participant states and the CIS as a whole. Among other matters that came up in this connection was the problem of setting the quota for armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty for each Commonwealth state to whose territory the Treaty applies. In accordance with the Treaty and the Agreement among the former Warsaw Pact countries related to that Treaty, armaments and equipment must be redistributed among the CIS states within the maximum levels established for the former USSR.

This problem, which is of great international importance, was resolved after fairly prolonged and laborious joint work—the heads of the CIS states signed the Agreement on the Procedure and Principles of Realization of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on the Territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States. This Agreement formulated and fixed the provisions envisioning the realization of the reduction norms set for the former Soviet Union and took into account the need for and possibility of full-scale implementation of the control-inspection activity and exchange of information envisioned in the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, as well as maintenance of the infrastructure created for reducing armaments. As is well known, this infrastructure was created while preparations were being made to realize the Treaty within the framework of the former USSR. Taking into account the existing production base for the European territory of the former USSR, 25 sites for the liquidation and conversion of armaments and equipment were defined and prepared. The appropriate organizational and control structural subdivisions were formed. Additional production capabilities were allocated. Technologies for destroying planes and armored tank artillery and equipment were developed.

But the problem of flank limitations envisioned by the Treaty remains an extremely urgent one for Russia. A situation has arisen where the radical changes in the geopolitical landscape that occurred after the Treaty was signed do not fit the Procrustean bed of certain norms established by it. In particular, this applies to the number of pieces of military equipment envisioned for the domestic military districts of the former USSR, which, with its collapse, become border troops for Russia. Obviously a variant that takes account of the new political realities and satisfies all participants in the Treaty can and should be found. In any case, the logic of the establishment and development of the partnership system of international relations requires that particular situations—such as the problem of flank limitations—also be viewed in the general system of coordinates that establishes the unquestioned priority of the force of

arguments over the arguments of force while observing the principles of equality, mutuality, consideration of one another's interests, and equal security. It is precisely in this system of coordinates that the new democratic Russia is forming and realizing its military ideology and policy.

The Good Neighbor Zone

The president of Russia, B. N. Yeltsin, in formulating the basic principle of Russian foreign policy, defined it in this way: the creation of a good neighbor zone of friendly states. (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 February 1993)

This zone may be represented as a multilayered, concentric structure whose center is the state. The state's subregional, regional, and global interests determine the radius of the particular layer of the good neighbor zone.

The steady expansion of the good neighbor zone and the inclusion in it not only of states that are nearby geographically but even distant states and at some point in the future—all states of the world will satisfy Russia's regional interests.

The Structure of the State's National Interests

Each state has its own unique structure of interests. On the scale of the world community, their number is identical to the total number of states. In order to ensure stability, security, and peace, it is fundamentally important that their interaction be determined not based on the formula "supremacy—subordination," which presupposes satisfying one's own interests at the expense of others, but on the basis of cooperation, coexistence, and symbiosis.

In this context, Russia's system of national-state interests in the most general, concise form could look like this:

The circle of **subregional interests** encompasses all the new independent states formed on the territory of the former USSR. From the standpoint of the place and role of these states in the system of Russia's socioeconomic, military-political, cultural, ethnic, and historical relations, it is the zone of its natural special interests. Russia is linked to most of the states of this zone by multilateral and bilateral treaties. There are a considerable number of problems created by the present stage of development that are related among other things to the status of the Russian-speaking population and national minorities, ensuring the security of borders, the status of Russian troops that found themselves abroad as a result of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the USSR, and others. Their resolution is especially important to Russia. All this must be taken into account and all the states that together create the new democratic, partnership world order come from this.

The circle of **regional interests** includes the European, Near East, Middle East, Central Asian, and Far East regions and Asian-Pacific Ocean region as a whole. Russia's trade-economic, military-technical, scientific, cultural, diplomatic, and other ties with states of this zone are developed primarily on the basis of mutually advantageous bilateral agreements. The common interest of both Russia and all states of this zone obviously consists of all-out development and reinforcement of the entire complex of these ties on a partnership basis.

The circle of global interests encompasses the space of the whole planet and includes both the system of Russia's interrelations with states that are geographically remote from it and the entire spectrum of interaction with states of the world and international organizations to resolve problems of a worldwide nature: the nonproliferation, reduction, and liquidation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction; the prevention, localization, and termination of wars and armed conflicts; the prevention of ecological disasters and cleanup of their consequences, and protection of the environment; the fight against international crime, terrorism, and the narcotics business; and so forth.

This scheme, regardless of all its arbitrary qualities, makes it possible not only to ponder the many-colored palette of the state's interrelations with the surrounding world, but also to put it in order and obtain a certain methodological basis for determining or at least explaining priorities. Needless to say, national-state interests, as a living, developing substance, are not restrained within the framework of a particular circle. They may be adjusted depending on the regional and worldwide situation and may spread and flow over in directions either from the core or toward the core of the structure along radii (axes) with the terminals in the form of states with which bilateral relations are being implemented. Of course, the number and spectrum of these "axes" are different for each state. And the particular content of each axis—political, economic, military, military-technical, scientific, cultural, ethnic, religious, and so forth—depends on the hierarchy of national-state interests extrapolated to the real economic weight, potential, geostrategic position, orientation, and character of policy and other parameters of the state with which bilateral relations are being implemented.

Applied to Russian national-state interests, these axes are the following: Russia-United States, Russia-NATO, Russia-Asia-Pacific Region, and so forth. For example, the parameters of interrelations along the Russia-United States axis are determined or rather should be determined in accordance with the political declarations of the highest level according to the formula of equal strategic partnership. This formula presupposes the realization of principles that are already fixed in, among others, the SALT-1 and SALT-2 treaties, the Camp David Declaration, the Charter of Russian-American Partnership and Friendship, the Vancouver Declaration, and the Moscow Declaration of the Presidents of Russia and the United States. In any case, these documents affirm the durability of the new partnership trend in the development of Russian-American relations based on recognition and mutual consideration of one another's national interests.

Russia and the United States have a common goal: ensuring international stability, security, and peace. For Russia, the realization of this goal provides favorable external conditions to help make democratic transformations successful, to help overcome the domestic political and economic crisis, and to help implement integration in world economic ties. For the United States, it provides the same conditions for socioeconomic progress and resolution of fundamental international and domestic policy problems. That is the most important thing. The interests of the two powers coincide in a whole number of particular spheres. Among

others, they include mutual interest in the development of bilateral cooperation in the area of strengthening international security and intensifying control over armaments; a general desire to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and uncontrolled use of dual-purpose technologies; mutual interest in preventing regional conflicts that are a destabilizing factor in international relations; refusal to accept aggressive, authoritarian regimes that represent a threat to security and the balance of forces in certain regions; the fight against international terrorism and the narcotics business; general adherence to the principles of democracy and compliance with individual rights; and development of cultural, scientific, and humanitarian cooperation.

Needless to say, there are spheres where Russian and American interests do not coincide. This applies above all to certain approaches to settling regional conflicts; to determining priorities in policy toward the states of Eastern and Central Europe; to recognizing the objective and purposeful nature of Russia's position as the center of strength and its special interests on the territory of the former USSR; to Russian exports to the United States and to ensuring Russia equitable efforts on the world market; and others.

The development of Russian-American partnership on the strategic level demands that national priorities be specified and basic interests be coordinated. It should be absolutely clear that the fact that they do not coincide, on the one hand, is natural and does not represent a threat to national and international security, and, on the other, demands an active and constructive dialogue and a joint search for mutually acceptable compromises in order to ensure a necessary and sufficient balance of interests.

This balance is not only possible but even necessary, since strategic partnership objectively helps strengthen national and global security, and hence is simply **economically advantageous for both** countries. First, it makes it possible to reduce military budgets. Second, it opens up prospects for reducing the volume of military aid to third countries. Third, it reduces the probability of the appearance of regional crises and conflicts requiring enormous financial and material expenditures. A Russian-American strategic partnership is no less advantageous politically, if only because Russia's isolation or self-isolation is in conflict with the interests of both Russia itself and of the United States: In both cases, this is the same as pulling the entire system of international relations back into the past, to the situation characteristic of the "cold war." And, finally, a Russian-American partnership promises direct advantages to both states on the military level. Here Russia's ongoing and long-term interests in many respects coincide with the United States' interests and are associated with ensuring guarantees of security, deterring possible aggressors, organizing interaction while adopting decisions on using or refusing to use force as an instrument for maintaining peace, and so forth.

The common desire to create a reliable and stable system of international—regional and global—security unites Russia and the United States. Their efforts today are concentrated in a number of general directions. Among them are: preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and missile technologies; prohibiting and creating

guarantees that exclude the possibility of the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction; settling conflicts and crises arising against the background of the general change in the military-political situation and the establishment of new independent states in Europe and Asia; preventing strategic stability from being undermined as a result of violation of international understandings in the area of arms limitation and reductions, and others.

Successfully overcoming the present difficult stage of general world development, the transition stage from the former, confrontational order to a new partnership world order, depends to a definitive degree on Russia and the United States by virtue of their geostrategic position. In the context of this transition, obviously Russian-American efforts should also be consolidated, among other things to step up activity and raise the role and significance of, and when necessary reorganize and refine, international organizations and structures of security, above all the United Nations, the CSCE, and others.

Interrelations along the Russia-NATO axis. Just as the North Atlantic Alliance, despite the collapse of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the obvious absence of a "threat from the East," continues to exist, so the development of relations with it in the direction of expanded interaction to maintain international security is in keeping with Russia's national interests. Needless to say, this means in the context of the intensification of the Helsinki process, the strengthening of the CSCE, and movement toward a European-wide, nonbloc system of security.

There are all the necessary prerequisites to develop this process and make it dynamic and effective. Above all this is the operation of the CNAC—the Council of North Atlantic Cooperation, the independent organ of the **European-wide** military-political mechanism closely connected to the CSCE for the prevention and settlement of crises and armed conflicts. At some point in the future, the CNAC, as the military component of a nonbloc system of security, could take over, along with the political-diplomatic mechanism of the CSCE, the reconciliation and coordination of efforts and interaction of all regional and interregional structures in the area of strengthening security, including NATO, the Western European Alliance, the European Community, and the CIS.

We can definitely see that an opportunity is opening up here for organizing and implementing partnership on a qualitatively new level, which can be a full-fledged cornerstone of the foundation of the worldwide, global system of security. It is precisely this point of view that makes the NATO Partnership for Peace [PFP] program, one of the first steps toward creating this system, attractive. That is precisely why it is in fact wise to implement Russia's partnership with NATO along the entire spectrum of interrelations in the field of ensuring security and peace: from political consultations and participation on a permanent basis in the activity of the management and planning organs of PFP to coordination of military planning, joint military activity, preparation and conduct of peace-keeping operations, training of cadres, and disarmament and monitoring of arms. We can expect that this partnership, which is interrelated with the interests not only of the group of states united in the North Atlantic Alliance but also with those of the CIS

participant states and all 53 states of the CSCE, will serve to truly strengthen stability and peace in the entire range of their vital activity.

Naturally, interrelations along the Russia-NATO axis represent a unique kind of a broad-scale military-political thrust of its interrelations with the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance. In this sense, the Russia-NATO axis, technically speaking, is a multichanneled one.

Another example is interrelations along the Russia—Asia-Pacific Region axis. Of course, this axis, although it is certainly not an ally axis but a geographic one is also a multichanneled one. The Asia-Pacific Region lacks a clearly manifested bloc system. The presence of the United States of America, China, Japan, Russia, India, and other powers in it predetermines a variety of interconnections of their national interests. They interact against the background of a whole number of complex interstate problems. Among them are the problem of the South Kuriles; the problem of Korea and the nonnuclear status of the Korean Peninsula; the problem of Taiwan; the border disputes of China with India, Vietnam with Laos, and Thailand with Campuchea; and the Chinese-Vietnamese-Philippine problem of the islands in the South China Sea, and others.

This makes creating an organization like the CSCE and adopting a document like the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 difficult, bearing in mind above all its key point on the inviolability of state borders. In this connection, the idea of creating a crisis settlement system in Northeast Asia with a Center To Prevent Crisis Situations suggested by the Russian president in Seoul in November 1992 is pressing. Its realization presupposes a great deal of preliminary work, above all to strengthen trust and develop cooperation in the areas of economics, culture, ecology, and so forth. A number of constructive proposals oriented to cooperation were advanced by the May (1994) forum of ASEAN.

Strengthening security and stability in the region and establishing good neighbor, partnership relations with the Asia-Pacific countries is in keeping with Russia's vital interests. Among other things, in interrelations with the United States, the experience of bilateral negotiations on arms limitations and on measures of trust regarding all types of military activity is useful here. In Russo-Chinese relations, support of China's proposal to create a "mechanism of international security" in the Asia-Pacific region, which was officially presented at the International Conference on Questions of National Security and Trust Among States of the Asia-Pacific Region in Nepal in February 1993, as well as completion of the revision of state borders and the large-scale launching of economic cooperation, can play an important role. Russia's ties with Japan have a great deal of constructive potential. The Russo-Japanese documents signed in Tokyo in October 1993 (the Agreement on Preventing Incidents at Sea Outside Territorial Waters and in Air Space Over Them, the Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Eliminating Nuclear Weapons Subject to Reductions in Russia, and others) could mark the beginning of new bilateral understandings in the area of security and measures of trust between the two states, which undoubtedly would promote the general settlement of military-political problems and strengthen stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Just as in these states, Russia wants to have good neighbors represented by India, Pakistan, and other states of South-east Asia and the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins and is prepared to develop equitable, partnership relations with them and promote their inclusion in the worldwide system of security, which guarantees stability and peace to peoples. That is Russia's fundamental approach to the formation, transformation on a new basis, development, and deepening of interrelations along all other "axes," whatever their azimuths and whatever regions the partner states are located in.

National-state interests are a reference point of the new system of coordinates in which international relations are developing today. Earlier they were frequently ignored, hushed up, trampled upon, discarded, and camouflaged. Now they are gradually being incorporated into the mechanism of interaction, cooperation, and partnership being created by common efforts. The overriding task of this mechanism is to see that political-diplomatic and other nonmilitary measures and means quell conflicting, opposing interests and that ways and methods to reconcile collisions and to develop, intensify, multiply, and integrate the common interests of states are found and used. That is precisely the essence of the strategy of partnership. Rid of hegemonic ambitions and ideological frameworks and conventions and associated by bonds of equality, mutual advantage, respect, and cooperation, national-state interests are good building material for partnership. Partnership is the universal key to a just, prosperous, stable, and secure world order. It is the future of humankind.

GROUND TROOPS

T-80 Models, 2S7 Profiled

94UM0276A Warsaw *NOWA TECHNIKA WOJSKOWA* in Polish, Special Issue 1994 pp 5-23

[Article by Janusz Magnuski: Soviet/Russian Medium-Size Tanks 1945-93]

[Excerpt] Because many not yet completely proved out new technical features had been included in a single design, the first prototypes of Objects 430 and 432 were designated for testing in 1960. The elaborate military tests revealed a need for successive revisions and improvements so that only as late as 1967 was the tank accepted by Ordnance as the T-64 and subsequently produced in small series. Since 1969 it was followed by the T-64A with a 125 mm smooth-bore cannon, this feature making the vehicle exceed equivalent foreign ones in terms of fire power. Meanwhile serious problems with the unconventional construction continued to persist until they were successfully solved in the nineteen seventies. Since 1976 there were put in production first the T-64B carrying "Kobra" guided missiles, later its modernized versions such as the one with a repelling armor plate and then the latest series with the better and more powerful 6DT engine. Production of this tank was completed in 1987, and its many versions are still a part the armored equipment in use not only by the Russian army but also by the armies of other CIS members. It is worth noting that this type of tank was never exported or produced under a license outside

the USSR. The structural components of the T-64 (chiefly its self-supported carriage) were included in the all-purpose transport truck (Object 429), which had also been developed at the A. Morozov engineering office and accepted by Ordnance as the MT-T. On the basis of this MT-T truck were subsequently built several machines for the Engineering Corps (BAT-2, MDK-3, and other ones), the PTS-2 caterpillar boat-tractor, and the PMM-2M self-propelled caterpillar ferry. According to American sources of information dating back to the nineteen eighties, the first two series of the S-300W air defense system (Nato code-named SA-12a Gladiator and SA-12b Giant) were mounted on trucks which have evolved from the original MT-T.

Problems arising with the first few T-64 series have made it necessary to have also other engineering offices participate in the modernization of this tank, first on their own initiative and later on orders placed by the Ministry of the Armaments Industry.

One of the first steps taken in this direction was redesign of the loading mechanism for the 125 mm cannon, this new mechanism having been designed under the guidance of L. Kartsev and tested in the T-62 prototype tank. In 1968 he proposed replacing the unreliable 5TD engine with the already proved out and modernized, nearly 700 hp strong, W-45 engine, this engine having been later replaced by the W-46 model with its conventional cooling system. In the course of further testing the original self-supported carriage of the T-64 was replaced with the carriage designed at the L. Kartsev engineering office on the basis of the Object 140 built in the nineteen fifties. The thus totally rebuilt tank (Object 172M) passed successfully through all tests under various climatic conditions with better results than had the T-64. It was accepted for armament as the T-72, its series production having then begun a year later and continuing to this day.

The State Prize for this tank was awarded to V. Venediktov, L. Kartsev's deputy, who had meanwhile become Chief Engineer at the Ural Railroad Car Manufacturing Plant (UVZ).

Many parts of the T-72 are standardized with those of the T-64: hull, turret, weapons, firing controls, etc. However its engine, cannon loading mechanism, and some structural members of the hull are different. As of now there exist at least eight basic versions of the vehicle and not fewer than four versions for export. Production of the T-72 under license was undertaken in the Polish People's Republic, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and also in India.

Both the T-72 and the T-64 rank equally high as basic tank types in the equipment of Russian and other CIS armored army divisions.

Also special vehicles based on the T-72 design have been built in Russia for its army, namely: the VREM-1 armored recover vehicle and the MTU-72 mobile bridge, also both IMR-2 and IMR-2M armored vehicles for the Engineering Corps. While prototypes of the T-72 were being built in Nizhny Tagil, the engineering office at the Leningrad Kirov Plant (LKZ) was designing still another type of tank (Object 219) later accepted by Ordnance as the T-80. Its history and development, also its structure, will be described later in this *NOWA TECHNIKA WOJSKOWA* article. Here it will

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be noted only that while the T-80 is largely standardized with the T-64 and the T-72 in terms of weapons and armor, its different features are first of all its drive system and then also its self-supported carriage structurally resembling that of many similar foreign tank types.

Considering that the T-80 has been in production for almost 18 years, and also on the basis of other governing time factors, one may assume that:

- The possibilities of modernizing the T-80 are being exhausted.
- The next new type of basic combat tank is already accepted for armament and even its production technology has perhaps already been mastered (accessible Western sources report a new 135-140 mm caliber tank cannon in vehicles tentatively designated as FST-1 and FT-2; other sources are "hinting" at a 125 mm caliber cannon, but this one for liquid propellant).
- A potential successor to this not yet known new basic tank is already in the design or even prototype testing stage.

The basic characteristic feature distinguishing the T-80 tank from the similar T-64 and T-72 models in terms of combat capability is its engine: a gas turbine. While development of the T-80 began in the early nineteen seventies, that of its engine began already in the nineteen fifties.

In those years the heavy Klim Voroshilov tank was conceived and extensive research on the use of gas turbines in ground transportation vehicles was done at the Scientific Research Institute of Transportation Machinery, successor to the LKZ Special Engineering Office in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). During the 1948-49 period the engineering office at the LKZ Turbine Department, commissioned by the Main Armor Directorate (GBTU), worked on a preliminary "gas turbine for tanks" project. This project did not meet all requirements and was canceled by the army.

During the 1955-58 period the LKZ engineering office, on orders placed by the GBTU, did work on a "gas turbine for heavy tanks" project. This one was carried through up to construction of the first two prototype gas turbines in the USSR for the new heavy tank (Object 288) designed by Zh. Kotin and his team. At that time such engines were not in great demand, however, because all work on heavy tanks in the USSR had been suspended.

In 1963 the Leningrad V. Klimov Scientific-Industrial Association, specializing in helicopter engines under its chief engineer S. Izotov, was included in the work program on gas turbines for ground transportation vehicles. Not quite three years later an experimental tank chassis (Object 288) was built with two coupled gas turbines taken each from a helicopter. This coupling of two engines turned out not be the best solution so that further efforts were directed toward construction of a single turbine with the appropriate power rating, which finally resulted in the GTD-1000 engine.

In 1976 the LKZ tank engineering office under the direction of its chief engineer N.S. Popov, prepared the basic T-80 tank (Object 219) for series production. This very tank then became the first in the world series-produced standard one with a gas turbine (series production of the U.S. M1 Abrams tank began in 1980).

One must emphasize here the high degree of standardization of entire structurally similar components achieved in the T-80 as well as in both T-64A and T-72 tanks with an occasionally identical construction of hulls, turrets, and weapons control mechanisms, as well as with identical sighting and observation instruments.

**Table 1. T-80 Tank
Comparative Data on Tanks T-64A T-72 T-80**

	T-64A	T-72	T-80
Weight	38.5	41	42
Crew	3	3	3
Overall length (mm)	9225	9530	9656
Length of hull (mm)	6540	6860	6982
Width (mm)	3290	3370	3380
Height (mm)	2170	2190	2193
Length of track, thread-ground contact surface (mm)	4242	4270	4279
Clearance (mm)	500	470	451
Specific power (hp/ton)	18	19	24
Ground pressure (kgf/cm ²)	0.84	0.83	0.83

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It can be seen from these data that the T-80 is close to the T-72 in terms of overall dimensions. It is the heaviest one of all but, owing to its 1000 hp gas turbine, has the highest specific power (the T-64 and the T-72 have only 700 hp and 780 hp Diesel engines respectively). Also in terms of maneuverability is the T-80 in no way inferior to the two other tanks. Each of the three tanks can be readily recognized by its characteristic hull and engine cover plate.

In the course of series production the T-80 was several times updated. Two years after its production had begun, the basic model was replaced by the T-80B version (Object 219R) differing from the basic one by including a 9K112 Kobra missile system with an electronic firing control system. While the T-80 could operate with an either optical or laser rangefinder, only a laser rangefinder was installed in the T-80B. In 1980 a turret standardized with the T-64B turret was put in production and the GTD-1000T engine was replaced with the improved GTD-1000TF model. The turret armor was reinforced in 1982 and in 1984 also the hull was reinforced, by welding-on a 30 mm thick additional plate in front.

The commander's T-80BK tank (Object 630) did not carry a Kobra rocket set.

In 1985 began production of the T-80BV version (Object 219BV) equipped with an additional armor plate: a KDZ repelling one.

At that time the T-80U (Object 219AS) was also put in production with a dual firing control system, enabling the

commander to fire all the types of projectiles on board except rockets. In this version of the T-80 tank the Kobra missile system was replaced by a 9K119 "Refleks" set with laser-aided homing.

It should be added here that at the same time was being built the T-80U1 version (Object 219A) equipped with Kobra missiles.

In the T-80U version the large-caliber anti-aircraft machine gun was mounted not on the commander's turret but on a special base steered from inside the tank (on some vehicles).

At the end of the nineteen eighties the T-80U was equipped with a complete set of built-in KDZ repelling armor plates and a GTD-1200 higher-power engine.

After production of the T-64B had ended, the M. Malyshev Transportation Machinery Manufacturing Plant in Kharkov was recruited for participation in the T-80 production program. Here was developed an up-to-date version of that vehicle, with a 6TD 1000 hp turbosupercharged reciprocating Diesel engine (upgraded 5TDF engine). This tank version with such a drive was named the T-80U (Object 478B). The factory-assembled KDZ repelling armor was analogous to the similar one used on both T-80 and T-80U1 tanks, except for the different number of attachable members ("ribs"). Unlike in all previous versions, the anti-aircraft machine gun in the T-80U1D was steered from inside the vehicle.

In 1990 the Kirov Works ceased building the T-80U1 and its series production from then on has continued in the Omsk Machine Manufacturing Plant. Meanwhile the T-80 is being further modernized and so, for instance, a 1500 hp gas turbine is now being tested.

Production of the T-80U1D in Kharkov became virtually paralyzed upon disintegration of the Soviet Union, inasmuch as up to 70 % of the main components (hulls, turrets, cannons, electronics, a.o.) had been previously supplied by collaborating suppliers located on Russian territory.

It is difficult to quote the exact number of T-80 tanks produced during the last 16 years. Such data were never officially published. However, from the numbers supplied by the Soviet delegation during talks in Vienna on CFE one can conclude that there were altogether 4839 T-80 tanks of all modifications in the European part of the USSR and with units of the Soviet army then stationed in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, etc. Considering that the T-80 tanks were assigned to army units most ready for combat duty (those strategically facing the West) while hardly any were dispatched to army units in Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Far East, one may regard the number 4839 number as representing close to 100 % of all T-80 tanks. [Editor's Note: The data cited by this author (according to which on the average 300 vehicles annually were produced in three factories) are published here with reservations].

Description of Tank T-80 Structure

General structural layout. The interior of this tank is divided into three basic compartments: control, combat, drive. The control compartment is located in the front part of the hull. In the middle of it there is a seat for the mechanic-driver behind steering levers on the floor. Inside a hole in the

forward glacis plate of the hull are mounted TNPO-160 vision blocks. For night-time driving they are replaced with TVNYe-4B instruments. Behind the seat there is an extra hatchway for emergency exit. On the right side of the seat are auxiliary fuel containers and a magazine with some of the ammunition. On the left side of the seat are the main fuel container, a panel with driver controls and with instruments monitoring the electric network on board the tank, also a storage battery with accessories mounted on it.

The combat compartment is located in the middle part of the hull under a rotary turret, in that turret being located the principal tank weapon: a 125 mm smooth-bore cannon with an automated ammunition feed system which not only transports, delivers, and feeds the ammunition to the cannon but also intercepts and drops the spent shell casings. The bottom plate of the turret, its "basket", is located inside the hull. The commander's seat and the gunner's seat are located respectively on the right side and on the left side of the turret. Each seat is furnished with a foot stool and a removable armor plate, these two crew members thus remaining safe when the cannon stabilizer is turned on and the cannon loading system operates in the firing mode. On the right side of the cannon there are also a coupled to it PKT 7.62 mm machine gun, a TPU R-124 intercom set, an R-123M radio station (R-173 in the latest tanks), and an ammunition feed control panel.

In the roof of the turret above the commander's seat has been installed a small cupola with a hatchway. Inside that cupola are mounted two TNPO-160 observation periscopes, a TKN-3 commander's observation instrument, and two TNPA-65 observation periscopes.

In the turret in front of the gunner's seat are located a sight-rangefinder, a night-sight, a gunner's panel, two devices for manual deflection of the turret and elevation of the cannon respectively, and a panel with controls for release of 902B "Tucha" smoke grenades. The gunner's hatchway is closed by a cover into which there has been mounted one TNPA-65 observation periscope.

The rotary "magazine" ring of the cannon loading mechanism is located in the lower part of the cabin.

The drive compartment is in the rear of the hull. The drive, namely the gas turbine, has been mounted here lengthwise. Power is transmitted to the drive shafts extending from lateral gearboxes on both sides of the turbine output speed reducer. Each lateral gearbox is mounted coaxially in a case with a lateral planetary gear train which directly drives the road wheels.

The turbine stands in a block together with an oil sump and air filters for the engine, some components of the smoke generating heat equipment, a BNK-12TD fuel pump, an AK-150SV high-pressure air compressor including an automatic pressure regulator, cooling and dust precipitating fans, an oil pump for the entire drive system, a GTs-18MO electric generator, and a GS-12TO starter.

The engine monoblock is secured to the hull at three points: by two brackets and one front support, the latter being fastened to the cover of the drive compartment. On the left side of this monoblock is a fuel distributor and on its right side is placed an oil container for the drive system. Between

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the engine and the rear cover plate of the hull there is another internal fuel container resting on resilient rubber mounts.

The cover of the drive compartment, a removable one, consists of two plates one behind the other. It can be lifted by one person and will then remain in the open position. Its front part has a built-in inlet shutter with a set of slats covered by a removable metal screen.

On the outside of the tank, mainly on the fenders, are fastened: external fuel containers connecting to the entire fuel supply system, boxes with the spare parts and accessories kit (ZIP), towlines, spare track links, a jack lever (automatic jack), mounts for additional fuel barrels, a part of the fording kit, a tarpaulin and camouflaging nets, a protective shield for the driver, and a part of the ammunition supply for the large-caliber anti-aircraft machine gun.

Construction of the tank hull. The hull of the T-80 tank is a rigid housing formed by armor plates which have been joined by welding. It consists of a front part, sides, a rear part, a bottom, and a cover. It also includes both partition and cover of the drive compartment.

The front compartment of the hull is formed by upper and lower armor plates sloping at wide angles and joined not only together but also to the upper front plate, the side plates, and the bottom plate. On the welds joining the front plate and the side plates are mounted brackets for live track rollers. To the glacis plate are welded: two tow hooks with spring-loaded latches, two brackets with guards for mounting the headlight reflectors, conduits carrying electrical wires for the headlights and the parking lights, and towline hangers.

The sides of the hull are forged vertical armor plates. On the outside are welded: brackets for rocker arms and wheel jerk limiters, brackets for rollers supporting the upper track, and hooks for the shock absorbers. In addition, to the side plates of the hull are welded fenders which carry spare parts and outdoor fuel containers. Above the fender tension wheels are located movable track guards which, like the armor side plates, can be swung open for technical maintenance work.

The rear part of the hull is formed by two plates, an upper one and a lower one connected by a welding joint. On the outside are welded two tow hooks with spring-loaded latches and are mounted: an exhaust shutter with a set of slats on hinges and with locks which hold them in place, brackets for fastening the rear parking lights and brackets for additional fuel barrels, lugs for straps securely holding the jack levers and for straps securely holding the spare caterpillar belt links.

The outlet shutter slats can be held in two positions by means of locks and ratchets. Following activation of the protective system for weapons of mass destruction, the slats will swing on their stems so as to close up the exhaust vents and thus protect the driver compartment against the effect of a shock wave generated by nuclear explosion.

The bottom of the hull, its "cradle", consists of three welded-on to one another armor plates. Several cuppings formed in the bottom plate make it more rigid and provide room for insertion of torsion rods. There is, by the way, also an cupping under the driver seat in the front compartment.

In addition there are several holes in that plate, under removable covers, which provide access for the maintenance crew.

In the drive compartment are located the lateral gearboxes in crank cases and mounting blocks for the engine. There is also a built-in partition here which separates the driver's compartment from the engine compartment.

Tank turret. The tank turret is a shaped casting of armor steel to which are welded-on a roof and also the armor plate of the 1G42 sight- rangefinder. In the front part of the turret there is a hole for the cannon barrel. On its right side there has been provided an oval (firing) hole for the coaxial machine gun. To the left side of the cannon hole is welded-on a bracket which holds the reflector of the 1-4A night sight. To both sides are welded-on attachment lugs for the smoke grenade launcher. In front of the outlet hole for the sight-rangefinder are welded-on lateral armor plates. Hooks are welded-on to the front and to the rear of the turret, two lifting hooks on each side. The commander's cupola is mounted within the right half of the roof. Within the left half of the roof are a gunner's hatchway and a hoop for seating the TPNZ-49 nocturnal sighting instrument, also a hole for insertion of the gunner's observation periscope and rear suspension of the sight-rangefinder.

In the rear part of the turret are welded-on to it lugs for mounting the brackets which hold a set of fixtures (enclosure) for the hooked-on OPVT underwater travel gear, lugs for a tarpaulin, and lugs for a camouflaging net. To the roof of the turret are also welded-on lugs for securely holding the wind speed sensor.

In the lower part of the turret is a cutout to the edge of which has been welded-on the turret basket. Threaded holes have been cut in this bottom plate for fastening bolts which secure the upper turret base plate. The turret itself is mounted on ball bearings which have been inserted in a round hole through both front and rear roof plates of the hull.

Weapons. The weapons of the tank are: a 2A46M-1 125 mm smooth-bore cannon and a coaxial PKT 7.62 mm machine gun, an Utios NSVT-12.7 mm large-caliber machine gun, ammunition for the cannon and the machine guns, a mechanized ammunition feed system, a 1A33 firing control system, and a 9K112-1 guided weapons system.

The cannon rests on trunnions in the turret. The hole is closed in front by an armor plate fastened to the cradle by screws, this plate being protected on the outside by a tarpaulin and on the inside the turret by additional gaskets.

The cannon consists of a tube reinforced by a jacket and screwed into the breech. In the middle segment of the tube is located a barrel exhaust port. The lock socket is also holding the lock. The part of the barrel extending beyond the armor plate is wrapped in a thermal insulating jacket which minimizes deformation of the barrel due to changes of atmospheric conditions. This shield consist of four segments with buckles and clips.

The movable part of the cannon, without armor plate and stabilizer, weighs 2443 kg. Its firing rate is 6-8 shots/min. The absolute firing range (at a 2 m tall target) with a subcaliber armor-piercing projectiles bullet is 2120 m.

The 2A46M-1 cannon differs from the 2A46-2 cannon on some T-80B tanks, principally by its symmetrically mounted support turntables and quickly restorable barrel-lock connection.

The function of the large-caliber anti-aircraft machine gun is to strike targets in air and on ground within a 2000 m range. Its mounting allows firing in any position within a complete 360° horizontal sweep and vertical homing within the -5° to +75° range. The complete system which ensures an effective firing operation consists of that large-caliber machine gun, the gun stock, a cradle, a stabilizing mechanism, a mechanism for vertical and horizontal sighting, a magazine with ammunition belts, a container for links of depleted ammunition belts, and a K10-T sighting instrument.

For shooting is used 12.7 mm ammunition with B-32 armor-piercing tracer projectiles and BZT-44 armor-piercing incendiary projectiles containing a tracer.

Disposition of the firing unit. The cannon ammunition are 38-40 launching charges in cartridges and the same numbers of subcaliber armor-piercing projectiles, HE fragmentation rounds, shaped-charge and guided missiles. The cartridges are disposed as follows: 28 arbitrarily stacked in the autoloader magazine, 7 in the control compartment, and 5 in the combat compartment. Five missiles and seven cartridges in the control compartment are placed in a crate, while two missiles stand up vertically next to it. Three of the five cartridges in the combat compartment carry armor-piercing projectiles, while the other two for those missiles are placed between the containers which stand in the middle on a partition.

Seven magazines with ammunition for the PKT machine gun are placed in the combat compartment and one is placed directly on the gun. The magazines with ammunition for the NSVT large-caliber machine gun are placed two in the back of the turret niche and one directly on that machine gun.

The cartridges for an AKM automatic rifle are in two bags (150 in each), one of the bags placed securely in the turret niche on the right side and the other one placed on the shelf in the turret behind the commander's seat.

There are F-1 hand grenades in a bag placed securely on a rack on the floor of the combat compartment behind the gunner's seat.

Cannon automatic loading system. This is a set of hydraulic, electrical, and mechanical devices for automatic loading of the cannon with any selected kind of ammunition available.

The ammunition holding part of the feed system includes 28 feeder-grip mechanisms for transport of trays carrying rounds into the loading position, i.e., its position along the longitudinal axis at which such a tray will be hooked-on to the feeder lever. The ammunition magazine is a ring structure with an upper ring and lower one connected by an array of columns. It is located outside the cabin of the combat compartment and fastened to the inside flange of the turret base seated on a ball bearing.

The magazine rotating mechanism of the ammunition feed system is fastened to the upper turret flange and to the cabin floor on the left side of the commander's seat. This either hydraulically or manually driven mechanism, a speed reducer, is coupled to the sprocket ring on the magazine roller.

The feeder leads a tray with cartridges into the "delivery line" (upper position of a tray after it has been lifted by the feeder lever), while the cannon is being moved into the "delivery angle" position (corresponding to alignment of the marker on the gunner's stationary armor plate with the marker on the cannon's left armor plate). When the stabilizer is turned on, guiding the cannon into its "delivery angle" position is done by means of a manual cannon elevation mechanism.

Each of the 28 trays of the cannon loading system consists of two half-trays coupled through a universal joint and designed to facilitate - loading rounds on them - transporting the rounds to the delivery line - steering rounds in the delivery channel into the ammunition chamber - placing the casings of spent rounds in the magazine. The upper half-trays carry rounds and they stand up vertically behind the cabin, while the lower half-carts carry missiles and they are laid horizontally under the cabin floor.

The delivery mechanism, mounted on the lower plate in the turret niche, consists of a striker and a speed reducer with a sprocket wheel driving the conveyor chain. On the reducer is mounted a device actuating the mechanism which ejects the spent casings and on the striker is mounted a conveyor switch. This switch signals the position of the chain to the electric system of the ammunition feed system and thus ensures release of the feeder lever after the chain has returned to its initial position. The chains of the conveyor which deliver rounds to the breech consist each of a left branch and a right branch connected by a rubber-lined key with a bolt.

The function of the interception mechanism is to catch and hold the spent casings ejected after firing and to drop them in the first empty cart after the next loading operation. This mechanism, consisting of a sweeper, a cord drive, and a screen-opening lever, is mounted on the cannon's left armor plate.

A loading cycle begins with setting the lever of the ballistic switch in the position appropriate for the kind of ammunition selected and pressing the cannon loading push-button on the sight-rangefinder. At that time a servomotor driving a hydraulic pump is actuated, the feeder lever drops into its lower position, and the magazine with ammunition begins to revolve. After a tray with the selected kind of ammunition has reached the delivery position, the magazine slows down and stops. While the magazine is rotating, the cannon barrel is simultaneously being secured in its loading position by the bolt of a hydromechanical lock and the cart with ammunition is put on the delivery line. When on this line, the cart opens to unload its contents into the cannon's ammunition chamber and then the lock closes. A green indicator lights up on the sighting instrument, to signal that the cannon is loaded.

As the conveyor chain returns, the spent shell is transferred from the interceptor to an empty tray. The feeder lever moves the tray into the lower position, while the cannon barrel is unlocked and moves into the position which matches the line of sight. The loading cycle is completed and the cannon is ready to fire.

Because of its specific structural characteristics, this cassetteless cannon loading mechanism on T-64 and T-80 tanks has been called "Korzina" (Basket).

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FCS 1A33 Fire control system. The 1A33 fire control system makes possible effective firing from both the cannon and the coaxial machine gun at tanks and other armored targets moving at speeds up to 75 km/h, at small targets (combat shelters, etc.), and at infantry. Firing can be done at rest and in motion at up to 30 km/h speeds, the de facto range of the cannon being 1 km, also under conditions of direct visibility through the sight-rangefinder and from hidden positions as well.

The FCS 1A33 firing control system together with the 9K112-1 guided weapon system makes possible firing guided missiles. The components of this system are: - 1G42 optical quantum monocular periscopic sight-rangefinder with line of sight stabilization in two planes - 1V517 ballistic tank computer with input data processor - 1V43 ammunition selector - E26M electrohydraulic stabilizer for weapon stabilization in two planes - voltage and frequency step-down transformer - wind sensor - slope sensor - tank speed sensor - course angle sensor

Guided weapons set 9K112-1. This set mounted in the T-80B tank makes possible firing guided missiles from the cannon at targets up to 4000 m away under conditions of direct visibility through the 1G42 sight-rangefinder while such a target (tank or other armored vehicle) moves at speeds up to 75 km/h. Firing can be done from a tank at standstill or moving at speeds up to 30 km/h.

The 9K112-1 set is functionally coupled to the FCS 1A33 firing control system and ensures: - possibility of simultaneous firing guided missiles from a company of tanks at close targets, simultaneously at the same target from two tanks at least 30 m apart, also with radio communication over various frequency channels and in various codes - firing guided missiles at elevation angles from -7° to $+11^\circ$ and with the tank yawing through up to 15° angles, also above water terrain - possibility of shooting at helicopters from an up to 4000 m distance, provided the target has been sighted from a distance of at least 5000 m, at helicopters moving at up to 500 m altitudes and up to 300 km/h speeds

The components of the 9K112-1 set are: - 9M112 missile - control network module - 9S461-1 tank version of guidance apparatus: transmission device, command formation and control module, photodetector, control and indication module, antenna module, and set of waveguides - converter with regulator set - collaborating FCS 1A33 components

The apparatus is located in the combat compartment of the tank, its independently mounted modules being easily replaceable. The set features a semiautomatic missile guidance system which uses a modulated light source on the missile and command signals transmitted by radio. With the aid of the 9S461-1 guidance apparatus are determined the missile flight coordinates and formed the flight control commands, which are then transmitted over radio waves to deck of the missile.

After launching, a light signal from the modulated source on the missile passes through the optical system of the sight-rangefinder and then enters the photodetector. At the same time the 9S461-1 coordinate data receiver generates voltages which steer the course and voltages proportional to the angular deviations of the missile path from the optical axis of that coordinate data receiver. The guidance voltages are

converted with the aid of programming unit for transmission to a module of amplifiers which form course command voltages. These voltages are sent to an encoder for conversion into video pulses, which in turn are sent to the radio transmitter and there converted into powerful high-frequency pulses. These pulses are then transmitted through waveguides and an antenna to the guided missile. The radio signals entering the radio receiver on the missile are decoded for conversion by a gyroscopic command separator into guidance voltages, then amplified and so sent to the steering apparatus in the missile. Its rudders then return the missile to the line of sight.

In this way guidance of a missile in flight proceeds in a closed automatic cycle. After a missile has been fired, the task of the sighting instrument is to keep its corresponding marker on the target throughout the missile flight toward that target.

A 9M112 missile is equipped with crescent stabilizers which produce a bearing force and rotate the missile about its longitudinal axis during its flight with guidance provided by deflection of rudders. A missile has two parts, main part and tail part, connected together in a tray of the cannon loading mechanism while the missile is being delivered to the cannon's ammunition chamber. The main part consists of a warhead and a cruising propulsion engine. The 9M124 warhead contains a shaped charge and is coupled to the motor by wire. The main part is equipped with a device which prevents placing in one tray the guided-missile feed mechanism and the 4Zh40 regular feeder used exclusively for plain missiles such as hollow-charge projectiles, subcaliber armor-piercing projectiles, and fragmentation-shatter grenades.

The tail part of a 9M112 missile consists of an mechanical compartment and a launching device. The mechanical compartment contains the entire equipment, including rudders and stabilizers, along with the connector set which couples it to the main part. The radio on board is designed to receive, generate, amplify, and decode guidance signals (commands), with the capability of operating with either of two codes and at either of five designated frequencies. Codes are set automatically during firing of a missile, while the selected frequency is set manually by means of a screw during placement of the missile on the cannon loading conveyor. The selected missile frequency should be the same as that of the 9S461-1 guidance system.

The function of the launching device is to impart to a missile an initial velocity and to transmit to it electric pulses from the tank. This device consists of a cartridge with a collar, a launching charge, and an ignition track in a galvanic sleeve with a pedestal for a multiterminal socket where electric wires of the apparatus compartment in the tail part of the missile are interconnected.

Engine and its systems. The drive system of the T-80 tank consists of an engine, which is a gas turbine, and accessory systems ensuring its proper operation: fuel feed, fuel injection and fuel injector scavenging, air supply, steering, lubrication, air purification with special equipment including dust precipitators and vibrators, and smoke generating heat equipment.

In the T-80B tank stands a 1000 hp GTD-100TF gas turbine (GTD- acronym of Russian designation: GazoTurbinnyy

Dvigatel - 1000 Tankovyy, Forsirovanny). The turbine set is a triple-shaft set of two mechanically independent turbo-compressors and a free turbine. The basic engine components are two centrifugal compressors, a high-pressure one and a low-pressure one, a combustion chamber, two axial compressor turbines, the axial main turbine, an exit nozzle, gearboxes, and a speed reducer.

The turbine operating cycle consists of the same processes as that of a reciprocating engine: intake - compression - combustion - exhaust. The difference is, however, that in a reciprocating engine this sequence of processes take place in one location which is the cylinder, while those of a gas turbine cycle proceed simultaneously and continuously in several locations: intake and compression in the compressors, combustion in the combustion chamber, work in the turbines, and exhaust through an exit nozzle.

Power from the free turbine to the tank's drive wheels is transmitted through a speed reducer. The speed of the turbine runner can vary over the 0-26,650 rpm range, depending on the position of the fuel pedal and on the resistance to rotation of the tank wheels.

The engine in the tank's drive compartment stands on a monoblock which also carries all components of several auxiliary systems, which greatly simplifies and facilitates assembly and disassembly operations. This monoblock is secured at three points on the longitudinal tank axis: two rear supports and a suspended one in front.

Fuel supply system. This system consists of four indoor and five outdoor fuel containers, pumps, filters, valves, cocks, fuel pipes, and control devices.

The fuel containers are filled with any of the following grades of fuel: T-1, TS-1, and RT, also Diesel L, Z, or A. The basic fuels are T-1 and TS-1, but mixtures of Diesel fuel with T-1, TS-1, or RT in any ratios are acceptable.

Air purification system. This system is to ensure the proper air purity level necessary for operation of the engine and for cooling it as well as other equipment in the drive compartment. It consists of inlet shutters in the cover above the engine, an array of air filters and radiators, a fan for cooling system components, two fans sucking in dust and cooling the engine oil respectively, ducts for the air which cools the system components, and either two outlet ducts or dampers in the drive compartment for air and dust exhaust respectively, openings in the drive compartment partition, and air filters in the nozzles of the high-pressure turbine stage.

Drive system. The T-80 tank has a mechanical drive system with hydraulic servomechanism. Its components are: - right and left transmission sets consisting each of a planetary gear train, a lateral gearbox, and since 1985 a hydraulic brake - lubrication system - hydraulic steering servomechanism

The drive system components are located in the engine compartment, in the rear part of the tank hull and on its sides. All the tank movements including turns involve simultaneous action of both lateral gearboxes steered by operation of the hydraulic servomechanism.

Track drive system. This system consists of a track and suspension. The track mechanism in turn consists of two 2

drive wheels, 2 belts, 12 road wheels, 10 support rollers, and 2 tension wheels with tension mechanisms.

A drive wheel has a hub consisting of two parts welded together, two removable sprocket rings, and a limiting disk. Each wheel is mounted on splines of the output shaft extending from the particular lateral gearbox. For cleaning the drive wheels from mud and snow, there is a special wedge welded-on to the side of the hull.

The caterpillar has minilink belts, each with force-transmitting connectors fastened to the ends of a bolt, a rubber-metal ball joint, and a rubber-lined track for the road wheels. Each belt has 80 links, 160 connectors, and 80 yokes. A link is made of two stamped metal members with two grooved bolts, each member having ground-biting hooks on its outside surface which ensure better contact with the terrain and vulcanized-rubber pads adhering to its inside surface. After the belt assemblies have been installed, they form each a track for their respective set of road wheels. The belts are mounted symmetrically and can be each mounted on any side of the tank.

The double-disk road wheels are made of an aluminum alloy with heavy rubber lining on the outside. The single-disk supporting the upper branch of each belt have also rubber banding and are mounted on brackets.

The belt tension wheels consist each of two cast disk, with apertures for the removal of mud and snow and with reinforcing ribs which increase the rigidity. These wheels are interchangeable.

The belt tension mechanism is of the endless screw type with spheroidal winding and it directly takes up forces acting on the tension wheel.

The tank suspension is independent, on torsion rods with hydraulic shock absorbers. It consists of 12 rods and 6 shock absorbers. The torsion rods are mounted in pairs parallel to one another across the width of the hull on its bottom plate, those on the right side shifted toward the front. The rods on that side are not interchangeable with those on the left side.

On the first, second, and sixth rocker arms are mounted hydraulic shock absorbers of the telescopic type with pistons.

Means of communication. Communication between crew members inside the tank is facilitated by a TPU R-124 internal telephone system. Communication with the outside is facilitated by an R-123 radio station and an R-173P radio receiver.


The R-173 radio station has a VHF-FM transmitter, structurally standardized with the R-173P receiver. It is equipped with noise and interference suppressors. Both transmitter and receiver can operate at 10 preprogrammed frequencies, a change from one frequency to another being effected automatically in not more than 3 s after the appropriate button has been pressed. The main antenna is 3 m high. One may also use 2 m high or 1 m high antennas and for communication over short distances also an emergency antenna.

Other Armored Vehicle on Self-Supported T-80 Frame

The self-supported T-80 tank frame was found to have been so well designed that many of its components were put in other combat vehicles.

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Large-Caliber Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun



Key: -1. NSVT Utios 12.7 mm large-caliber, -2. cradle, -3. equalizing mechanism, -4. K10T sightig instrument, -5. gun stock, -6. crank of raising mechanism, -7. magazine for ammunition, -8. grip-handle of trigger mechanism, -9. handle of rotating mechanism, -10. connector, -11. release button

Thus self-supported T-80 frames are found in the self-propelled 203 mm 2S7 "Pion" artillery, in the self-propelled 152 mm 2S19 "Msta" howitzer (briefly described in NOWE TECHNIKA WOJSKOWA, No 6, 1993), and in series 830 caterpillars (vehicles for field command, launchers, transport, radar stations, and other services) of the S-300V air defense missile division (also already described, in NOWA TECHNIKA WOJSKOWA, No 2, 1993).

203 mm self-propelled 2S7 Pion artillery. This artillery (factory designation: Object 216) was developed at the LKZ engineering office under the guidance of its chief engineer N.S. Popov and at the end of the nineteen seventies, after its series production had begun, delivered to armies.

The structure of its self-supported frame is a special one, its basic components such as drive wheels, road wheels, tension wheels, belts and wheels supporting their upper branches, rocker arms, torsion rods, and shock absorbers adopted from the T-80 tank.

A grooved 203.2 mm 2A44 cannon weighing 14,550 kg is mounted on the rear part of the self-supported frame. It fires a 3VO534 fragmentation-shatter grenade weighing 110 kg with an initial velocity of 960 m/s, adequate for covering a distance of 37.5 km. A missile included in the ammunition will, when fired from this cannon, cover a distance of 55 km. Directly on top of the carriage, mounted in special sockets in the rear part of the vehicle, are four sets of missiles with launching charges. The firing rate of the cannon is up to four shots in two minutes. The crew consists of seven members. During troop movement they are seated as follows: commander, gunner, and mechanic-driver in the armored front cabin, four soldiers in a separate, armored, closed compartment between the engine room directly behind the front cabin and the cannon's base and cradle. The time for change from marching mode to combat mode (or reverse) is 10 min.


Recoil after firing is reduced by dropping heavy "plow blades" from the rear of the vehicle and stability of the self-supported frame is enhanced by dropping also the belt tension wheels to the ground. The artillery weighs 46 tons its dimensions in the marching mode are: total length from barrel outlet to edge of "plowshare" 13,100 mm, width

3,380 mm, height 3,000 mm. Its V-46-1 700 hp Diesel engine enables the artillery to reach speeds up to 50 km/h.


In 1983 the cannon was updated, its firing rate increased to five shots in two minutes and its supply of ammunition on board to eight missile sets. Data processors for the firing operation were installed. The guaranteed travel distance capability was lengthened. This modern version of the artillery is designated as the 2S7M.

In 1992 the Russian army had 304 units of the 2S7 self-propelled cannons equipping its heavy artillery brigades and 122 units were in possession of the Czechoslovak army.

Mounting of Drive Monoblock in Hull of T-80 Tank




T-80UD Tank



Clearly visible submerged fording tube in rear of turret and mounting of spare fuel barrels, quite different than on T-80 and T-80BV tanks

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
Cannon Loading Mechanism



Key:-1. feeder lever, -2. master cylinder, -3. tray, -4. cam, -5. projectile, -6. cartridge (launching charge), -7. cannon lock, -8. spent shell casing interceptor, -9. conveyor, -10. conveyor belt

Side View of T-80BV (M. Damchuk)


Sylwetka boczna T-80BW (M. Damczuk)



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Projections (Side, Top, Front, and Rear Views) of T-80UD (M. Damchuk)

T-80UD w rzutach (M. Damczuk)



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AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Moscow Air Defense District Cutbacks Worry Commander

LD2008161694 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 20 Aug 94

[Video report by A. Minakov; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The Moscow Air Defense District marks its 40th anniversary today. Not everyone in Russia knows that the protection of an enormous territory in the center of the country against air attacks is so reliable that other could, in the very near future, lead to a considerable reduction in the effectiveness of the protection of the central industrial region and the Russian capital. Sharp reductions in the district and air defense forces are taking place at a time when the rest of the world is attaching more attention to air defense.

[A. Kornukov, commander of Moscow Air Defense District; captioned] We have reached the limit, below which we can not go. Simply, history and the people will not forgive us if, suddenly, a serious test befalls us, and a depleted air defense system is not capable of withstanding it.

[video shows military aircraft taking off; radar; general views of military outpost; interview with Kornukov]

Votintsev: Origins of Air Defense

94UM05074 Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY
ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, 1993 pp 54-61

[Article by Col-Gen (Ret) Yu.V. Votintsev: "Unknown Troops of the Vanished Superpower"]

[Text] Chapters from the manuscript of the book prepared for press by the former commander of the missile and space defense troops, Colonel-General (Retired) Yu.V. Votintsev, about the events and people at the on the country's main line of resistance. Individual journalists and writers continue to talk about the extent our country is being overarmed, which is detrimental to the people's welfare. At the same time, the Soviet people's efforts in achieving that unquestioned priority which we had in the matter of protecting the USSR from the most fearsome weapons—nuclear missiles—were literally hushed up for decades.

Our Ancient Cossack Origin

The memory for some is a burden. For me, from an old Cossack family, as well as for the majority not forgetting their roots, it is a guiding star.

During the reign of Aleksander II, part of the Don Cossack Troops led by an ataman—my great-grandfather—was sent to protect the eastern boundaries of the empire, to the border with China. The fortress of Vernyy (became Alma-Ata in 1921) was laid and 19 stations were founded. In 1867, Vernyy became the administrative center of the Semirechensk Cossack Troops. Legends about the courage, fearlessness, and military skill of my great-grandfather were passed by word of mouth from generation to generation. He died in one of the battles, cut down by sabers. His remains were buried in a Cossack felt coat in the Vernyy fortress.

The ataman's son, my grandfather Dmitriy Votintsev, being in the rank of lieutenant colonel, inherited the ataman mace and headed the Semirechensk Cossack Troops. He died early, in 1897, leaving behind four children. My father, Vsevolod Dmitriyevich, was identified to study at state expense at the Tashkent Cadet Corps, from which he graduated in 1911, ranking first with an award. That same year, he entered the Petersburg Polytechnical Institute imeni Peter the Great and joined the party of Bolsheviks.

My father actively participated in revolutionary work in Petrograd until 1917. In November, he was sent to Tashkent by the Party Central Committee to render assistance in strengthening Soviet power in Turkestan.

Located in a dense ring of fronts, Turkestan was completely cut off from Russia. The British in the Iranian city of Meshed, right at Turkestan's border, founded the British Military Mission. An experienced intelligence officer, General W. Malleson, headed the mission. From here they coordinated the operations of numerous agents. Well-known agents conducting intelligence collection in countries of the West appeared in Tashkent: F.M. Bailey, Blacker, Dzhunkovskiy¹, P. Etherton, and others. In late 1917, imperialists of the Entente and the United States created an underground White Guards espionage and sabotage center—the Turkestan Military Organization (TMO)—from former officers and generals of the tsarist army.

Probably, there are few who know the most shameful fact in the history of the struggle of these "patriots for the great and indivisible"—the signing in 1918 of a treaty under which they pledged to transfer Turkestan to the British as a protectorate for a period of 55 years. In exchange, Malleson promised the counter-revolutionaries 100 million rubles, 16 mountain guns, 40 machineguns, 25,000 rifles, and a corresponding amount of ammunition.

The conspirators were forced to hurry—the situation at the fronts portended the inevitable uniting of Turkestan and Central Russia, and the threat of exposure was becoming increasingly real. The White Guard-Socialist Revolutionary Rebellion, the direct organizers of which were F.M. Bailey and the American consul in Tashkent, R. Treadwell, began on the evening of 18 January 1919. The republic's military commissar and White Guards officer, Osipov², called the dispositions of the Second Siberian Regiment and summoned members of the government of Turkestan and other senior Soviet and party workers allegedly for an emergency meeting. Concerned by the alarming situation in the city and not suspecting treason, my father, chairman of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee, and A.N. Malkov³, people's commissar of internal affairs; V.D. Figelskiy⁴, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars [SNK]; V.N. Finkelshteyn⁵, first deputy chairman of the Tashkent Soviet; I.P. Fomenko⁶, chairman of the Turkestan ChK [Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage]; D.G. Shpil'kov⁷, party druzhina commander; and N.V. Shumilov⁸, chairman of the Tashkent Soviet, came to the traitor. All of them and seven more commissars—S.P. Gordeyev⁹, Ye.P. Dubitskiy¹⁰, M.S. Kachuriner¹¹, A.Ya. Pershin¹², M.N. Troitskiy¹³, A.V. Chervyakov¹⁴, and G.I. Lugin¹⁵—were captured by the conspirators and brutally murdered that same night.

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The rebels were defeated by multinational armed squads of workers.¹⁶

At the Service of the RKKA

The situation in Tashkent remained difficult. And after the death of my father, our family was forced to leave for Leningrad. I entered the Leningrad Artillery School imeni Red October right after my oldest brother.

In June 1938, about 30 of us officer candidates who were making good progress, active Komsomol members, were transferred to the Sumi Artillery School. In October 1938, I was among 12 officer candidates who graduated early, given the rank of lieutenant, and assigned as a platoon commander at the Tbilissi Mountain Artillery School.

The chief of the school, Colonel Yevdokimov, was quite surprised by the appearance of a 19-year-old lieutenant, especially one having only two years of training. I had to take over a platoon arriving from the Moscow School imeni Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. All the officer candidates were extended servicemen or junior commanders before entering the school. Their fellow platoon commander in school in Moscow was the son of the legendary Division Commander A.V. Chapayev.

At the Tbilissi School, the principles of a commander's honor were not declared. No one shouted "I have honor," but they lived and served in such a way that they gave no one any reason to reprimand them. To this day, the former school battalion commander, Captain and now Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) V.T. Bagdasaryan, remains for me the example of a commander-officer, military professional, and observant pedagogue. Having gotten to know him well, I understood what the expression "military backbone" actually means.

From July 1941 to the fall of 1942, I commanded a battery in the Second Penza Artillery and Mortar School. Four years of development as a commander in school collectives laid a foundation for commander professionalism and helped throughout subsequent service to feel confidence in my strengths and capabilities.

Successful work in schools and awarding of the "Outstanding RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] Soldier" badge and the "Badge of Honor" order literally became shackles for me. More than 20 of my requests to be sent to the front remained unsatisfied. They replied: "You are needed at school to train artillery commanders." But finally, in November 1942, I received permission from the school chief, Major-General of Artillery S.N. Kapustin, to be assigned to the field army. Battery commanders P.T. Gitulyar¹⁷ and A.A. Buryakov¹⁸ received the same permission.

At the Front

The severe winter at the front in 1942 welcomed us with a hard December frost. At the Moscow Military District Personnel Directorate, we received an assignment to the 295th Mortar Regiment, which was activated at Rybinsk. My battalion was being manned with commanders, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers mainly after medical treatment at hospitals and having combat experience.

Another 130 were men with a "wealth of life experience"—released early from prison on probation. They all had prison terms of 10 years or more for robbery and other grave felonies. Under wartime laws, a previous conviction was automatically stricken in the event of death, being wounded, distinction in combat, or receipt of a governmental award. Running ahead, I will say that by the time we parted (one and a half years later I turned over the battalion in connection with a reassignment), the previous conviction had been stricken from all 130. In the most difficult battles, located almost constantly at the forward edge of the battle area, as they said at the front, no one "celebrated a coward," and everyone fought desperately and increasingly more skillfully with each passing day.

Almost until the very end of the war, until entering the Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, I fought as part of the 71st and 93d guards divisions and went from battalion commander to artillery division commander. I saw the war, like tens of thousands of officers of this rank, in daily battles, burying myself in the ground day and night in order to stand to the death in defense, or rushing into a swift offensive, destroying enemy tanks and personnel by direct fire, located at the gun panoramic sight. In 1943, we had already learned not simply to fight but also to win. Each of us who was constantly located at the forward edge of the battle area, of course, more than once had to experience the human feelings of fear and self-preservation. And it took a certain amount of courage to suppress these feelings and not show them to anyone.

After the war ended, I was immediately accepted into the second year at the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, which I completed in 1947. Having the right to choose my duty station, I went to the Far East, where a tense military-political situation was taking shape by this time.

The Korean War

The Far East. The Maritime Military District. Six years of service in the area which to this day I recall with great warmth, even though they cannot be called peaceful years. Beginning in 1950, the war rumbled on for three years in neighboring Korea.

On 22 June 1950, namely on the day marking the start of the Great Patriotic War, the district commander, Colonel-General S.S. Biryuzov¹⁹, summoned the chief of the Operations Directorate, Major-General V.V. Turantayev²⁰, and me, at that time acting chief of staff of district artillery. Warning us of the special importance and secrecy of the conversation, Biryuzov remarked that he trusted us and did not require a non-disclosure receipt.

The commander ordered us to leave immediately for the Vozdvizhenko Airfield, from where the two of us flew on an Li-2 aircraft to Pyongyang. At the headquarters of Kim Il Sung²¹, we were to meet with the former chief of the district political directorate and presently our ambassador, T.F. Shtykov²², to gain an understanding of the situation, find out his opinion, and, if serious events take place, relay exhaustive information on them and a prognosis for the next few days.

A car at the entrance, the airport, the aircraft taking off, the flight across the border, changing clothes, and landing at

Pyongyang already in civilian clothes on the dirt runway in front of the Korean-Soviet Aircraft Company. The well-groomed nature and comfort of the airfield and the excellent cottages in which our and Korean pilots and maintenance personnel lived called attention to themselves.

The headquarters of Kim Il Sung was comparatively close to Pyongyang. From talking with Shtykov, it was learned that DPRK troops had been brought to full combat readiness and moved to the 38th parallel. Our advisers were recalled from battalions, regiments, and divisions and sent home. A plan for invasion of South Korea had been drawn up in detail, and there was no doubt about its implementation in the next few days. Shtykov was tired, alarmed, and was not by any means seen as the boss in this country, as rumors asserted. Turantayev immediately reported everything to Biryuzov.

As an eyewitness, I dare say that military provocations, and quite major ones, on the part of the South Korean Army took place. But on 25 June 1950, apparently with I.V. Stalin's blessings, the invasion prepared for conducting an offensive operation by the DPRK Army was accomplished.

On the evening of 25 June, when Turantayev and I left for Pyongyang, all the city's population, men and women, were rejoicing in the streets in white clothing. There were fireworks. The patriotic fever was determined by the rapid and successful advance of the troops and the anticipation of a near unification of Korea led by the national leader Kim Il Sung.

Seoul was taken on 28 June. Pursuing the enemy, troops quickly advanced to Taejon. Turantayev and I followed the path of retreat of South Korean and American troops. We saw how they abandoned their armament, took motor vehicles in fighting, and retreated to the port of Pusan. Striving to rescue the South Korean troops and American troops located in Korea, back on 27 June U.S. President H. Truman issued an order on a wide-scale invasion there by American troops. Massive, merciless bombing of North Korean cities began from the air and by shipborne artillery of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

When we flew out of Korea several days later, we were already traveling through a destroyed and burning Pyongyang. At the airfield, where our miraculously intact aircraft was standing, most of the cottages were burned down, and many of the maintenance personnel had perished. We departed right after the next bombing, as soon as the craters on the runway were filled.

On 27 July 1953, after three years of an exhausting and devastating war, a Cease-Fire Agreement was concluded, which up to the present still remains a half-measure in resolving the problem of unifying the Korean people.

In the Air Defense Forces

In November 1955, after graduating from the General Staff Academy, I was appointed to the position of deputy commander for combat training of a separate surface-to-air missile army—chief of a combat training department. Air defense of Moscow was included in the mission of the special-purpose army.

The army commander, Lieutenant-General of Artillery K.P. Kazakov²³, recalling our service together in the Far East, frankly said in the first conversation that the Air Defense Forces were also a new thing for him; therefore, we would have to master together the armament and equipment being received by the army. He defined the main thing in my upcoming job to be to train at a stepped up pace to perform a combat mission the personnel of units that earlier performed installation and construction work.

From talks with designers and long-time residents, I managed to ascertain reliably that Stalin was the initiator in creating a powerful and reliable air defense of Moscow. Recollections about 1941, apparently, did not give him peace of mind up to the final days. Having lost to a political adversary only once, he did not believe in the strength of any alliance with World War II allies. He did not trust treaties and agreements which he signed. Fortunately, in this case his suspiciousness turned out to be perspicacity.

Europe was still smoking in ruins in 1945, when British Prime Minister W. Churchill, during his sadly famous speech in the American city of Fulton, declared a "crusade" against communism. It was in this country—the citadel of democracy—on 12 March 1947 that the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed, setting the task of "throwing back" communism. At its basis was the monopoly on nuclear weapons as the main means of deterring the USSR.

In 1948, Stalin set forth the task of organizing a reliable defense of the skies of Moscow with advanced air defense weapons with their subsequent use to cover other of the country's most important installations against nuclear strikes, which at that time could be delivered only by enemy aviation. Accomplishment of this task was entrusted to the Special Bureau (SB-1) created in 1950. The general designer was P.N. Kuksenko²⁴, and the chief engineer was Beriya's son, Sergey²⁵. All work was accomplished under the control of the KGB, associates of which headed the departments of the SB-1, and scientists and designers were their deputies. German specialists were also involved in the work, and by no means from among prisoners, but on a contract basis with comfortable living and working conditions provided.

In August 1950, technical recommendations were developed for the "Berkut" system. In the SB-1 collective it was believed that this name stood for the abbreviated names of Beriya and Kuksenko. The Third Main Directorate (TGU) of the USSR Council of Ministers was specially organized to create the system; it was headed by the talented V.M. Ryabikov²⁶. It was allocated the necessary monetary funds, and powerful construction organizations, design bureaus, and manufacturing plants for technological equipment and missiles were subordinated to it. After L.P. Beriya's arrest in 1953, the system was renamed the S-25.

In five years, two rings of concrete roads were erected at a radius of 50 and 100 km from the center of the city with a total length of about 2,000 km; two radar coverage zones at a distance of 25-30 and 200-250 km from Moscow using A-100 radars and 56 surface-to-air missile (SAM) regiments with B-200 missile guidance radars in fixed and reinforced concrete shelters were deployed; and launch positions and special technical bases for maintaining missiles were built.

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The creation of the S-25 system in the early 1950's, capable of destroying up to 1,000 enemy aircraft simultaneously with launching up to three missiles against each, demonstrated convincingly the ability of our economy, which was recovering after the war, to concentrate the necessary resources for the defense of our country. This was truly a scientific and technical feat.

The scientific managers and leading designers of the system equipment were A.A. Raspletin²⁷, A.L. Mints²⁸, G.V. Kusunko²⁹, and L.V. Leonov³⁰. The V-300 guided missile was created in the design bureau of A.S. Lavochkin³¹ by designers A.M. Isayev³², N.S. Lidorenko³³, and V.P. Barmin³⁴. Field units were under the subordination of Lieutenant-General of Artillery N.F. Nilovskiy. We would note that the system was created in secrecy, even from the Ministry of Defense.

A full-scale firing complex for the system was set up at the Kapustin Yar Range. This enabled the chairman of the State Commission—First Deputy Commander in Chief of the National Air Defense Forces Marshal of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev—to comprehensively test with his typical exactingness and refine the system to the designed characteristics. The work was organized and supported by the site chief, B.A. Korolev.

Development of the S-25 system became sort of a training school for a whole host of the most prominent scientists, designers, engineers, and skilled workers and for changing the specialization of plants. The experience acquired in testing the S-25 system was very valuable. It became completely obvious that it was necessary to have special methods support for the testing of complex systems. The first such documents were drawn up and tested in practice by the chief of the Kapustin Yar Range, Lieutenant-General of Artillery P.N. Kuleshov³⁵, and the chief of the analysis department at the range headquarters, R.A. Valiyev³⁶.

In the spring of 1955, the Third Main Directorate was abolished in connection with completion of the basic work, and a special-purpose separate army was deployed based on the S-25 system; it was commanded by K.P. Kazakov. Its officer personnel were mainly graduates of military academies, the Bauman Higher Technical School, the Aviation Institute, and other technical higher educational institutions. Service in this army for many years was considered a matter of special importance, pride, and honor.

In August 1957, operators of one of the A-100 long-range detection radars located in the vicinity of Smolensk detected a target with a heading toward Moscow at an altitude of about 20,000 meters. Without entering the army's impact zone, it turned and headed west. At that time, missiles were not yet on combat alert at the launch positions. The army commander reported this to the chief of the General Staff and the USSR minister of defense. The chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy, and a group of generals arrived at our command post that same evening. After a careful study of the target tracking chart, the specialists that came with the marshal reported to him that there could not be such a target. The work on a false target, as they believed, was the result of a radar malfunction or operator error, since neither a bird nor an aircraft could be located at such an altitude.

However, Kazakov and the army chief of staff, F.A. Olifirov³⁷, insisted that this was an intruder aircraft and asked Sokolovskiy to speed up the decision about placing missiles on combat alert. Literally the next day after this incident, an order came down from the USSR minister of defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy, on placing the army on combat alert to protect and defend the skies of Moscow with missiles that were armed and fueled. Apparently, the transporting of the missiles from the technical bases to the launch positions did not go unnoticed by foreign intelligence. There were no further provocative flights by aircraft in the direction of Moscow. At that time, I could not even assume that fate would again lead me to this unidentified aircraft, but this time on the southern border.

In September 1957, K.P. Kazakov communicated to me an order assigning me as chief of a special missile group, which for the first time would be brought out to a military parade in honor of the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Sixty-two missiles from the National Air Defense Forces, Ground Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces³⁸, and the Navy were concentrated at the parade field. Some of them came directly from the plants. Near the parade field, at the exit to the rehearsal, motor vehicles from various foreign missions were hanging around obtrusively next to each other at the exit to the rehearsal, despite the fact that the missiles were constantly under covers, and they were accompanied along the parade route by special groups from the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate and intelligence officers.

On 7 November at 0800 hours, the column took up its assigned place on Manezhnaya Square. All the windows in the Metropol Hotel building were open, and long-barreled lenses of movie and still cameras were sticking out of the windows. The column of missiles brought up the rear of the parade. When we reached Red Square, everything around us froze for an instant. Then ovations began in the grandstands. After passing over the square, the column stretched out along the embankment, and the soldiers began to cover the missiles quickly. At this time, the first rows of demonstrators from the square had already appeared. People formed a solid ring around the column, crawled on the vehicles, and hugged the soldiers and officers.

A reception for the parade participants was held in the evening at the Bolshoy Kremlin Palace. I remember the nervousness experienced that overtook the disappointment. Party and government leaders and the majority of those invited were in Georgiyevskiy Hall, and the military were in the Granovitaya Chamber. At about 2200 hours, N.S. Khrushchev³⁸, N.A. Bulganin³⁹, Mao Tse-Tung⁴⁰, and R.Ya. Malinovskiy came in. A tall wine glass of cognac was presented to them, although they were already rather tipsy. The chief of the Main Personnel Directorate, General of the Army A.P. Beloborodov, brought me to Khrushchev and introduced me as the chief of the parade missile group. After shaking my hand, Khrushchev said that the Central Committee declares its gratitude to me. Then he talked several minutes with those around him and suddenly noticed an interesting, stout woman. Khrushchev took off his suit jacket and, left in his embroidered belted blouse, began to dance with her in a squatting position. Standing next to him,

Colonel-General P.F. Batitskiy⁴¹, looking at this scene, grasped his wife under the arm and said loudly and sharply that there was nothing more for him to do at this.

But let us get back to the special-purpose army. Mastering new combat equipment that is unlike anything else turned out to be a decisive condition of the comparatively rapid growth of the technical competence and professional training, above all, of officer-engineers and commanders of the main subunits and regiments. The great deal of life experience and the ability to single out what is important enabled K.P. Kazakov to subordinate the entire tenor of life and training to the planned combat training and vigilant performance of alert duty. The students of the special-purpose army were well known in the National Air Defense Forces. Many of them subsequently became prominent military leaders. Among them are Colonel-General F.A. Olifirov, Lieutenant-General N.A. Asriyev⁴², and Lieutenant-General M.I. Nenashev⁴³.

The data I have cited about the force composition of the special-purpose army were top secret. Today, the S-25 system has been taken out of service and dismantled. More modern and effective SAM systems are used to protect the skies of Moscow.

(To be continued.)

Footnotes

*The USSR Council of Ministers decision on creation of the Strategic Missile Forces was adopted on 17 December 1959.

1. Dzhunkovskiy—a tsarist general and former commandant of Petrograd.

2. Konstantin Osipov—warrant officer and a Left Socialist-Revolutionary. In early 1918 was enlisted by British intelligence. Having headed the rebellion, he personally executed commissars and fled to Iran.

3. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Malkov—secretary of the SNK and commissar of internal affairs.

4. Vladislav Damianovich Figelskiy (1885-1919)—Polish revolutionary and Bolshevik. In November 1918 was elected chairman of the SNK and chairman of the Supreme Military Collegium for Defense of the Republic.

5. Vulf Naumovich Finkelshteyn (1885-1919)—from January 1918 member of the executive committee of the Tashkent Soviet and first deputy chairman of the Tashkent Soviet.

6. Ionat Perfilyevich Fomenko (killed in 1919)—chairman of the Turkestan ChK.

7. Dmitriy Grigoryevich Shpilkov (killed in 1919)—commander of a party *druzhina*.

8. Nikolay Vasilyevich Shumilov (1875-1919)—in September 1917, member of the Military Revolutionary Committee and participant in the October Armed Uprising in Tashkent. From November 1918 chairman of the Tashkent Soviet.

9. Semen Pavlovich Gordeyev (killed in 1919)—member of the city committee of the Bolshevik Party.

10. Yevdokim Prokhorovich Dubitskiy (killed in 1919)—commissar of lines of communication.

11. Mikhail Samoylovich Kachuriner (1897-1919)—from October 1918 chairman of the Tashkent Soviet of Trade Unions and member of the editorial board of NASHA GAZETA.

12. Aleksandr Yakovlevich Pershin (1874-1919)—from December 1917 member of the city committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (of Bolsheviks) [RSDRP(b)]; from March 1918 commissar for foodstuffs.

13. Mikhail N. Troitskiy (killed in 1919)—editor of the KRASNOARMEYETS newspaper.

14. Aleksey Vasilyevich Chervyakov (killed in 1919)—chairman of the republic court martial.

15. Georgiy Ivanovich Lugin (killed in 1919)—assistant chief of security of Tashkent.

16. The White Guard-Socialist Revolutionary Rebellion in Tashkent 18-21 January 1919 was quickly suppressed. During the rebellion, interventionists and White Guardsmen brutally murdered leaders of the Communist Party and of the government of the Turkestan ASSR and Tashkent Soviet. A total of 14 people were executed. In 1964, a monument to the commissars was placed on square opposite the train station in Tashkent.

17. Petr Terentyevich Gitulyar (1914-1992)—colonel. Chief of the operations department of the artillery headquarters of the Sixth Guards Army. Served in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. Buried in Kiev.

18. Aleksey Andreyevich Buryakov (1918-1981)—lieutenant colonel. Buried in Lvov.

19. Sergey Semenovich Biryuzov (1904-1964)—marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union, and People's Hero of Yugoslavia. From 1947 to 1953 commanded the Maritime Military District.

20. Vladimir Vladimirovich Turantayev—colonel-general. From 1950 chief of the Operations Directorate of the Maritime Military District Headquarters. Later, was chief of the Main Staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

21. Kim Il Sung (born 1912)—marshal of the DPRK. Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers 1948-1972. From 1966 general secretary of the Central Committee of the Labor Party of Korea. From 1991 president of the DPRK and simultaneously chairman of the Central Committee of the People's Committee of the DPRK.

22. Terentiy Fomich Shtykov (1907-1964)—colonel-general, from 1938 second secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee. During the war was member of the Military Council of the Leningrad, Volkhov, and Karelian fronts. After the war was member of the Military Council of the Maritime Military District. USSR ambassador to the DPRK 1948-1951.

23. Konstantin Petrovich Kazakov (1902-1989)—marshal of artillery. In 1951 was commander of artillery of the Maritime Military District. In 1955 was commander of a

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special-purpose surface-to-air missile army. Was commander of missile troops and artillery of the Ground Forces 1963-1969.

24. Pavel Nikolayevich Kuksenko (1896-1980)—poruchik, major-general. Signal chief of the Western Front, which was commanded by M.N. Tukhachevskiy. Arrested in 1937. Released in 1939. The author of development of a radar sight for bombers. Doctor of technical sciences, academician of the Academy of Artillery Sciences. From 1947 headed the SB-1, where together with S.L. Beriya developed under the code name "Kometa" air-to-sea and later air-to-ground and shore-to-sea weapons. In 1950 was chief designer of the Berkut system.

25. Sergey Lavrentyevich Beriya (born 1925)—engineer-designer. Presently lives and works in Kiev.

26. Vasily Mikhaylovich Ryabikov (1907-1974)—colonel-general and engineer. Hero of Socialist Labor. From 1951 chief of the Third Main Directorate. Later on was in important posts in the RSFSR Council of Ministers and was first deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan.

27. Aleksandr Andreyevich Raspletin (1908-1967)—scientist and designer in the field of radio and electronics. Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Hero of Socialist Labor.

28. Aleksandr Lvovich Mints (1895-1974)—physicist and radio engineer. Hero of Socialist Labor and academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Director of the Radio Engineering Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences 1957-1970.

29. Grigoriy Vasilyevich Kusunko (born 1918)—retired lieutenant-general, scientist, and designer in the field of radio engineering and electronics. Doctor of technical sciences, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Hero of Socialist Labor.

30. Leonid Vasilyevich Leonov (1910-1964)—chief designer of detection radars operating in the centimeter waveband. In 1949 developed and created the first such radar, the P-20, which was successfully used in air defense, the Air Force, Navy, and the Civil Air Fleet, and the A-100 radar for the Berkut system.

31. Semen Alekseyevich Lavochkin (1900-1960)—scientist and aircraft designer, major-general of the Engineering and Technical Service. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

32. Aleksey Mikhaylovich Isayev (1908-1971)—designer of aircraft and rocket engines. Hero of Socialist Labor. Creator of engines for the Vostok, Voskhod, and Soyuz spacecraft.

33. Nikolay Stepanovich Lidorenko (born 1916)—designer in the field of onboard electric power supply sources for missiles and solar batteries for spacecraft. Corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Hero of Socialist Labor.

34. Vladimir Pavlovich Barmin (born 1909)—designer in the field of machine building equipment. Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Hero of Socialist Labor.

35. Pavel Nikolayevich Kuleshov (born 1908)—marshal of artillery and Hero of Socialist Labor. From 1943 deputy commander of guards mortar units of the Soviet Army. After the war, was deputy commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces. From 1965 chief of the Main Directorate of Missile and Artillery Armament of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

36. Rafgat Akhtyamovich Valiyev (born 1911)—retired major-general, scientist in the field of development and testing of active weapons or air defense and antiballistic-missile defense systems. In 1952 was chief of the analysis and testing department at the Kapustin Yar Range. Member of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the General Staff.

37. Fedor Akimovich Olifirov (born 1918)—retired colonel-general. During the Great Patriotic War was a senior officer of the operations department of the Fifth Guards Army Headquarters. In 1956 was chief of staff of a separate special-purpose surface-to-air missile army. In 1961 was commander of a separate air defense army and in 1966 was commander of the Baku Air Defense District.

38. Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev (1894-1971)—statesman and party figure, lieutenant-general. From September 1953 to October 1964 was first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

39. Nikolay Aleksandrovich Bulganin (1895-1975)—marshal of the Soviet Union. Hero of Socialist Labor. Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers 1955-1958.

40. Mao Tse-Tung (1893-1976)—chairman of the PRC and chairman of the State Defense Committee 1954-1959.

41. Pavel Fedorovich Batitskiy (1910-1984)—marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union. Commander of the Moscow Air Defense District 1954-1965; commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces 1966-1978.

42. Nikolay Aleksandrovich Asriyev (born 1920)—retired lieutenant-general. In 1965 commander of an air defense corps; in 1968 chief of staff of the Moscow Air Defense District; in 1972 department chief at the Military General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K.Ye. Voroshilov. Doctor of military sciences, professor.

43. Mikhail Ivanovich Nenashev (born 1918)—retired lieutenant-general. In 1955 deputy chief engineer of a separate special-purpose surface-to-air missile army. In 1961 chief of department for antiballistic-missile and anti-space defense weapons in the Main Procurement Directorate of the National Air Defense Forces. Hero of Socialist Labor.

NAVAL FORCES

Adm Aleksin Defends Navy's Fighting Capacity

944F1268A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Rear Adm. Valeriy Aleksin, chief navigator of the Navy of the Russian Federation, under "Carte Blanche" rubric: "Our Seamen Remain the Best in the World: on the Question of the Strength and Power of the Russian Navy"]

[Text] In the opinion of many "independent experts," the power of our Navy cannot be assessed at this time, because it has not taken part in any combat operations for many

decades now. Still another "hobby" of the amateur "experts" is the "catastrophic state" of the Navy in connection with its high accident rate.

These superficial judgments of uninformed and incompetent people who left the Navy a long time ago are being circulated and spread, whereas one is not always able to give thought to the true situation, which differs significantly from what has been invented by the "experts."

Let us try to look into these matters without prejudice.

In the first place, the ships of the Navy, even those that are not of the latest designs, have been bought from us by other countries and over the past 25 years they have repeatedly taken part in various regional military conflicts and wars in the navies of these countries. As a rule, their adversary at sea had ships and weapons of American production or delivered from other NATO countries.

The results of these encounters and sea battles are known. On the seas, the side that had Soviet naval weaponry always came out on top, even in those cases when the crews of the ships were not distinguished by particular proficiency.

Thus, in the course of the war between India and Pakistan in 1972, the India Navy made up of former Soviet destroyers and missile patrol boats completely destroyed the entire fleet of Pakistan that had ships of American construction (destroyers of the "Gearing" type and others) in a sea battle lasting just one hour (!). With their remaining cruise missiles, the Indian patrol boats struck Pakistan's port and main naval base. The enormous fire at oil storage tanks, at which the missiles were aimed, and its consequences put the Government of Pakistan in a state of shock and in general this was the end of the war. Of course it ended with a total victory for India.

Prior to that time, in 1967, a missile salvo from two patrol boats (Soviet construction) of the Egyptian Navy destroyed one of the newest destroyers of the Israeli Navy, the "Elat," obtained from the United States.

In 1988, a cruise missile from a MiG-23 fighter bomber of the Iraqi Navy in the Persian Gulf destroyed the American frigate "Stark" of the "O. Perry" type—one of the most up-to-date frigates that are the basis of the maneuvering forces of the U.S. Navy.

One can also present a kind of negative example of the high combat effectiveness of our naval weapons (about which the press also wrote).

In the Pacific Ocean in 1987, the missile-target "Termit" launched from a missile patrol boat and knocked down (although not completely destroyed) by several anti-aircraft missiles continued to fly and crashed into a small guided missile ship, the "Musson." The ship (it is little more than one-fifth the size of the frigate "Stark") perished, taking with it the lives of 39 seamen. That is, our missiles are practically invulnerable.

Are these not enough examples, which, however one may relate to them, indicate the real combat capabilities of our naval weapons?

Secondly, in recent years our ships have repeatedly visited the ports and bases of the United States, Great Britain,

Canada, the FRG, France, and other countries and participated in joint maneuvers, exercises, and actions of multinational forces with the naval ships of these countries. And the judgments of Western specialists were based not only on the external appearance of the ships and their crews but also on practical naval training and the results of practical actions, including with the use of weapons. And no one can deny that our seamen not only look better than anyone but are also the best at mooring and shooting. Is this not a convincing indicator of the state of the Russian Navy?

Thirdly, in response to the statements of our home-grown skeptics about the murderous ("catastrophic" and so on) state of our "submarine-targets," which are supposedly 10 tens as noisy and have a detection range 100 times less than the submarines of the U.S. Navy, it is useful to analyze the true state of things rather than the advertising brochures and statements (from both sides).

It is generally recognized in the world that the accident rate of ships under peacetime conditions is an integral summary result of such components as the level of combat training of crews and the quality and reliability of ships, their weapons, and equipment, including the range of mutual detection of submarines under the real conditions of navigation, the organization of service on them, and the professional training of submariners.

The sum of these components is approximately the same on board the submarines of the Russian Navy and the U.S. Navy. This conclusion is confirmed by analysis of nearly 20 underwater collisions of our ships with those of the U.S. Navy from 1967 through 1993 that were fraught with equal danger of the loss of the ship and therefore not intended by either side. The Americans are in agreement with this conclusion about the reasons for collisions.

Everyone has heard about the last two such collisions that took place in the Barents Sea in 1992 and 1993. But not everyone knows that after the collision in 1992 the submarine (nuclear) "Baton Rouge" was not repaired but was written off the force composition of the Navy (just as the SSBN "Nathaniel Green" after a navigation accident in 1986), whereas the nuclear submarine "Grayling" has been under repair since 1993. Both of our submarines that were involved in these collisions have already carried out tasks in the course of combat service after full repairs and the accomplishment of all the tasks of combat training. These facts say a lot to the unprejudiced professional specialist.

And there is one other fresh fact that it is useful to consider in the context of this theme. In 1994, the U.S. Navy proposed the cessation of the further operation of its stationary system SOSUS for the illumination of the underwater situation, which is the basis for their antisubmarine warfare. The official reason is the reduction of budget appropriations. Actually SOSUS has become ineffective in fighting our new low-noise ships, because it was intended against our ships built from 1960 through 1970, which were indeed tens of times noisier than those that were built from 1980 through 1990.

Fourthly, if one assesses the accident rate of the navies of the USSR and United States in terms of the generally recognized accident index, which is calculated as a ratio of the number of ships of the fleet involved in an accident in one

year to the actual strength of this fleet, then over the last seven years this indicator is smaller by a factor of 2.35 for the Russian Navy than for the U.S. Navy and half that of the Ministry of the Navy of the Russian Federation (now the Department of Naval Transport of the Russian Federation).

It is possible to answer the question of who has the worst situation with respect to submarine disasters in a similar way. In the postwar period, four submarines of the United States were lost (two of them were nuclear: the "Thresher" in 1963 and the "Scorpion" in 1968) out of 150 in the fleet. In the Naval Forces of the USSR, seven submarines were lost, including three nuclear submarines (K-8 in 1970, K-219 in 1986, and the "Komsomolets" in 1989), with their total number being twice that of the United States.

Thus, the accident index for submarines of the U.S. Navy is 2.7 percent, whereas it is 2.3 percent for the submarines of the USSR Naval Forces. That is, it is approximately the same.

True, our last two nuclear submarines were lost in the last 10 years and this is why it is felt so keenly. But there are many reasons for this, most of which go beyond the Navy. They were uncovered by a multilateral government commission that investigated the reasons for the loss of the "Komsomolets." The decrees of the government of our country on the prevention of these causes are being carried out. The current economic crisis in the country is limiting their realization appreciably.

The fact that Iran is buying submarines (of the type "Kilo" and "Varshavyanka") from Russia and not from Germany or Sweden speaks eloquently about the quality of our submarines. It is because ours cost half as much and their combat effectiveness is greater. This was also shown by the concern (if not to say fright) that the Americans had from the appearance of submarines of our construction in the naval forces of Iran in the Persian Gulf. This was also evoked by their low noise level. These submarines cannot be detected even by the most up-to-date American nuclear submarines of the "Los Angeles" type that guard their aircraft carriers.

Hence the facts persistently indicate that the U.S. Navy does not have any overwhelming advantage over our Navy with respect to the quality of ships, their weapons, and hardware.

And finally, one last thing to conclude this subject. It is known that the serious defeats of the USSR in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War in 1941 were not at all dictated by the fact that the Red Army was armed with Mosin rifles of model 1891/1930. They were dictated above all by the strategic miscalculations of Stalin and those around him in the assessment of the military and political situation in Europe, including the assessment of the danger of the unleashing of war and the means of repelling aggression. It was precisely for this reason that half of the frontal aircraft of the border military districts were destroyed on the first day of the war.

But the Navy did not lose a single ship on the first day of the war, when all of the main bases of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets were attacked. And even then our fleet was not absolutely the strongest in the world. Our state did not have adequate means for this. But the fleet was built under the

affirmed five and ten-year programs. Basically it was established by 1941 and it successfully performed all the tasks placed on it in the course of the war. In so doing, in all battles on the land and at sea without exception, the military seamen invariably showed wonders of courage and heroism, great combat proficiency, and valor and they always defeated a technically better equipped adversary.

The personnel of the Russian Navy invariably showed this great morale and these high combat and moral qualities in all the years after the war as well. They still have them today.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Support Problems, Resource Shortages Confront Military

Reforms Seen Bringing Deprivation

94UM0523A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by Oleg Vladyskin, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Army Is Being Re-equipped and... Increasing Becoming Impoverished or How Life Itself Makes One Large-Scale Profanation Obvious"]

[Text] Well, the reproaches toward the military are not at all stopping; they do not wish to reform the Armed Forces, they say. "Arguments" of this sort are actively set in motion when the Ministry of Defense again raises the question of the most difficult state of the social sphere in the Army and Navy and when it solicits funds to build housing for hundreds of thousands of homeless officers and warrant officers and to increase the pay and allowances of servicemen, whose families have ended up on the brink of poverty.

In general, the situation in the Armed Forces is presented in some form turned inside out. The capability to ensure the military a deserving life and a proper social status is directly linked to fulfillment by them of earlier specified conditions. First make the Army highly professional and small, capable of accomplishing the missions facing it not by the number of "bayonets," but thanks to good organization of their structures and efficient use of the most perfect weapon systems and military equipment, and then maybe we will be concerned about you.

You simply cannot think up a more derisive posing of the question. After all, government people limited in rights and deprived of methods of self-support are actually being put in the position of heroes of one old and banal anecdote. Remember patients of a well-known medical institution were promised that the swimming pool would be filled with water after they learned how to dive into it correctly...

KRSNAYA ZVEZDA has already written many times that such "providing of incentive" to reform the Armed Forces is actually hindering it. And we will not again repeat the arguments cited earlier for the obvious and general need for material support of any undertakings and reforms. But let us try to use a graphic example to demonstrate how much this scheme of relations with society and with the state that is being artificially imposed on the Army is similar to profanation. In practice, it is implemented with precision "to the

contrary:" the military are purposefully engaged in reforming, but they are living worse and worse.

We recently visited a training center for training air defense specialists for the Ground Troops. We saw with our own eyes how entire regiments at full strength were being retrained prior to the acceptance of new systems into service. In other words, the center is directly accomplishing reform in the military-technical area—it is increasing the number of field units which are converting to operation of namely the most modern types of weapons. Let us talk about this in more detail to make it clear what specifically the effect of such activities is.

As Colonel Mikhail Balyasnyy, chief of the center's combat vehicle cycle, explained, they are engaged in retraining personnel of regiments where until recently they had in their inventory the widely known "Osa" and "Kub" surface-to-air missile [SAM] systems, but now no longer being produced by industry. These battalion-level SAM systems are being replaced by the excellent "Tor-M1" self-propelled systems. Specialists in surface-to-air missile brigades of corps and Army subordination equipped with the outdated "Krug" systems are being retrained to work on the S-300V system, which surpasses the famous American Patriot for virtually all technical parameters. The re-equipping of military units that has begun signifies a breakthrough in improving the quality of air defense in the literal sense.

Firing range is increasing considerably. The type of targets that can be hit is expanding, and the probability of their destruction is increasing significantly. In addition, one SAM now can simultaneously track and engage a much larger number of air targets than old systems. In addition to all this, fewer people are used on the combat crews. This, in turn, makes it possible to reduce noticeably the establishment strength of units as a whole.

Well, tell me, is not all this the desired results of military reform? Let us just carry out the planned programs.

However, last year the training center accomplished retraining of half the number of specialists necessary and potentially possible. The reason? Extremely insufficient financial support of the requirements of the Armed Forces. You see, they are retraining personnel of those regiments and brigades which are already receiving new equipment. And very, very limited money has been allocated to the Ministry of Defense for its purchase.

This year, the situation with financing has become even worse. The 40.6 trillion rubles allocated for defense needs is hardly enough to pay the meager pay and allowances for servicemen, wages to civilian employees of the Army and Navy, and various pensions and benefits. Practically nothing is left for purchasing new equipment and armament. But at that same training center, we did not meet a single officer or warrant officer who had any doubt that even in such a critical situation we should continue re-equipping the Army. On the contrary, military professionals are convinced that the our country's Armed Forces have a chance in the foreseeable future to resemble "self-defense forces" of some island republic of Timbuktu. At the expense of what will we have to support the process of rearming units and retraining specialists in today's situation if only at last year's level?

Today, every serviceman personally feels the consequences of the abrupt curtailment of funds for defense needs. If someone, in making budget decisions, does not understand that the Army cannot cease all kinds of activities (combat training, troop duty, renovation of the arsenal) and simply wait for handouts merely for the very fact of their existence, in the end even these pitiful payments have to be redistributed within the Armed Forces to satisfy a whole host of other requirements that are not disappearing.

It is not by accident that they "forgot" to index military pay and allowances in the fourth quarter of 1993. That same experience was later repeated in the second quarter of this year, granting people in uniform the opportunity to overcome the mean tricks of inflation with wages unchanged for six months in a row. Only in July did they increase wages 1.4-fold. But the prices for goods and services, even according to official data, doubled in the past six months... The unique application of rules of arithmetic combined with the chronic "forgetfulness" of statesmen have yielded a curious effect. the purchasing power of the pay and allowances of servicemen is now almost half what it was a year ago.

The material situation in which regular military are in today can be illustrated using the example of the highest-paid official of the training center of the Air Defense Troops of the Ground Forces. Its chief, Major-General Vladimir Volyanik, has been serving in the Armed Forces for three decades. He has gone from being a soldier to his present high rank. He has changed duty stations many times. During his stay as regiment commander, he and his subordinates were the first to master the unique for those times "Osa" SAM system. Now, as we know, he oversees retraining of specialists of this system for servicing more modern systems that are unlike any weapon systems in the world. Several thousand people are constantly under his command. The state values a general's knowledge, experience, labor, and degree of responsibility with monthly pay and allowances equal to that of a militia captain; two-thirds the wages of a cashier at the Savings Bank; half as much as a city garbage truck driver; and one-third that of an unskilled laborer at the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant. And this is after the increase in pay and allowances given this month to the military.

Must we explain what "impressive incomes" those servicemen have who have not yet reached the rank of general?!

Perhaps we should augment the reformers' picture of impoverishment in this way. Half of the permanent staff of the training center (teachers, instructors, and maintenance personnel) do not have housing. Another 10 percent among them need drastic improvement in housing. The only hope for easing this problem is the planned construction of a multi-story apartment building, where...one out of every 10 in need of housing will be able to get an apartment. The center will participate in its construction on a share basis with the air defense school and the Orenburg Oblast administration, which is helping the military (much thanks, of course, to it for this!) to overcome the financial debility in housing construction. It is not free of charge, true. The garrison had to sacrifice part of its useful territory, transferring it to the local authorities.

With the coming of times of harsh practicalness, one must assume that such a method of solving the Army's social

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problems is acceptable. Within reasonable limits, of course. For it is inconceivable to strive to allocate housing to all regular servicemen by reducing the size of garrison territories to the patches of land on which the headquarters and barracks will fit.

That is why I would like to use an everyday tale with respect to this conversation. Don't teach military to live, but help them better materially. This is especially true since in this social situation that is extremely degrading for them, they are demonstrating astonishing patience and are advancing military reform with concrete deeds, not empty words. If we approach the assessment of these efforts honestly, it is time for at least someone to remember his promises and begin making good on the promissory notes.

Modernization Hindered in Volga Military District

94UM0523B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by Major Oleg Filev, Samara: "A Very Young Soldier in a New Sheepskin Coat... That Was Yesterday."]

[Text] It is known that due to the shortage of compulsory service soldiers, even officers have been forced to take over posts. At the same time, in the estimates of western experts, our country has developed the world's best security devices using radio waves and ultrasound. Reputable firms consider it an honor to have on their staff a professional for security equipment [TSO]. He is worth his weight in gold. Recently, for example, at the Aleks Investigative Agency in the city of Samara has installed a multiple-redundant security system. Now Samara businessmen are not concerned about storing information in offices, especially since the former chief of the security equipment group of our district is monitoring the operation of the electronic devices.

Unlike the wealthy firms, the situation with security equipment is different for the time being. The active regulation defines the organization of guard service using security equipment. Posts are equipped with an installation detection and alarm system and perimeter detection devices. Trained specialists must work behind the signal reception console. The very organization of guard duty is also changing. Security monitoring teams are being introduced, which are to monitor the good working order of electronics and the condition of barriers, doors, and seals at installations.

"For now, guard duty by security monitoring teams is still not being used in the district," said Colonel G. Chervov, chief of the TSO group of the troop duty branch of the Volga Military District Headquarters. "The problem is that the Ministry of Defense is in debt to the makers of the security equipment. Therefore, we have to count more on our own forces and on the initiative of commanders."

A year ago, at facilities of the district training center they trained a group of security equipment specialists. For the group they selected those who were familiar with electronics back before they came into the Army. For example, Junior Sergeant Aleksey Petukhov had developed an enthusiasm for assembling computers. In the unit Aleksey went to after completion of the courses, he was made responsible for the

installation and maintenance of security equipment. Commanders are pleased with him—there are no complaints about the junior sergeant's management.

But Petukhov is one of the few lucky ones who are working in their specialty. Most of the course graduates ended up being assigned duties having nothing at all to do with security equipment.

Judge for yourself what the result of such an attitude toward the use of security equipment and specialists is. Recently there was a major theft at one of the depots. Taking advantage of a malfunction of the installation security system, a sentry penetrated into the depot and removed several fire arms. The thief was soon found, and the stolen weapons returned. But only after the appropriate order was given throughout the district did the unit commander, having learned his lesson, believe in the capabilities of the security equipment.

Incidentally, many chiefs in the Volga Military District have known for a long time that you cannot get by without modern security equipment today. Colonels Yu. Ryabov and V. Svirida did not skimp on creating redundant security systems around the units and inside the premises. They also found the money to install antennas which cost millions of ruble to install per kilometer. And although the number of guards has been greatly reduced, the degree of protection of the facilities has improved considerably.

But the introduction of electronics in the district's units still is being delayed for a main reason—a shortage of funds. But for now, soldiers dreaming about video cameras and displays are offered felt boots and stretch sheepskin coats on guard duty. Recent military signal school graduates with security equipment engineer diplomas are put on combat crews, and the instruments themselves gather dust in the depots, reminding us of the electronic age in which we live.

Military Assistance to 1994 Harvest

94UM0553A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Oleg Falichev and Feliks Semyanovskiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Harvest-94: The Army Will Come to the Assistance of Village Toilers This Time as Well"]

[Text] Say what you like, but our economy evidently still cannot get by for long without the Army's help. People in shoulderboards are taking part in building roads in the Non-Chernozem Zone, constructing housing, gathering the harvest... And having realistically assessed their strength, the villagers arrived at the conclusion this harvest season as well: We can't cope by ourselves. But where to get reliable, disciplined helpers who can be trusted to transport the new harvest and much more? But of course, in the Armed Forces.

By the way, the statesmen also arrived at that conclusion. Russian Federation Government Decree No 901 "On Additional Measures for Gathering the Harvest of 1994" was issued on 3 August. With consideration of the need of individual regions of the Russian Federation, it speaks of sending 2,500 motor vehicles with servicemen-drivers for gathering the harvest. The procedure for logistic and financial support of motor transport battalions and command and control entities which was in effect in the 1993 harvest

has been preserved. The Russian Federation Ministry of Railways, for example, will support the movement of motor transport subunits to work sites and then return them to permanent stationing locations. Passenger cars will be included in the trains to move the people.

The Decree obligated the Russian Ministry of Finance to make final settlement with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense within a month after completion of the motor transport battalions' work in the harvest for expenses for formation, delivery to and from harvest areas, upkeep, and disbanding of motor transport battalions and also for work of restoring equipment, which will not be covered by funds earned by motor transport battalions.

As in previous years, the hauling of agricultural cargoes is being paid for on the basis of contracts concluded between branches of the Armed Forces, military districts and unit commanders on the one hand and administrations of krais and oblasts and farm directors on the other. The pricing to be applied for operation of motor vehicles of different makes in hauling farm products also has been established.

A Russian Federation Minister of Defense directive came out right after this decree, spelling out specific duties of officials in fulfilling the decree. A staff of the heads of motor transport battalions, which was headed up by Major General Sergey Bogomolov, is functioning in the Ministry of Defense. The nature of work, the requirement for people and equipment, and regions where assistance is needed first of all already have been clarified.

Assemblies for officers in charge who will engage in the upcoming harvest were held at Leningrad Military District facilities. First deputy commanders of military districts also held the very same assemblies in other places. Work is under way simultaneously to prepare motor transport equipment for work in the fields. The resultant picture is as follows. The Strategic Missile Troops are assigning 1,000 motor vehicles, Air Defense Troops 200, Navy 300, Moscow Military District 250, North Caucasus Military District 175, Far East Military District 150, Leningrad, Volga and Transbaykal military districts 100 each, Siberian Military District 75 and Ural Military District 50. As we see, representatives of practically all branches of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and districts will offer their shoulder to the village toilers.

Alas, despite the government decree about final settlements with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense within a month after completion of the harvest, this requirement will not be mandatory for all (the problem of nonpayment is well-known). At any rate, for now far from all farms have announced that they have funds for concluding contracts for payment. This is reported by our correspondent for the Air Defense Troops, for example. And in the final account, won't the military have to agree to barter, which often is disadvantageous for them? And won't vehicles return to units with bodies filled with grain?

The question of efficient use of motor transport battalions also remains open. Recent experience indicates that military equipment often ends up uncalled for in those regions where the harvest has not been good. Would that such a thing not be repeated again.

In previous years reserve soldiers were brought in for the harvest in connection with the Army and Navy personnel shortage. Now they have been relieved of military duty stints of this kind. Perhaps it is for the better, inasmuch as those who were called into the Army only for the harvest period treated the motor vehicles with which they were entrusted far from wisely.

Finally, it already has been determined that motor transport subunits, of missilemen for example, will work in Volgograd, Orenburg, Novosibirsk, Penza and Arkhangelsk oblasts and Krasnoyarsk and Altay krais; Air Defense soldiers in Moscow, Novosibirsk and Murmansk oblasts, the Navy in Volgograd and Kursk oblasts and Maritime Kray... Speaking in military language, each subunit has been assigned its own mission. We will hope that this time the grain harvest will not resemble a spontaneous battle for the harvest and that the soldiers' labor will be rewarded on its merits, as is appropriate in an era of market relations.

Medical, Other Implications of Redeploying Withdrawn Troops

94UM0552A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Aug 94 p 2

[Interview with Major-General of Medical Services Yuriy Ivanovich Pogodin, first deputy chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Military Medical Directorate, by Petr Altunin, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA, date, place and occasion not specified, under rubric "Military Medicine": "A Soldier on the March and a Doctor Beside Him"; photograph of Pogodin included]

[Text] *The Russian Army began to move in the course of reduction and reform. Military units and formations are being withdrawn from countries of Europe and the CIS. At all times it was distressing for a soldier on the march—both epidemics and food poisoning lay in wait. How are military medical personnel solving these problems now in the course of troop redeployment?*

Our conversation with Major-General of Medical Service Yuriy Pogodin, first deputy chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Military Medical Directorate, was about this.

[Box insert]

From the KRSNAYA ZVEZDA dossier.

Yu. I. Pogodin was born in the city of Nikolayev in 1950. He completed the Military Medical Academy and the Military Medical Academy leadership faculty. In the troops he went up all the medical service steps from regimental senior physician to district medical service chief. Since November 1993 he has been first deputy chief of the Main Military Medical Directorate. He is married and has two children.

[End box insert]

[KRSNAYA ZVEZDA] Yuriy Ivanovich, There were similar mass troop movements perhaps only in the Great Patriotic War. Does the experience of that time help you?

[Pogodin] No matter how terrible that war may have been, our military medicine proved up to it in general and on the whole, from the aspect both of having a maximum return of

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wounded and sick to formation and of maintaining sanitary-epidemic well-being both at the front as well as at rear posts. We always refer to this invaluable experience. As before, personnel undergo a medical checkup before being sent off, and a train physician is appointed along with a train commander. Based on the situation, a railcar or compartment is outfitted for giving medical assistance and isolating infectious patients. The sanitary condition in railcars is monitored in the course of movement, and the quality of water, food and washing of dishware is monitored at halts. The situation largely is simpler compared with war, but a number of tasks also have been added, for servicemen's families, women and children, also are traveling and medical personnel also look after them.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And so the train has arrived and unloaded at Post X let's say. Just what requirements are placed on the troops' new stationing locations from a medical standpoint?

[Pogodin] First of all, before the train (and perhaps even more than one) arrives, integrated teams of specialists—logistic specialists, billeting service specialists, and of course medical personnel—visit the new place more than once. There always are three points in our field of view: How will meals, water supply and people's accommodation be organized? If there are deviations of some kind from the norms, we immediately sound the alarm. Last year, for example, a military unit was withdrawn from Kishinev to Siberia, and there was an outbreak of intestinal diseases specifically because of poor provision of modern conveniences and non-observance of rules of hygiene. A team of medical personnel from the district and of representatives of the Main Military Medical Directorate was immediately "committed" there. The infection was done away with in a week: necessary sanitary measures were taken and patients hospitalized.

And this is not an isolated case. It is one thing when foreign firms build installations for troops being withdrawn—everything shines there, as they say. It is another matter when construction does not manage to be completed (above all when engineering systems are not placed in operation) before the arrival of new units due to a shortage of financing or even an inability to organize; that is when various kinds of unpleasantness occur.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But sometimes the local sanitary-epidemiological situation contributes to such unpleasantness?

[Pogodin] Without question. By the way, that situation is very difficult now. Last year four million more people in the country had infectious diseases than in the previous year. There was an increase in the number of dysentery, typhoid fever, infectious hepatitis, diphtheria, measles and other illnesses. True, the Army is standing firm—on organization and on timely sanitary-hygienic and prophylactic-treatment measures.

Still, we are not living in isolation under a hood. Therefore acute intestinal infections and viral hepatitis disease broke out from external (and, it must be admitted, from internal) causes in newly arrived and "settled-in" units on the Abakan, Ussuriysk and Ulyanovsk posts.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And how are matters arranged with treatment of family members and children?

[Pogodin] We already managed to "crack" certain "non-working" provisions of the Law "On the Status of Servicemen." Now both family members and children are given assistance at post medical establishments, and T/O&E pediatricians and gynecologists have been introduced in hospitals. And where there is no such possibility, they are received on an equal basis with others in local hospitals and polyclinics.

It must be said that there are problems in this matter. First of all, we are experiencing a shortage of specialists in children's and women's diseases—commercial structures lure them over with higher wages. Secondly, in connection with the introduction of medical insurance in civilian treatment facilities, in places they already have begun demanding payment for treatment from military units and also from the servicemen themselves and their families. And this despite the fact that there are decisions of Minzdravmedprom [Ministry of Health and the Medical Industry] on giving free medical assistance to these categories of citizens. Recently the Main Military Medical Directorate drew up a package of documents ensuring social protection of servicemen and their families with a transition to insured medicine. These documents now are in the government.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Yuriy Ivanovich, it was reported recently in the press that a military unit is being withdrawn from the Baltic, and life in tents awaits it...

[Pogodin] I read about this and know about the difficulties of the troop withdrawal from Baltic countries. But such a thing—where a unit has been "dumped" on a bare place—essentially has not happened to us. The General Staff plans everything in advance. But if, contrary to expectation, such a thing occurs, we get to work immediately. We have both mobile medical forces and we have the experience, including that of Afghanistan, where, by the way, I had occasion to be more than once. There is a regulation which describes who is to do what.

The practice of redistributing medical forces and assets underwent a good workout with us recently. I would like to take special note of the Leningrad and Volga military districts and their medical service chiefs, I. Izyumtsev and V. Kudinov, in this regard. A unique assault force of medical personnel immediately arrives at the site where a regiment or division "lands" and is attached to aid stations, medical battalions, and hospitals. Equipment and drugs arrive in addition, and physicians from the local hospital join in...

The following quite recent example also can be given. A new unit arrived for stationing in Anapa. There were barracks for the soldiers, but officers' families ended up in a difficult situation. The minister of defense and chief of the Main Military Medical Directorate visited the site, after which the minister made the decision to settle the new tenants in our own children's health camp—the season ends there in just a month.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Yuriy Ivanovich, it seems the "road travails" of our troops are ending with the date of their withdrawal of 31 August. Will your work also be more stable then?

[Pogodin] Military service means incessant movement and alerts. Therefore increased mobility of medical forces is one of our chief concerns.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Text of Russian-Georgian Status-of-Forces Treaty

94UM0274A Moscow DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK in Russian No 1-2, Jan 94 [Signed to press 24 Jan 94] pp 38-47

["Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia on the Legal Status of Military Elements of the Russian Federation Temporarily on the Territory of the Republic of Georgia"]

[Text] The Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia, considering the new political realities in Europe and throughout the world and the acquisition by the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia of state independence,

guided by an endeavor to lay the foundations of qualitatively new friendly relations between them and to develop mutually profitable cooperation based on the principles and rules of international law, and

wishing to create a legal basis for the temporary stay of military elements of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Republic of Georgia,

have agreed as hereunder:

Article 1

For the purposes of this treaty the terms indicated below shall signify:

1. "Military elements of the Russian Federation"—large strategic formations, combined units, and units, regardless of the branches of service or combat arms, and also military enterprises, establishments, and organizations under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.
2. "Command of military elements of the Russian Federation"—the command of the Group of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus in the person of the group commander, to whom all the military elements under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, including the military elements of central command, are subordinate on matters of their temporary stay on the territory of the Republic of Georgia.
3. "Persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation":
 - a) servicemen performing military service as part of military elements of the Russian Federation, other than the Border Troops, and also persons scheduled as replacement troops;
 - b) civilians working in units, at military enterprises, and in establishments and organizations of military elements of the Russian Federation, other than citizens of the Republic of Georgia;
 - c) individuals temporarily assigned to military elements of the Russian Federation.
4. "Members of the families of persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation"—spouses and children and also other relatives who permanently

reside with them and who are their dependents, other than citizens of the Republic of Georgia.

5. "Place of deployment garrisoning"—areas of territory with precisely defined, mutually agreed boundaries, which are the property of the Republic of Georgia and on which military elements of the Russian Federation and the real property intended for their functioning are temporarily accommodated.
6. "Real property"—all types of arms, military equipment, and munitions and also transport and all other material and technical facilities necessary for support of the military elements of the Russian Federation.
7. "Movable assets"—plots of land temporarily occupied by military elements of the Russian Federation and the barracks and housing and service utilities of the base compounds, military enterprises, access railroads, airfields, ports, training centers and areas, proving grounds, firing ranges, fixed command posts, command and control posts, communications and electronic and navigation support centers, buildings and installations of arsenals, storage depots, and warehouses and other buildings and installations which are the property of the Republic of Georgia at the temporary disposal of military elements of the Russian Federation and which are intended to support their ability to function.
8. "Transitional period"—the time of the stay of military elements of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Republic of Georgia.

Article 2

The planned withdrawal of military elements of the Russian Federation shall be regulated by a separate agreement. The Contracting Parties shall render one another assistance and cooperate purposively on matters of the temporary stay and planned withdrawal of the military elements of the Russian Federation. The authorities of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia shall further in every possible way the maintenance of benevolent relations between the populace, state authorities, and public organizations of the Republic of Georgia and the military elements of the Russian Federation and make provision for the regulated, sure, and timely compliance with this treaty.

The military elements of the Russian Federation, the persons constituting them, and the members of these persons' families shall respect the sovereignty and comply with the legislation of the Republic of Georgia, shall not interfere in its internal affairs, shall not participate in internal conflicts, and shall not allow the military service or specialized military training in the places of deployment garrisoning of citizens of third countries. The authorities of the Republic of Georgia shall respect the legal standing of the military elements of the Russian Federation, the persons constituting them, and the members of these persons' families and shall not impede activities of the combat training of the personnel of the units and subunits of the military elements of the Russian Federation. They shall adopt the necessary measures, coordinated with the military elements of the Russian Federation, providing for their security and safety and the safekeeping of assets, including measures to forestall and suppress all unlawful actions.

Article 3

The overall strength of the personnel of the military elements of the Russian Federation is to be agreed by the Contracting Parties. The places of deployment garrisoning which they occupy the day this treaty is signed shall be reserved to these elements up to their withdrawal to the territory of the Russian Federation or disbandment, unless the Contracting Parties agree otherwise.

The re-stationing of the military elements of the Russian Federation, except in the instances specified in Article 7, and the replacement of the military elements of the Russian Federation shall be undertaken in accordance with plans agreed with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia.

Article 4

The Russian Side undertakes not to dispose of and not to transport across the territory of the Republic of Georgia weapons of mass destruction nor to carry out research in this sphere.

Article 5

The military elements of the Russian Federation shall in the transitional period contribute to the creation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia, assisting in the training for them of compulsory-service personnel and career command and engineering personnel. The procedure of the funding and provision with material resources shall be determined by a separate agreement.

Each Contracting Party shall create the necessary conditions for the military elements of the Russian Federation to discharge their functions.

Article 6

While temporarily on the territory of the Republic of Georgia, the military elements of the Russian Federation shall perform assignments set by the Government of the Russian Federation and the command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In the practical realization of this and other provisions of this treaty the command of the military elements of the Russian Federation shall operate in close interaction and following consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia. The use of the military elements of the Russian Federation in combat operations shall be permissible only in accordance with a joint decision of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia and in accordance with legislation of each Contracting Party.

Article 7

The military elements of the Russian Federation shall conduct on the territory of the Republic of Georgia maneuvers, exercises, and other planned training activities within the confines of the facilities allocated them as specified in Article 1, clause 7. Combat training outside of these facilities shall be permitted only on the grounds of plans agreed with the competent authorities of the Republic of Georgia.

Routes that are to be agreed between the command of the military elements of the Russian Federation and competent

authorities of the Republic of Georgia may be used for the movement of tracked military equipment from the places deployment garrisoning to the proving grounds, training areas, and firing ranges and also its relocation from some proving grounds, training areas, and firing ranges to others in the course of exercises and maneuvers. The procedure of use of the former is to be agreed two to three weeks before the start of the exercises.

Exercises of the military elements of the Russian Federation from the regiment up shall be subject to prior notification of the competent authorities of the Republic of Georgia no later than one month prior to their commencement, and evaluations of the combat readiness of the troops involving their move outside of the facilities specified above shall not be conducted earlier than the agreed times here.

The principles and actual procedure of the performance of exercises, the numbers of the participants, the areas, routes, and times that they are to be held, the time of the field firing stages and the safety zones, and environmental and other questions shall be agreed separately, unless they are encompassed by the provisions of other articles of this treaty. The military elements of the Russian Federation shall adopt all necessary measures for the prevention to the extent possible of damage being caused at the time the exercises are being held.

For the purpose of preventing accidents during exercises, other than field-firing exercises, the military equipment and arms systems shall not be loaded with ammunition. The ammunition necessary for exercises involving field firing shall be delivered by separate transport. During firing and exercises involving field firing the necessary safety zones shall be organized in conjunction with the competent authorities of the Republic of Georgia around the firing ranges and above them.

The military elements of the Russian Federation shall be entitled to implement measures to ensure their own security and guard military facilities where they are garrisoned and on the move in accordance with the procedure established in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, of which the local authorities shall be notified.

Article 8

The establishment by the military elements of the Russian Federation of prohibited areas and safety zones shall, except in the instances specified in Article 7, be permitted only following consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia.

Article 9

The Republic of Georgia shall not impede overflights of its territory by aircraft (airplanes, helicopters) of military elements of the Russian Federation in accordance with requests satisfied in advance, except for prohibited areas, which shall be determined by the Government of the Republic of Georgia.

The control of air traffic over the entire territory of the Republic of Georgia shall be entrusted to its competent authorities.

The procedure of the organization and execution of flights by aviation of the military elements of the Russian Federation and use of the air space, airfields, and proving grounds

shall be determined by sets of instructions pertaining to flights over the territory of the Republic of Georgia.

Article 10

Warships (craft) of the Russian Federation temporarily based on the territory of the Republic of Georgia shall cruise unimpeded in the territorial and inland waters of the Republic of Georgia in order to execute planned activities to maintain combat readiness and provide for day-to-day vital functions following consultation with the competent authorities of the Republic of Georgia.

Other ships (craft) of the navy of the Russian Federation shall enter inland waters and call at ports in accordance with a prior application to the competent authorities of the Republic of Georgia.

Article 11

The Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the sphere of assurance of the safety of shipping and the flights of aircraft. The procedure and forms of this cooperation shall be determined by special agreements of the Parties.

Article 12

Electronic facilities of the military elements of the Russian Federation temporarily stationed on the territory of the Republic of Georgia are to be registered and annually reregistered from the time this treaty takes effect. A registration record shall be maintained by both Parties.

The military elements of the Russian Federation shall present to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Georgia annually the list, purpose, and deployment garrisoning of their electronic facilities.

The Republic of Georgia shall reserve for the military elements of the Russian Federation the right to use radio frequencies by field components of the troops in accordance with the procedure in effect by the time this treaty is signed.

Joint duty in intra-garrison communications nets shall be organized for the interaction of the military elements of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia.

To avoid mutual radio interference the joint use of radio frequencies by military elements of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia shall be regulated in accordance with a mutual arrangement by a permanent joint group of experts.

The procedure of the exchange of information on the issues raised in this article shall be regulated by a separate agreement.

Article 13

The military elements of the Russian Federation, the persons constituting them, and members of their families may avail themselves of postal and communications services in accordance with the rules in effect in the Republic of Georgia.

The Republic of Georgia regards the operational equipment for the delivery of mail to the military elements of the Russian Federation as postal equipment of the postal administration of the Russian Federation.

The procedure of the use of postal services, communications, and radio frequencies shall be determined by a separate agreement.

Article 14

The military elements of the Russian Federation shall exercise their activity with the provision of measures to preserve cultural and historical objects and natural resources and to prevent environmental pollution.

After this treaty has been signed and has taken effect, the Contracting Parties shall within the framework of the Mixed Commission formed in accordance with Article 32 determine the damage caused cultural and historical objects, natural resources, and the environment of the Republic of Georgia by the activity of the military elements of the Russian Federation during their stay on the territory of the Republic of Georgia. Compensation for the damage shall, in accordance with Article 26, be entrusted to the Russian Federation.

Article 15

Legislation of the Republic of Georgia pertaining to the prevention of and the fight against infectious diseases of man and animals shall extend to the military elements of the Russian Federation, the persons constituting them, and the members of their families. The military elements of the Russian Federation may within the confines of the real-property facilities allocated them apply their own rules, unless a threat to the health of the population arises here.

The military elements of the Russian Federation and the Georgian authorities shall notify each other immediately of a suspicion of the presence of particularly dangerous infections and their outbreak, progress, and elimination and also of the measures being adopted in this connection.

In the event of it being necessary to implement special measures to safeguard health in the area of the real-property facilities allocated them, the military elements of the Russian Federation shall cooperate with the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Georgia in their implementation.

The military elements of the Russian Federation shall independently analyze and monitor the state of the food, medication, and other goods they import, guaranteeing that no harm is caused the health of the population by their importation here.

Article 16

Servicemen of the military elements of the Russian Federation shall wear the form of clothing established for them and possess and bear arms in the places of deployment garrisoning in accordance with the procedure established in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Carrying personal weapons outside of the places of deployment garrisoning is permissible only for the purpose of the accomplishment of official assignments pertaining to the protection and safety of the military elements of the Russian Federation and their real property, arms and military equipment, and financial and material resources.

The state authorities of the Republic of Georgia recognize the papers in effect on the territory of the Russian Federation attesting the identity of the servicemen of the military elements of the Russian Federation and members of their families.

Article 17

The military elements of the Russian Federation, the persons constituting them, and the members of their families on the territory of the Republic of Georgia within the framework of this treaty may move freely on transport facilities belonging to them on general-use lines of communication if the laws of the Republic of Georgia are observed and intra-unit assignment orders are taken into consideration here. The military elements of the Russian Federation shall have the right to avail themselves on the territory of the Republic of Georgia of general-use transport (on land, including the railroads, in the air, and on water) and transport equipment on the same terms as the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia.

The Georgian authorities shall without any examinations or the collection of fees recognize the driver's licenses in effect on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Official transport facilities of the military elements of the Russian Federation must have easily distinguishable number plates and identification markings indicating official ownership. The authorities of the military elements of the Russian Federation shall issue the number plates for the official transport facilities and report their registration to the competent authorities of the Republic of Georgia.

The authorities of the military elements of the Russian Federation shall exercise supervision of the proper technical condition of the transport facilities they authorize for operation, lights and signals included, and shall bear the responsibility for this.

Private transport facilities shall be presented for maintenance inspection to the appropriate internal affairs authority of the Republic of Georgia, and official transport facilities shall undergo maintenance inspection at the place of deployment garrisoning and, if necessary, could be subjected to additional joint maintenance inspection by competent authorities of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Georgia and the military elements of the Russian Federation, which shall be entitled to inspect driver's licenses, service forms and records, and papers attesting the identity of the drivers.

The military elements of the Russian Federation shall comply with the rules of the road in force in the Republic of Georgia, including the rules governing behavior at the scene of highway accidents and also the rules governing the shipment of hazardous materials. Compliance with the said rules shall be monitored by the competent authorities of the Republic of Georgia and the authorities of the military elements of the Russian Federation. Georgian legal provisions concerning a driver's deprivation of the right to operate a means of transport shall operate without restriction in respect to the persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation and the members of their families who are drivers of official or private means of transport. A driver's license shall be confiscated by the

Military Automotive Inspectorate (VAI) of the military elements of the Russian Federation in accordance with a request of the authorities of the Republic of Georgia.

Agreements with the authorities of the Republic of Georgia may be concluded on the earmarking of the general-use highway system and the procedure of its regular use for movements of the military elements of the Russian Federation in which 20 and more means of transport and also any number of large and heavy-freight means of transport are engaged. Such movements shall be coordinated ahead of time with the Military-Transport Department of the Republic of Georgia.

The movement of large-load and heavy equipment, including tracked vehicles, shall be undertaken by railroad transport where possible. If in a given area rail communications are wanting or if the distance is negligible, the tracked vehicles may be transported also on trailers or under their own steam by agreed routes.

Article 18

The Republic of Georgia shall reserve for the military elements of the Russian Federation the right to use real-property facilities on a noncompensable basis, and electric power and municipal, construction, and other services, in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Georgia applicable to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia. Real-property facilities not being used by the military elements of the Russian Federation on the day that this treaty is signed and released as a result of their withdrawal or reduction shall be transferred to the Georgian Side.

Military enterprises, access railroads, airfields, ports, training centers and areas, proving grounds, firing ranges, and fixed command posts of the air defense Troops shall be intended for joint use by both the military elements of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia. The procedure and conditions of the use by the military elements of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia of these facilities and also of all types of services shall be determined by a separate agreement of the Contracting Parties.

Article 19

The Russian Federation shall hand over to the Republic of Georgia the arms, military equipment, and other movable assets of the military elements of the Russian Federation necessary for the creation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia, including its navy. To this end the Parties shall determine by a separate agreement the procedure of division of the movable assets.

The Russian Side shall for the transitional period assume a commitment pertaining to the safekeeping of the real property used by the military elements of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Side shall present to the Georgian Side papers on the presence of the movable assets and real property of the military elements of the Russian Federation within the period of three months following the day this treaty is signed.

Article 20

The Contracting Parties shall assure the fullness of political, socioeconomic, and personal rights and liberties of the

persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation and the members of their families in accordance with the rules of international law.

Article 21

The military elements of the Russian Federation, the persons constituting them, and the members of their families and also persons discharged into the reserve or released as retirees are entitled on the same conditions as citizens of the Republic of Georgia to purchase for payment the goods necessary for their supply and personal consumption and to avail themselves of required services within the framework of legislation of the Republic of Georgia.

Article 22

The right to own and dispose of apartment houses, country cottages, garden plots, garages, and similar real property they have purchased legitimately in the Republic of Georgia, including the right to dispose of it at their discretion when leaving the territory of the Republic of Georgia for permanent residence also, is recognized for the persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation and members of their families, as also for persons who have been released into the reserve, have retired, or are on a pension. Upon the said persons' sale of lawfully privatized apartments, the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Defense authorities retain the preferential right to purchase such apartments at the current market price.

Article 23

The Contracting Parties shall assure the residence of the persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation and members of their families in the living space they occupy at the moment this treaty is signed.

Servicemen not provided with living space and also those arriving subsequently to perform their military service in place of those departing shall be provided with living space thanks to the living space vacated following the departure of the servicemen, regardless of its departmental affiliation, and also that leased by the command of the military elements of the Russian Federation from the Republic of Georgia. The Georgian Side shall lease residential premises to the command of the military elements of the Russian Federation, providing for the compact residence of the servicemen and the members of their families.

The Georgian Side shall assign the military elements of the Russian Federation for the entire period of their stay on the territory of the Republic of Georgia the living space in homes, regardless of its departmental affiliation, which they occupy on the day that this treaty is signed in accordance with the established strength of the military elements and with regard to the provisions of housing legislation of the Republic of Georgia.

The Republic of Georgia shall provide with the appropriate registration (residence permit) the persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation and the members of their families.

Article 24

The persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation and the members of their families shall

cross the border of the Republic of Georgia on the basis of papers attesting identity (military service cards) or passports for overseas travel, and underage children, on the basis of an entry on these papers. The procedure of the admission of military elements of the Russian Federation, the persons constituting them, and the members of their families traveling alone or as part of military units, subunits, and teams and the procedure of the transportation of military freight across the border of the Republic of Georgia following the establishment of its operating conditions will be determined by a separate agreement.

The Republic of Georgia shall grant persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation and members of their families crossing the border of the Republic of Georgia the right to carry through their personal effects without the collection of duty, taxes, or payments in accordance with customs legislation of the Republic of Georgia.

Article 25

Questions of jurisdiction connected with the stay of military elements of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Republic of Georgia shall be regulated as follows:

1. In respect to proceedings concerning crimes and administrative offenses committed by persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation or members of their families outside of the places of deployment garrisoning, legislation of the Republic of Georgia shall apply and its courts, public prosecutor's offices, and other competent authorities shall operate, as a rule.
2. Clause 1 of this article shall not apply in respect to proceedings concerning the crimes and administrative offenses of persons constituting military elements of the Russian Federation and members of their families:
 - a) committed in the places of deployment garrisoning or during the performance of official duties;
 - b) committed against the Russian Federation or against persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation and also in respect to proceedings concerning military crimes.

In respect to proceedings concerning the crimes specified in subclauses "a" and "b," legislation of the Russian Federation shall apply and its public prosecutor's office and judicial and other competent authorities shall operate.

3. Competent authorities of the Republic of Georgia shall make provision in respect to judicial decisions and rulings of competent authorities of the Russian Federation for the detention of persons taken into custody and their conveyance under escort. Sentences in the form of imprisonment, compulsory labor, and dispatch to a disciplinary battalion in respect to the persons specified in clause 2 of this article shall be served on the territory of the Russian Federation, and in respect to the persons specified in clause 1, as the competent authorities of the Republic of Georgia shall decide.
4. The competent authorities of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia may reciprocally make requests of one another concerning the handover or acceptance of jurisdiction or the serving of sentence in respect to

individual cases (persons) specified by this article. Such requests will be given favorable consideration.

5. Questions of mutual legal assistance shall be regulated by a separate agreement.

Article 26

The Russian Federation shall compensate material damage if it has been caused by the actions or oversights of the military elements of the Russian Federation or individuals constituting them in the performance of their official duties in the Republic of Georgia or the institutions or citizens of third states on the territory of the Republic of Georgia, in both instances in amounts established on the basis of claims presented in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Georgia.

Disputes arising in respect to questions of compensation for damage are to be examined by the Mixed Commission formed in accordance with Article 32 of this treaty.

Damage shall be compensated by the Russian Federation no later than three months following the day a ruling is made by the Mixed Commission or the judgment of a court takes effect.

The payment of the sums in accordance with a ruling of the Mixed Commission to the injured parties and institutions shall be made by the appropriate bodies of the Republic of Georgia with subsequent compensation by the Russian Side.

Article 27

The Republic of Georgia shall compensate the Russian Federation for damage if it has been caused assets of the military elements of the Russian Federation and also persons constituting them and members of their families as a result of the actions or oversights of official institutions of the Republic of Georgia in the amounts established by the Mixed Commission.

The Republic of Georgia shall compensate the Russian Federation, persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation, and members of their families damage if it was caused as the result of actions or oversights of citizens and legal entities (other than official institutions) of the Republic of Georgia in the amounts established by a Georgian court on the basis of claims made against the persons who caused the damage.

Damage shall be compensated by the Republic of Georgia no later than three months following the day a ruling is adopted by the Mixed Commission or the judgment of a court takes effect.

Article 28

Labor juridical relationships between the command of the military elements of the Russian Federation and persons working for wages who are not on the list of the persons specified in clauses 3 and 4 of Article 1 of this treaty shall be regulated by legislation of the Republic of Georgia in the sphere of labor, occupational safety and health, and social insurance.

The Georgian authorities shall assist the command of the military elements of the Russian Federation at its request in the settlement of matters pertaining to the conditions of the

labor of persons working for wages and also in determination of the amounts and procedure of payment of wages.

Arguments ensuing from labor and social-insurance juridical relationships shall be settled by a court of the Republic of Georgia. The persons working for wages shall institute proceedings with the Republic of Georgia. At the request of the command of the military elements of the Russian Federation, proceedings against persons working for wages shall be instituted with the Republic of Georgia. For a settlement of these disputes the provisions of a special agreement shall apply.

Article 29

The Republic of Georgia shall ensure rights equal to those of Georgian citizens for persons constituting the military elements of the Russian Federation and the members of their families in obtaining an education in its higher, secondary, and secondary specialized educational institutions, in attendance at or admittance to preschools, and in health care. The Republic of Georgia shall guarantee the handover, and the Russian Federation, the complete safekeeping throughout the time of use, of school premises in the places of compact residence of the families of servicemen, and the Russian Side shall make payment here for the lease of the corresponding premises in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Georgia when such premises are outside of the places of deployment garrisoning.

Article 30

Questions of pensions for servicemen and members of their families and of social services for retirees among them and also questions connected with their acquisition of citizenship of the Republic of Georgia shall be determined by a special agreement.

Article 31

For the settlement of questions connected with the temporary stay and withdrawal of the military elements of the Russian Federation, the Contracting Parties shall appoint their representatives for matters of the stay and withdrawal of the military elements of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Georgia, who, with regard to the agreed conditions of the withdrawal, shall determine and coordinate the necessary measures.

Article 32

For the solution of questions connected with the interpretation or application of this treaty a Mixed Commission, to which each Contracting Party shall appoint three of its representatives, shall be formed.

A special subcommission for the division of military property and its joint use, which will prepare proposals for the governments of the Contracting Parties, shall be created under the auspices of the Mixed Commission.

The Mixed Commission shall operate on the basis of the rules that it adopts.

The location of the Mixed Commission shall be determined by the city of Tbilisi.

In the event of the Mixed Commission being unable to resolve a matter forwarded for its consideration, this matter will be resolved via diplomatic channels as quickly as possible.

Article 33

The Contracting Parties shall agree as quickly as possible to draw up and sign the set of agreements regulating matters

connected with the temporary stay of the military elements of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Republic of Georgia.

Article 34

This treaty is subject to ratification and will take effect on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which will take place in the city of Moscow.

This treaty shall remain in force through the end of 1995 and shall be extended automatically for a subsequent three-year period unless either Party notifies the other Party in writing one year prior to the expiration of the original term of its desire to terminate the treaty.

In the event of the notification in writing of one Party of its intention to terminate the treaty in accordance with the provisions of this article, the Russian Side will withdraw its military elements from the territory of the Republic of Georgia before the end of 1995.

Done in Moscow on 9 October 1993 in two copies, each in Russian and Georgian, both texts being equally valid, what is more.

[Signed] For the Russian Federation, M. Kolesnikov

For the Republic of Georgia, A. Skitishvili

UKRAINE

Military-Industrial Questions Considered

94UM0531B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
2 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Volodymyr Mokhurenko: "The VPK at the Center of Attention"]

[Text] The request of Minister of Machine Building, the Military-Industrial Complex [VPK] and Conversion Viktor Petrov with regard to the realization of work in the area of nuclear science and technology was supported at a session of the Commission of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on Questions of Defense and State Security chaired by Volodymyr Mukhin at the end of July.

The status of the military-industrial complex and urgent measures to bring it out of crisis were reviewed. The chairman of the Commission on the Affairs of the VPK and Military Science, Borys Korzhhevnykov, reported to the commission that the people's deputies have lately been visiting the defense enterprises, where they have been studying the situation. Many concrete proposals were made during the discussion. It was resolved that the next session of the commission would hear reports with the appropriate information from Vice Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, Minister of Defense General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky and Minister of Machine Building, the Military-Industrial Complex [VPK] and Conversion Viktor Petrov, for the purpose of devising practical recommendations pertaining to getting out of the difficult current situation in this area.

Pustovyy Calls for Development of Domestic Weapons Industry

94UM0531A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Jul 94 p 2

[Interview with Deputy Chief of Weaponry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Lieutenant-General Ihor Vasylovych Pustovyy by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Oleh Vachayev under the rubric "Topical Interview": "Lieutenant-General Ihor Pustovyy: 'Ukraine Can Have Its Own Weaponry, but We Have To Be Working Already Today'"]

[Text] *Résumé of Interlocutor: Lieutenant-General Ihor Vasylovych Pustovyy completed the Black Sea Higher Naval School imeni P. Nakhimov, the Military Academy imeni F. Dzerzhinsky (radiotechnical and command departments), and the Military Academy of the General Staff. He served at the Poti Naval Base, and in the Republic of Cuba. He then served in command posts, starting with the chief of staff of a missile regiment and ending with the command of a missile army of the RVSN [Strategic Rocket Forces]. When Ukraine gained its independence, he voluntarily came over to serve in the national Armed Forces in 1993.*

He has been Chief of the Main Directorate for Science and Weapons Development and Testing and Deputy Chief of Armaments of the Armed Forces of Ukraine since April of 1994. Our discussion started with the problems that face that structure.

[I.V. Pustovyy] The activity of the Main Directorate consists of organizing scientific research and experimental design, and testing and bringing weaponry to series production—which, by the way, we are also engaged in. We have created the corresponding structures for this purpose. The directorate for production orders and ties with industry, for example, supervises the activity of the military representatives at the enterprises of the VPK [military-industrial complex] (NARODNA ARMIYA related the tasks of the directorate in the February 2 issue for 1994O.V.).

Several units, small plants and arsenals are also subordinate to us. But that is another of our tasks—the creation of the necessary reserves of weaponry.

[O. Vachayev] Ihor Vasylovych, world experience testifies that the Armed Forces of a nation as such have never been occupied with the development of advanced models of weaponry and military hardware. That work is concentrated in the VPK, design bureaus and other organizations that have the corresponding physical plant and personnel. But the basis of the requirements for those models is provided by the Armed Forces at various levels, and military-scientific and military-technical support of those projects is accomplished...

[I.V. Pustovyy] We also work to coordinate the efforts of the design bureaus and the Ministry of Defense. But civilian specialists work at the KBs [design bureaus] that have high scientific and technical intelligence in their higher educational realm. They are, of course, not occupied with the creation of requirements, say, at the operational-strategic level, or predictions of both the means of armed struggle or the employment of the weaponry itself. We are occupied

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with that. The work is too scientifically intense and prolonged. World practice testifies that 5—10 years are required for the creation of a new type of weaponry, and for some models, it is as much as 15 years from idea to metal, as we say.

The Ministry of Defense itself, and no one else, determines what weaponry the Army needs. And for that we need specialists, and not only in military affairs. Quite a bit of scientific and technical potential—doctors and candidates of sciences in various fields—is concentrated in the Main Directorate. The work on creating a Central Scientific-Research Institute of Weaponry and Military Hardware and a mock-up of a state scientific-research test range continues as well. All of this permits us to work with the VPK on equal terms.

The plan for our collaboration is this: proceeding from the requirements of the Military Doctrine as approved by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense determines what weaponry is needed, and with what characteristics. We order these or those prototypes from the KBs on the basis of those requirements, and thereafter are occupied with coordinating that work.

The development priority in the balanced building of the branches of the Armed Forces, various types of troops and special troops, as defined in the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, is given to high-precision weaponry of enhanced power, the manpower and means of reconnaissance, air and space weaponry, electronic warfare, missile troops, aviation and air-mobile units, advanced types of surface ships and submarines.

The weaponry and military hardware that will raise the firepower and mobility of the troops and forces, as well as weapons systems competitive in the world market, take shape in accordance with the Military Doctrine and the military-technical priorities of Ukraine.

These fundamental provisions provide the ideas for the degree of the requirements that are devised at the Main Directorate, and must be incarnated in the new models of the weaponry.

[O. Vachayev] Touching on your collaboration, I cannot bypass this question. There was, as they say, a distinctive kind of pressure on the part of the VPK during the existence of the former USSR. That is, there was the dictate of the general designer, who, having created this or that model, foisted it onto the Ministry of Defense, since he was essentially a monopolist in his field. Models that sometimes did not conform to the requirements substantiated for them were received by the troops as a result...

[I.V. Pustovyy] I want to caution you against a vulgar understanding of this question. The dictate indeed existed, but within the bounds of the order from the Ministry of Defense, for which the money was allocated from the state budget.

It is another matter that the general designers were not always able to provide what the military needed. And, taking advantage of their reputation and influence, not to impart the characteristics that were ordered for them to that

same weaponry. The subjective factor, that is, was in effect. The interests of the Armed Forces were always in first place regardless of all that.

The latter topic pertains entirely to Ukraine as well. Wherever we place orders, that is in science and industry, the people's money is invested. And we must monitor where and how that money is used. The Military Doctrine, by the way, and specifically through the principles of the military-economic policy of Ukraine, provides a quite clear-cut mechanism for eliminating that dictate. Suffice it to recall the competitive approach to the development and production of new weapons systems and military hardware, and the use of the contract approach to the fulfillment of orders of the Ministry of Defense. And everything, as they say, will be in its place.

[O. Vachayev] A no less important question in this regard. Each new model or type of weapon requires testing. You, Ihor Vasylovych, mentioned work on creating a state scientific-research proving ground. But the idea still exists that Ukraine does not have anywhere to put the corresponding physical facilities. And furthermore, is there a possibility that proving grounds outside the boundaries of the country, in Russia and Kazakhstan, could be used for testing? Which is most suitable for Ukraine in that case?

[I.V. Pustovyy] This is quite a difficult problem, and will require more than the resources of the Main Directorate alone to resolve. But I will say that a scientific-research base exists in Ukraine. We have something to start with, and are developing it in the designated directions.

As for the use of test facilities abroad, agreements would undoubtedly be required here at the international level. When this issue is properly resolved, we as specialists will without fail be involved in the work. Familiarization with the prospects of military-scientific and military-technical collaboration is still underway at the level of the ministries of defense of the countries concerned.

I would like to point out here nonetheless that one cannot always count on this or that country in military matters. One must take into account not only the economic aspects, however attractive they may be, but also the political ones. This means, with regard to testing, that we can do everything with our facilities that we need to, and we will never be the masters of someone else's, the more so in such an unstable situation as exists in most of the CIS countries.

I am convinced that all of the pluses and minuses must be summed up at the state level. It is not the business of the military to meddle in politics.

[O. Vachayev] A last question, which is of interest to many of our readers, both military and civilian. Is Ukraine able to create its own weaponry? The state, after all, has great scientific, technical and industrial potential, but on the other hand, the economic crisis is profound...

[I.V. Pustovyy] Much has already been said about this at various levels, and I do not want to repeat it. I would say only that we really do have great potential. But we must also understand that there will be no success in the development of weaponry without an advance in the economy of Ukraine itself. Whatever programs we may prepare, whatever orders we may be working on—the future arming of the Armed

Forces with everything they need is impossible without a stable overall situation. To break that mutual dependence would be heading nowhere.

[O. Vachayev] Two state programs for the creation of weaponry are under development in the Armed Forces of Ukraine today. One of them is figured for the period to the year 2000, and the other to 2010. The formulation of the state order for 1995 is underway. The Ministry of Defense has developed 28 programs for scientific-research and experimental-design work. They are all aimed at the development of weaponry and hardware. The realization of all these plans, however, is being held back by the lack of the appropriate financing, a legacy of the profound economic crisis in the nation. The money allocated, or rather the miserly portion of it, for example, does not permit the fulfillment of the state order of the MO [Ministry of Defense] for this year. The appropriations moreover do not take into account the indebtedness to enterprises of the VPK for 1993, which is partly covered out of today's defense budget...

[I.V. Pustovyy] I am certain, despite all of the difficulties, that Ukraine will be able in the future to create and have its own weaponry. But to sit and wait for whoever will bring you everything on a silver platter, as they say, is not the business of a patriot of Ukraine. We need to work doggedly toward that even today, each at his job. Our tasks have been assigned, and the time for debate has passed. So—to work.

[O. Vachayev] Thank you for the serious discussion.

Border Guard Leaders Meet With Scientists

94UM0531C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
23 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Serhiy Huk: "The Border Guards and Ukrainian Scientists Are Working in Close Contact"]

[Text] A session of the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine was held recently at which the question of the military-assistance work of the scientists was reviewed. Chairman of the State Committee for Affairs of Protecting the State Border of Ukraine and Commander of the Border Troops of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Valeriy Hubenko, his deputies and border troops officers were invited to be present at the session.

The president of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Academician Borys Paton, who opened the session, sincerely welcomed those present, and expressed the gratitude of the border troops for their collaboration, expressing the hope that future close contacts between the scientists and the border troops of Ukraine will raise the quality of protection of the borders of our nation.

Chairman of the State Border Committee General of the Army Valeriy Hubenko, who spoke at the session, talked about the building of the Border Troops, the results of their activities, and the problems that the border troops are working on today. He expressed an interest in expanding ties between the border guards and the scientists, and their joint work aimed at strengthening the Fatherland.

The order on the Border Troops, which was encouraged by a great many of the scientists who are making a substantial contribution to the building of the Border Troops of Ukraine, was read out at the end of the meeting.

Odessa Ground Troops Institute Information Processing Conference

94UM0531D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
14 Jul 94 p 1

[Unattributed item from Odessa: "The Contribution of the Military Scientists"]

[Text] One of the organizers of the first "Information Sciences: Theory, Technology, Practice" national scientific conference was the Odessa Ground Forces Institute. Representatives of the southern regional science center of the Ukrainian Academy of Information Sciences, the Ukrainian-Polish "Kontakt" Scientific and Technical Joint Venture and the "Element" Special Design and Technological Bureau reviewed topical issues in incorporating information sciences into the educational process. The military scientists shared their considerable experience in this area.

Carpathian Military District Computer Support Problems

94UM0531E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
28 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Oleh Vachayev: "Who Will Help the Computer Center?"]

[Text] It is no longer a novelty that the headquarters of larger formations, or even units, are linked by electronic computers that serve well the needs of the troops. The computer center that is supervised by Major Vitaliy Monakhov operated at a high information level during the inspection conducted in the mechanized formation of the PrykVO [Carpathian Military District] as well.

But it is too early to speak of a center as such. This structure, after all, is not part of the standard organizational structure, with all of the attendant consequences (NARODNA ARMIYA has written repeatedly about this problem—*Auth.*). One of the most painful issues here is the provision (or rather, the lack of centralized provision) of modern computer hardware. They get out of the situation in the formation—as they do everywhere, by the way—by relying on the assistance of patrons. Vitaliy Yuriyovych was lucky to get an American (Eyser) computer with the necessary peripherals through the local state administration. The happiness soon passed, however, when it became clear that there was no way to monitor the emissions, without which the computer could not be operated under the conditions of a military unit. The corresponding structure of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine unfortunately also does not have such apparatus. So they are racking their brains in the unit—to whom can they turn for help now?

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Nazarbayev on Kazakh Military Doctrine

94UM0556A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 17 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Ivan Zakharchenko, KAZTAG: "N. Nazarbayev: Kazakhstan's Military Doctrine Is Strictly Defensive in Nature. We Have No Territorial Claims on Anyone and Favor Universal Peace"]

[Text] An opposed-forces command and staff exercise involving various combat arms was held at the Republic Ministry of Defense Central Training Area on 15 August.

In repelling the "Green" force's "aggression," the "Red" force demonstrated the ability to concentrate necessary forces and assets for delivering powerful counterthrusts to destroy the "enemy." After conducting a number of fire assaults against him using aircraft, tube and missile artillery, mortars and other kinds of weapons, the "Red" force shifted from defense to the offensive. This was done under reliable protection of air defense weapons, which accurately destroyed airborne targets attempting to halt the advance of tanks and BMP's. Soldiers of the assault subunit and combat engineer subunit, chemical specialists, scouts, and aircraft and helicopter pilots also distinguished themselves in the exercise. Military representatives of the near and far abroad observed their actions attentively.

In the final account, all missions assigned for the period of the opposed-forces command and staff exercise were accomplished successfully.

President Nursultan Nazarbayev was present at the exercise. Before the beginning of combat training operations, he visited the "Red" FEBA [Forward Edge of the Battle Area] and the command post, where he chatted with officers, NCO's and privates.

At the conclusion of the exercise, the head of state spoke to its participants. He said that, as commander in chief of the country's Armed Forces, it was the first time he had been present at such a major Army activity conducted under conditions with maximum approximation of combat. The President expressed satisfaction with the course of the

exercise. During meetings with soldiers at combat positions, he formed the opinion that each knew his mission and performed it precisely.

Like the people of Kazakhstan, our Army is multinational, noted Nazarbayev. It is also necessary to continue to strengthen its unity, without which high combat readiness is inconceivable.

The republic's leader noted that he always stood for preserving unified Armed Forces and borders of Commonwealth states, and Kazakhstan is not at fault for their disintegration. Now it is very important to adjust firm ties within the CIS framework and ensure equality of people in all the post-Soviet space. The republic signed a military cooperation treaty with Russia which provides in part for contract service of their citizens in either of the two countries as desired and the parties' mutual deliveries of necessary equipment and weapons.

Kazakhstan's military doctrine is strictly defensive in nature, emphasized the President. We have no territorial claims on anyone and favor universal peace. The idea of establishing a Eurasian Union also is aimed at this.

The basic purpose of armed forces of a sovereign state is to ensure reliable protection of its territorial integrity and independence and to fulfill their constitutional duty to the people at any minute. Despite existing difficulties, the republic leadership has given and will give constant attention to the Army and will show concern for people in shoulderboards.

The commander in chief announced gratitude to all exercise participants and charged Minister of Defense Sagadat Nurmagambetov with recommending the most distinguished ones for commendation.

Then the head of state inspected the combat equipment and weapons with which our Army is outfitted and the proposed models of the new military uniform. In a formation stationed not far from the range he familiarized himself with a tank regiment's training facility and visited the barracks of one of the subunits of a motorized rifle unit.

In a nearby village the President also visited the Museum of Kenen Azerbayev, a folk poet and singer known far beyond Kazakhstan. He made an entry in the Book of Honored Guests. Amateur performers gave a concert with a program including songs by Azerbayev.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Support for Major Aviation Industry Urged*MM2208124794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Aug 94 p 1*

[Article by Aleksandr Manushkin: "Russia's Aircraft Fleet Is Unique. Will It Retain Its Status as a Great Aviation Power?"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Here are some typical symptoms of the time. Last year there were 11 crashes involving Russian airlines, in which 221 people were killed. Over the past few months the major crashes near Irkutsk and in Kemerovo Oblast and the recent crash near Chita alone have cost 247 lives. Those are sad figures. And we should probably not dwell on them on the day before Air Fleet Day. But they cannot be ignored. Whether we like it or not, these figures are part of the history of Russian aviation as well.

Just why has what was once a leading world aviation power acquired a reputation as a country where it is dangerous to fly?

Of course, each specific case had its own causes. But, clearly, there is also a general point that unites them. This is the current state of our society and its economy.

Aeroflot—which used to have a monopoly on air transport—has now given rise to numerous small airlines which are unable to buy new airliners. They do not have the funds, and their old aircraft are getting obsolete and coming to the end of their working lives....

The Air Force fleet is becoming obsolete too. Owing to inadequate funding the Air Force has bought virtually no new aircraft over the past three years or so. And it is not just a question of new aircraft. There are not enough spares for the old aircraft. Things are reaching the point where certain aircraft have to be cannibalized to provide parts and components to keep other aircraft in combat-ready condition.

The country's first-class air fleet was created over the course of entire generations. It could be destroyed in just a few years. And these losses could be irreparable. Navigators have the concept of the "point of no return." This is the point on the map after which it is impossible for an aircraft to return to its original airfield (on its remaining fuel). Is not something similar happening to all the country's aviation? Many specialists have told me that Russia's air fleet has already suffered irreparable losses. Is this so?

In quantitative terms it probably is. But in qualitative terms.... I have visited many experimental design bureaus developing 21st-century aircraft technology. They are still working. They still hope that the government will address their needs.

And how strenuously military aviators are striving to maintain their combat readiness! I happened to hear one Air Force leader say: "I'm ashamed that military pilots earn so little." But if you bear in mind that even this salary is received late, and that there is no aviation fuel, no batteries, and no spares, you are simply amazed that they are still able to fly at all.

In the first seven months of this year alone Military Transport Aviation has shipped 11,444 tonnes of cargo for the national economy (on government orders). During the same period, because of the troop withdrawal from abroad both near and far, Military Transport Aviation has shipped 28,373 men and 14,816 tonnes of cargo (691 flights). Military airmen have flown 229 flights for peacekeeping forces in 1994.

Nor is the Air Force forgetting about combat training.

In short, despite everything, aviation (both military and civil) is still alive and is continuing to carry out the tasks entrusted to it. But it needs state support. Ultimately we need to realize that the aircraft fleet created in Russia is unique. You can count on the fingers of one hand the countries where the most varied aircraft can be developed from design work through to cutting metal. They include Russia. Only our country and the United States have a large fleet of military transports capable of flying large numbers of men and materiel to any part of the globe in a matter of hours. Only Russia and the United States have the national asset of long-range aviation which makes it possible to perform global missions.

Russia has all the potential required to remain one of the world's leading aviation powers. We have superb scientific research and design collectives. We have a large production base. Finally, we have people who are willing and able to operate our aircraft skillfully. If only our statesmen could find the funds and the wisdom to preserve this and support all those whose hearts and minds have forged the fatherland's aviation might and glory.

SECURITY SERVICES

On Responsibility for Guarding Central Asian Borders*94UM05494 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Aug 94 p 2*

[Article by Vitaliy Strugovets: "The Southern Borders of the CIS: Who Is Protecting Them, and How?"]

[Text] Perhaps not a single region has been attracting as much attention in the last 15 years as Central Asia. The war in Afghanistan, interethnic strife in Kyrgyzstan, civil war in Tajikistan.

The borders of these republics have long become hot spots not only in the climatic sense. What is going on today on the southern borders of the CIS, made up of the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?

Border Troops 'With a Pleasant Appearance'

The 156-kilometer Uzbek-Afghan border is the shortest of all external borders of the CIS states. This probably explains why Uzbekistan is the sole Central Asian state of the Commonwealth with which Russia does not have an agreement on joint protection of external borders.

The border troops of Uzbekistan, which have the job of ensuring the security of the state's borders, were created on 24 March 1992 by an edict of the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The main administration of the border

troops—the highest structural subdivision of the troops—is under the national security service. The commander of the Republic's border troops—Major General Vladimir Rakhmatulayev—came to this post from the Republic's former KGB, where he managed the activities of special subunits.

The border troops of Uzbekistan consist of the Termez border detachment, two separate checkpoints—"Termez" and "Tashkent"—and a border brigade. The last is the most mobile and battleworthy unit of Uzbek border troops. Special attention is devoted to furnishing it with combat equipment, armament and personnel. The brigade's main job is to capitalize on the high mobility of its subunits to make it possible to quickly resolve various complications on the border and to fight the drug trade.

Considering that all of Uzbekistan's external border is a river border, the leadership of the border troops devotes a great deal of attention to restoring the battleworthiness of the former Termez coast guard brigade, which maintained the security of the borders of the USSR on the Amu-Darya and Pyandzh rivers in Soviet times. The brigade's vessels were hardly operated after the disintegration of the Union, and today, in the words of one of the leaders of Uzbek border troops, they are in "a state of limited battleworthiness." But the command of the national border troops feels certain that coast guard vessels will soon go on duty, because the unit is already practically fully manned with officers, specialists and compulsory-service seamen.

A little about personnel. This is one of the most painful issues for Uzbekistan's border troops. Only 32 Uzbek officers were serving in the USSR's border troops at the end of 1991. It was impossible to create national border troops with their assistance even with regard for the large group of specialists that had been transferred to the border troops from the Republic's KGB. And today, three years later, up to 70 percent of the officers in the administration of the commander of the border troops and up to half of the officers in the subunits are not of the indigenous nationality. It was to change this ratio that junior officer courses were organized, in which privates, NCOs and warrant officers underwent accelerated training. And a special border cadet group was created at the Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command School.

Much attention is also being devoted to manning the troops with compulsory-service servicemen. In addition to higher medical requirements, a height of not less than 172 centimeters and a pleasant appearance are mandatory conditions of induction into the border troops.

Given all of the complexity of the problems of maintaining the security of the state's borders, Uzbek "green berets" are concerned with three main issues: fighting smuggling and drugs, creating a strong barrier in the so-called Vakhsh sector—the junction of the Uzbek, Tajik and Afghan borders, and covering the channels of illegal transfer of emigrants from Asia to Europe. The number of the latter increased an especially large amount this year. While I was in Uzbekistan nine Malaysian citizens attempting to pass over Uzbekistan by air to Western Europe on forged documents were detained at the "Tashkent" checkpoint.

"We Trust You"

Today Kyrgyzia is the sole CIS state not possessing its own border troops. Russian border troops are protecting the 1,089 kilometers of its external borders by agreement. The RF Group of Border Troops in Kyrgyzstan consists of three border detachments—Osh, Naryn and Karakol [Przhevalsk], and several checkpoints. The group is under the command of Major General Pavel Vasko.

The absence of armed conflicts is a trait that distinguishes the Kyrgyz-Chinese border from all other southern borders of the CIS. Still, it can't be called peaceful. The main problem is that demarcation, which has been going on for more than 20 years already, has still not been finished. Hence the presence of disputed sections, especially in hard-to-reach places. This, by the way, is typical of the entire external border of the CIS with China. Because in contrast to the usual world practice, it is determined not by a treaty but on the basis of segments regarding which agreement had been reached previously. Still, in some cases the amount of disputed territory does not exceed several hundred square meters. It should be noted that delegations from Commonwealth states bordering with China (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzia) stand together as a rule in a united front in negotiations on the disputes.

The Osh and Naryn sectors are the most complex portions of the border. Attempts to move drugs and illegal border crossings have been stopped several times here. Mass migration of the population from China into Kyrgyzstan and back has recently become a real problem. Six cases of border violations by Chinese citizens were documented in June. "Shuttle" merchants have developed extensive but not always legal activity. Capitalizing on the difficult mountain terrain, they often transfer loads of cargo from one country to the other without proper control. There were four attempts to transport unlicensed materials—nonferrous and rare-earth metals and animal skins—in the first month of summer just at the "Turugart" checkpoint alone.

But let's return to the border troops. At the beginning of this year Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev visited the Naryn border detachment and gave a rather high assessment to its border protection activities. Kyrgyz Prime Minister A. Dzhumagulov, who visited the "Irkenshtam" checkpoint in June, offered the same kind of praise. Specialists of the Main Command of the RF Border Troops are more restrained in their assessments. And here's why. Sixty percent of the inductees serving in the Russian Group of Border Troops in Kyrgyzstan are citizens of the Republic, who are serving in our troops under a special status. But here's the problem—too many of them "are on the lamb." Their unpreparedness for the difficulties of service, especially in border troops, is the reason. The Republic's Supreme Soviet was even compelled to adopt a law giving amnesty to the "deserters." The number up for punishment was all too great.

The Front Line

The Tajik-Afghan border is more reminiscent of a front line along practically all of its 2,000 kilometers. In just the first six months of this year 129 attempts to penetrate the border by armed violators were averted, border troops went into

combat 64 times, and our subunits and patrols received fire from opposition forces 149 times.

The Groups of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan is fulfilling the main mission of providing for the security of this southern border of the CIS. Today they consist of five border detachments, an air regiment, and the group commander's reserve. Subunits of the reserve of the commander of the RF Border Troops are also permanently stationed here for reinforcement purposes. The group is under the command of Lieutenant General Anatoliy Chechulin.

While tension is common to the entire border, it was explained to me at the group's headquarters that each portion of the border has its unique feature. Armed conflicts and exchanges of fire are most typical of the zone of responsibility of the Moskovskiy border detachment. The Pyandzh sector is distinguished by presence of an underground local opposition. Because of the large amount of hard-to-reach places, the Khorog sector is the principal route of transfer of opposition fighters, weapons and drugs. And in the neighboring section, in the Murgab sector, the load of drugs that was detained in mid-July was the largest for this region in the last five years—over 40 kilograms, worth around 6 billion rubles. During about the same time the border troops also had to deal with a new phenomenon—penetration of the border in the direction of Afghanistan by citizens of third states. Particularly Estonia and Belarus.

In order to increase the Republic's contribution to ensuring the security of the Tajik-Afghan border, in June of this year the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet adopted a decision reorganizing the security ministry's administration for protection of the state border into the border troops of the Republic of Tajikistan. Organizationally the border troops of Tajikistan consist of an administration, three border brigades, the "Khadzhent" separate checkpoint, and support units. Naturally all of this is still in the formative stage. Consequently as was noted by their commander, Major General Aleksandr Rogov (formerly the commander of the Pyandzh border detachment) in an interview with this KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, the Tajik border troops are not physically protecting the border. They are providing security at rear lines in the Moskovskiy and Pyandzh sectors. In mountain regions, for example in the Shuroabad sector, they are setting up their posts and serving jointly with Russian border troops.

Personnel is the main problem of the Tajik border troops. Over 80 percent of Tajik officers and warrant officers are serving today in the Russian border troops. Low pay is the main reason why they do not consider serving in the national border troops. As an example the commander of the Tajik border troops receives only 64,000 rubles. This is good in the Republic, where the average wage is 15,000-20,000. But this is what privates receive in the RF Group of Border Troops in Tajikistan. Therefore in order to strengthen its national border troops the government has been forced to call up older reserve officers and organize training for junior officers. Graduates of civilian institutions of higher education are also being selected for short-term officer training for the border troops. In addition Tajik cadets are currently undergoing training in institutes of the RF Border Troops and in the St. Petersburg Artillery School on the basis of an agreement.

Despite the activity of the leadership of Tajikistan in forming national border troops, Makhmadsaid Ubaydulayev, the deputy chairman of the Republic's Council of Ministers, said in answer to my question that creation of Tajik border troops will not mean that Russian border troops will be departing soon from this region. He emphasized that formation of national border troops will take more than just a few years.

Border Guard Naval Brigade To Become Division

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[Text] A brigade of Russian border guard vessels stationed on the South Kurile Islands will be transformed into a division, the Navy Headquarters told Interfax.

At present, the brigade is mainly based on Shikotan Island and consists of ten vessels.

"This step is motivated by the need to put an end to the illegal fishing by the Japanese in the Russian territorial waters," a top-ranking official of the Russian Navy Headquarters said in an interview with Interfax.

As has already been reported, this week Moscow and Tokyo exchanged oral protests following events near the South Kurile Islands. Japan's protest was over the use of firearms by Russian border guards against Japanese fishermen. Russia declined the protest saying that the violation of Russian borders is inadmissible as is illegal fishing in its waters.

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